Essays on innovation and contest theory by Letina, Igor
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2017
Essays on innovation and contest theory
Letina, Igor
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-136322
Published Version
Originally published at:
Letina, Igor. Essays on innovation and contest theory. 2017, University of Zurich, Faculty of Economics.
Essays on Innovation and Contest Theory
Dissertation
submitted to the
Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics
of the University of Zurich
to obtain the degree of
Doktor der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Dr. oec.
(corresponds to Doctor of Philosophy, PhD)
presented by
Igor Letina
from Bosnia and Herzegovina
approved in February 2017 at the request of
Prof. Dr. Armin Schmutzler
Prof. Dr. Nick Netzer
Prof. Dr. Georg Nöldeke

The Faculty of Business, Economics and Informatics of the University of Zurich hereby autho-
rizes the printing of this dissertation, without indicating an opinion of the views expressed in
the work.
Zurich, 15.02.2017
Chairman of the Doctoral Board: Prof. Dr. Steven Ongena
iv
Acknowledgements
When it comes to achievements, research suggests that individuals tend to underestimate
the role of luck and to overestimate the contribution of their own effort and abilities. Even with
that bias, I am amazed by the amount of good fortune that I have had while writing this thesis.
I was fortunate to have advisors who were generous with their time and advice and gentle
but precise with their criticism. Without the kind guidance of Nick Netzer, Georg Nöldeke and
in particular Armin Schmutzler, the quality of this dissertation, and the person submitting it,
would be significantly lower.
Writing a thesis is a process filled with uncertainty and self-doubt. For me, it would have
been an impossible task without the amazing colleagues from the University of Zurich. In
particular I would like to thank Jean-Michel Benkert, Lea Cassar, Florian Engl, Tobias Gesche,
Andreas Hefti, Steve Heinke, Stefan Jönsson, Arnd Heinrich Klein, Johannes Kunz, Shuo Liu,
Andràs Péchy, Philippe Ruh and Sabrina Studer.
For their support and trust in me, I am grateful to my parents Desanka and Aleksandar
Letina, and to my brother Srđan Letina.
Last but not least, I am thankful to my co-authors. Jean-Michel Benkert, Shuo Liu, Nick
Netzer and Armin Schmutzler, it was a joy working with you.
Igor Letina, Zurich, November 2016
v
vi
Contents
I Dissertation Overview 1
II Research Papers 7
1 The Road not Taken: Competition and the R&D Portfolio 9
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3 A model of stochastic multiproject innovation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.5 Comparative statics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.6 Optimal portfolio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.7 Extensions and robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2 Inducing Variety: A Theory of Innovation Contests 33
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3 The Optimal Contest for the Buyer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.1 Auxiliary Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.3.2 Characterizing the Optimum . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.4 Auctions and Fixed Prize Tournaments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.5 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5.1 Number of Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.5.2 Other Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.2.1 Generalized distributions and quality functions. . . . . . . . . . 47
2.5.2.2 Heterogeneous Suppliers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.5.2.3 Fixed-Prize Tournaments with Multiple Prizes . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.5.2.4 Multiple Designs by the Same Supplier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.6 Relation to the Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
2.7 Conclusions and Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3 Designing Dynamic Research Contests 55
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.2 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
vii
viii
3.4 Optimal Contest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
4 Delegating Performance Evaluation 71
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.1 Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.2.2 Implementation with Credible Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
4.3 Optimal Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.1 The Optimality of Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.3.2 Optimal Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.3.3 Unique Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.3.4 Implementation in Tullock Contests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.4 Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.1 Imperfect Effort Observation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.4.2 Cheap Talk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.4.3 Non-Separability and Asymmetry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.5 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
III Appendices 95
A Appendix: Chapter 1 97
A.1 Main Proofs and the Running Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.1.6 Proof of Corollary 1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
A.1.8 Proof of Corollary 1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.1.9 Proof of Proposition 1.7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
A.1.10 Example: Process innovation in a Cournot market . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
A.2 Further Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.2.1 Efficiency defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
A.2.2 Mixed strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.2.3 Limited budget and costly financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition A.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition A.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition A.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition A.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
ix
B Appendix: Chapter 2 119
B.1 Basics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.1.1 Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.1.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.2 Proofs of Auxiliary Results (Section 2.3.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
B.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
B.2.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.3 Proofs of Main Optimality Results (Section 2.3.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B.3.3 Proof of Corollary 2.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.4 Proofs on Auctions and Tournaments (Section 2.4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
B.4.2 Proof of Corollary 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
B.5 Extensions: n > 3 (Section 2.5.1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
B.5.2 Sufficient Conditions for FPT equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
B.5.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
B.5.4 Proof of Corollary 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B.6 Other Extensions (Section 2.5.2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B.6.1 Proof of Corollary 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
B.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
B.6.3 Proof of Lemma 2.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
C Appendix: Chapter 3 137
C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
C.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
D Appendix: Chapter 4 155
D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
D.1.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
D.1.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
D.1.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
D.1.4 Proof of Lemma 4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
D.1.5 Proof of Lemma 4.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
D.1.6 Proof of Lemma 4.6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
D.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
x Contents
D.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
D.5 Proof of Theorem 4.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
D.6 Proof of Proposition 4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
D.7 Proof of Proposition 4.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
IV Bibliography 177
V Curriculum Vitae 189
Part I
Dissertation Overview
1

Dissertation Overview
This dissertation consists of four separate chapters which are centered around two themes
— innovation and contests. At first blush it may seem that the two themes are not related.
However, a closer examination reveals that contests, as mechanisms, are often used to induce
individuals and firms to innovate. The idea that we can design institutions in a way that induces
some desirable behavior underlies all four chapters of this dissertation.
Chapters 1-3 examine questions related to how institutions should be designed in order to
induce discovery of innovations (see Figure 1). It is difficult to overstate the importance of
innovations on the evolution of the human standard of living, as essentially every aspect of
human life has been made better by some innovation. But innovations are rarely products of
mere serendipity. Rather, they are a response to the environment of the innovator, who seeks
a way to make his labor easier or profits larger by innovating. As innovations become more
complex and difficult, having the proper institutional environment that encourages innovative
activities becomes more and more important.
The influence of institutions on innovative activity has been extensively studied by economists.
However, for the most part the focus of the literature has been on inducing innovators to work
harder, or inducing firms to invest more resources in innovation. This dissertation begins with
an observation that discoveries are not merely the outcome of trying harder — often they are
the result of attempting the right, and sometimes surprising, approach to solving the problem
at hand. One implication of this is that we need to design our institutions not only with the
goal of increasing the amount of resources invested in innovations, but also to make sure that
the resources are invested in the right combination of approaches.
Chapter 1 considers the question of the R&D portfolio from the perspective of firms compet-
ing on a product market and seeking to innovate as a way of increasing their profits. It develops
a model in which firms can invest in multiple research approaches and examines the duplication
and variety of research in equilibrium. I show that an equilibrium always exists and characterize
both the (unique) equilibrium R&D portfolio and the socially optimal portfolio. These results
are then used for comparative statics and to derive policy implications.
The results in this chapter offer insights relevant to competition and innovation policy. This
chapter shows that a merger will likely decrease the variety of research approaches, which is a
question that has been asked in several merger cases (for example, in the blocked merger between
Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman). Hence, a competition authority reviewing a merger
proposal in an industry in which innovation is particularly important should take this negative
effect into account. Comparing the market equilibrium with the socially optimal outcome, I
show that firms competing on the product market will tend to overinvest in duplication of
research approaches and underinvest in the variety of research approaches. This implies that
innovation policy should be aimed at increasing the variety of research approaches that the firms
3
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Chapter 1: The Road not Taken: Competition and
the R&D Portfolio
Chapter 2: Inducing Variety: A Theory of Innovation
Contests (with Armin Schmutzler)
Chapter 3: Designing Dynamic Research Contests
(with Jean-Michel Benkert)
Chapter 4: Delegating Performance Evaluation
(with Shuo Liu and Nick Netzer)
Economics of Innovation
Design of Contests
Figure 1: Overview of the main themes.
pursue. The chapter concludes by relaxing several important assumptions and shows that the
main results are in general robust.
Chapter 2 continues with the examination of how institutions affect the choice of research
approaches. We assume that there is a sponsor who is interested in obtaining an innovation. To
stimulate research, the sponsor commits to an innovation contest. Examples of such innovation
contests abound — from the 1714 Longitude Prize for accurate determination of the latitude of
a ship at sea to the 2015 EU Horizon prize for a test to determine whether antibiotics should
be prescribed to a patient with flu. In this chapter, Armin Schmutzler and I study the optimal
contest design when the research approach of the participants matters. We are in particular
interested in how contest design can be used to influence the variety of research approaches
taken by the contest participants. The main result we obtain is that a bonus tournament
— a tournament offering two prizes, a high ("bonus") prize when one participant significantly
outperforms others, and a low prize when the best and the second-best solutions are of similar
quality — is optimal. The intuition behind this result is simple. Since the high prize is only paid
out in the case of significant difference in performance, the participants will seek to pursue those
research approaches which are likely to succeed when the ones pursued by their competitors
fail. This leads to diversification of research outcomes. By changing the difference between the
low and the high prize, the contest designer can affect the level of diversification of research
outcomes. In particular, the socially optimal level of diversification can be implemented, but it
will not always be in the best interest of the contest sponsor to do so. We also examine how
some commonly studied and used contests perform in our setting. A fixed prize tournament,
where a fixed prize is paid to the winner of the tournament is not good for inducing diversity. In
particular, when there are only two contestants there will be no diversity (and full duplication) in
equilibrium. An auction, which is optimal in the setting of Che and Gale (2003), induces socially
optimal diversity but at the cost of high payments to contestants. Since the payments are lower,
a bonus tournament outperforms an auction. We show that our analysis can be generalized
beyond the baseline model and discuss implications that go beyond innovation contests.
5In Chapter 3, Jean-Michel Benkert and I continue the study of optimal design of innovation
contests. The focus in this chapter is on the dynamic incentives to invest in costly effort. Once
dynamics are taken into account a novel problem arises. Namely, when should the contest end?
Taylor (1995) — which is the seminal paper on dynamic innovation contests — assumes that the
contest ends after an exogenously fixed number of periods. However, the ending time could also
be a design parameter. The longer the contest lasts, the more likely that a valuable innovation
will be discovered. However, a long contest is also likely to lead to inefficient duplication of
research costs. Of course, a contest designer could set the contest length that is optimal in
expectation. In this chapter, we show that she can do better. Namely, we show that it is
possible to implement a quality-contingent stopping rule, where the contest ends only once an
innovation of sufficient quality has been discovered. We further show that the implementation
result is robust, and provide sufficient conditions under which the optimal outcome is achieved.
The mechanism that achieves this quality-contingent stopping rule is a dynamic prize profile.
That is, the principal commits to pay out a prize to the winner which depends only on the
period in which the prize is awarded. If the overall level of prizes is high enough, then the
contestants will have an incentive to invest in innovation and to reveal the winning innovation
as soon as they have it. The change in the prizes paid out from one period to the next provides
the incentives to the principal to stop the contest as soon as the innovation of sufficient quality
is discovered.
While Chapters 2 and 3 have examined the way contests should be designed, they do not
tackle the question of whether some other feasible mechanism could do better than any contest.
Surprisingly, there are very few results of this kind in the literature. Among other results,
Chapter 4 provides a setting in which contests are actually optimal in the class of all feasible
mechanisms. In this chapter, joint with Shuo Liu and Nick Netzer, we consider a problem of
a principal who wants to incentivize agents to work. However, the principal does not observe
the effort exerted by the agents but there is a reviewer who does. The principal then designs a
renumeration scheme and delegates its implementation to the reviewer. Furthermore, we assume
that the reviewer takes the payoff of agents into account when implementing the renumeration
scheme and that the intensity of this bias is private information of the reviewer. While none of our
results depend on the direction of reviewer’s bias (that is, the reviewer can receive both positive
and negative utility from agents’ payoffs), our favored interpretation is that the reviewer’s bias
is positive. This is referred to as the leniency bias, since it makes the reviewer reluctant to
punish the agents.
In this setting, a contest is always in the class of optimal mechanisms. The reason for this
is as follows. The leniency bias makes the reviewer reluctant to punish shirking agents, which is
necessary to sustain the incentives of the agents to work. The contest acts as the commitment to
punishment — one of the agents has to receive the lowest prize, which acts as a punishment for
shirkers. We further characterize the optimal contest and show that it features n−1 equal prizes
and one zero prize. The zero prize is used as the commitment to punishment. Next we show
that the optimum can be implemented by familiar allocation rules: (modified) all-pay auctions,
Tullock contests, and rank-order tournaments with both additive and multiplicative noise can all
be used to implement the optimum. In particular, an all-pay auction with censoring implements
6 Dissertation Overview
the optimum as the unique equilibrium. Our results offer one explanation for the widespread
use of contests and in addition identify a set of conditions under which contests could perform
better than institutions currently in use.
The common thread permeating this dissertation is the question of institutional design,
with a particular focus on rules and institutions aimed at providing incentives for firms and
individuals to engage in innovative activity. Chapter 1 focuses on competition policy as one
such institutions. Chapters 2 and 3 examine the design of innovation contests. Chapter 4
examines the delegation of performance evaluation more broadly. While the models examined
in this dissertation offer clear-cut answers, they should not be interpreted literally. As any
theoretical exercise, this dissertation captures some factors while ignoring others. This should
be kept in mind when interpreting these results and in particular in any attempt to apply them.
Part II
Research Papers
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1 The Road not Taken: Competition and the R&D
Portfolio1
1.1 Introduction
In 1998, the U.S. Department of Justice blocked the proposed merger of Lockheed Martin
and Northrop Grumman, the largest blocked merger in the U.S. history at the time. The
merger would have reduced the number of firms supplying aircraft and electronic systems to
the Department of Defense from three (including Boeing) to only two. According to Robinson
(1999) and Rubinfeld and Hoven (2001), one of the main reasons why the Department of Justice,
supported by the Department of Defense, opposed the merger was the concern that the merger
would have had negative effects on innovation. However, the issue was not so much with the
amount of funds invested in innovation, the bulk of which comes from the Department of Defense
anyway (Rubinfeld and Hoven, 2001). Rather, the principal concern was that reducing the
number of firms in the industry would reduce the diversity of approaches to innovation.
This article develops a model where the effects of such a merger on the variety of approaches
to innovation and the amount of duplicative research can be studied explicitly. From society’s
point of view, higher variety of research projects being developed is desirable because it increases
the probability that the innovation will be discovered. On the other hand, more duplication of
research projects is also desirable because it implies stronger product market competition ex
post and lower deadweight loss. The market R&D portfolio is a function which captures how
many firms are investing in each of the possible projects, and the variety of approaches is the
fraction of projects which are developed by at least one firm. Of course, both more variety and
more duplication are costly. The main object of analysis will be the market R&D portfolio. The
model will allow us to study how a change in the market structure will change the equilibrium
R&D portfolio.
The main model assumes that there are N symmetric firms competing in a market. In the
first stage, the firms can invest in innovation. There is a set of heterogeneous research projects
and firms simultaneously choose the subset they wish to develop. The innovation is assumed to
be drastic2 and the discovery procedure is stochastic. All approaches are ex ante equally likely
to be successful, but ex post only one approach will be successful. The approaches differ only in
the cost needed to pursue them. There are no spillovers or patents. Each firm which invested
in the successful approach receives the innovation whereas each firm that did not invest in the
1A version of this paper is published as Letina, I. (2016), “The Road not Taken: Competition and the R&D
Portfolio,” RAND Journal of Economics, 47, 433–460.
2Innovation is drastic if whenever at least one firm innovates, firms without the innovation cannot compete.
This assumption was introduced by Arrow (1962); see also Gilbert (2006). This assumption is not needed for the
characterization of the equilibrium and is relaxed in Section 1.7.
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successful project receives nothing from its research. In the second stage, the firms compete on
the product market either with or without the innovation.
As all approaches are ex ante equally likely to be successful, the firms have an incentive to
develop only the cheapest projects. However, the number of firms developing any given project
also determines the number of firms which will compete on the product market with the new
technology. Thus, when choosing which projects to develop the firms face a trade off — cheaper
approaches cost less to develop but will in equilibrium attract more competitors. I show that an
equilibrium of the investment game always exists and that the equilibrium market R&D portfolio
is uniquely determined. I provide a simple characterization of the equilibrium R&D portfolio
and show that it follows a step function — with more expensive approaches being developed by
fewer firms.
The characterization of the R&D portfolio is then used to derive comparative statics. I
show that a decrease in the number of firms weakly decreases the variety of approaches to
innovation and also weakly decreases the amount of duplication. Hence, a merger leads to a
weakly decreasing variety of approaches to innovation. A policy implication drawn from this
analysis is that the competition authorities should take into account the negative effects of a
merger on the variety of approaches to innovation, in part giving theoretical foundation to the
concern expressed in the Lockheed-Northrop case. However, if a merger leads to efficiency gains,
this result need not hold.
Next, I consider the effects of a change in the intensity of competition between firms. I
define an increase in the intensity of competition as any exogenous change which decreases firm
profits.3 An increase in the intensity of competition is shown to increase the variety of approaches
to innovation and to decrease the amount of duplication in equilibrium. Thus, an increase in
the intensity of product market competition leads to more specialized R&D portfolios. This
illustrates why an increase in the intensity of competition can both increase and decrease the
amount of resources invested in R&D — if the reduction in duplication of research efforts is
greater than the increase in variety of research efforts, the total amount invested in R&D will
decrease. If the opposite is true, the total amount invested in R&D will increase.
I provide a characterization of the socially optimal R&D portfolio and compare it with the
market R&D portfolio. I derive the condition under which the market investment in the variety
of research approaches is optimal, too low or too high. Similarly, I derive the condition under
which the market duplication of research approaches is optimal, too low or too high. I show that
in a large class of homogeneous goods models, the market will always underinvest in the variety
of approaches to process innovation. This result implies that there is a role for government
subsidies of R&D. Furthermore, it implies that the subsidies should be targeted at research
projects with high development costs and high potential payoffs.
The main body of the article assumes that the innovation is drastic, firms are symmetric,
have unlimited budgets and use only pure strategies. I consider the effects of relaxing these
assumptions in turn and show that the equilibrium structure is in general robust. In particular,
the assumption that the innovation is drastic is not necessary. In Section 1.7, I provide a
characterization of the equilibrium portfolio without assuming drastic innovation and show that
3Similar approach is taken in Schmidt (1997) and Schmutzler (2013).
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it is qualitatively similar to the equilibrium portfolio when the innovation is assumed to be
drastic. However, comparative statics become significantly more complex. Section 1.7 shows that
similar comparative static results can be obtained without the drastic innovation assumption if
instead additional assumptions are imposed on the reduced form payoffs.
The outline of the article is as follows. In Section 1.2, a brief overview of the related literature
is provided. Section 1.3 describes the model. The equilibrium is characterized in Section 1.4.
Comparative statics are analyzed in Section 1.5. The socially optimal portfolio and its relation to
the market portfolio are analyzed in Section 1.6. In Section 1.7, I relax a number of assumptions
made in the main body of the article. Section 1.8 concludes. All proofs and additional extensions
are in the appendix.
1.2 Related literature
This article contributes to the literature on the relationship between market structure and the
incentives of the firms to invest in innovation. A large part of this literature studies the amount of
resources that firms invest in R&D. Depending on the specifics of the model used, the literature
finds that the competition in the marketplace can increase, decrease or have non-monotone effects
on the amount invested in R&D. For surveys of this vast literature see Gilbert (2006), Sena (2004)
and van Cayseele (1998). Vives (2008) and Schmutzler (2013) provide comprehensive studies for
a range of market competition models and demand structures. Important contributions to this
literature have been made from the endogenous growth literature, particularly from the models
of step-by-step innovations (see for example Aghion et al. (2001) and Aghion et al. (2005)). This
article contributes to this literature by providing a model which allows us to consider how the
variety and duplication of approaches to research change as the market structure changes, and
how it relates to the socially optimal amount of variety and duplication of research.
This article is more closely related to the part of the literature on competition and innovation
that examines how competing firms choose some aspect of the research strategy. Bhattacharya
and Mookherjee (1986) and Klette and de Meza (1986) consider a model where undertaking
research is like drawing a random variable. The maximum realization of the random variables
determines the winner of the race (winner takes all) but also both private and social payoff.
Firms choose a parameter of the density function, which determines the variance and in some
scenarios the correlation of the research output. This parameter is interpreted as a research
strategy of the firm. Dasgupta and Maskin (1987) consider a similar model. Results obtained
by these models depend on the assumptions made about the distribution of research outcomes,
but in a large class of cases, firms undertake excessive risk (because firms care who wins the
race, whereas society only cares about the best research output; however see also Cabral (1994)
and Kwon (2010) who find that the market is biased against risky research). At the same time,
if reducing correlation is costly, firms will choose research strategies that are too correlated,
as firms will not internalize the benefit low correlation confers to its opponent when its own
research output is low. In this setting, the firms can choose only one research project (i.e.,
each firm chooses one parameter of the density function), hence these models cannot examine
the variety of research projects. At the same time, in these articles the choice of correlation of
the outcomes is interpreted as a measure of duplication. In the present article, duplication of
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research is literal — the firms can choose to pursue the same project.
Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) study an interesting model where two players search for
a treasure which is hidden in one box among a set of boxes. Each player has an endogenously
chosen capacity determining the number of boxes he can examine in each period. The player
that first discovers the treasure, keeps it. The research strategy is the choice of the boxes which
will be examined in each period. In both this article and in Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997),
the players can choose both the intensity and the location of search. However, the equilibrium
predictions are different. The main result of Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) is that the search
will be completely random, whereas in this article pure strategy equilibria will always exist. The
reason for this difference is that in Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997) the search continues until
the treasure is found and in this article the search lasts only one period. When there are multiple
search periods, there is an incentive for players to preempt their opponent by searching exactly
those boxes that the opponents intends to search in the next period. This incentive destroys
any equilibrium in which the search is not completely random. Clearly, this incentive does not
exist when search lasts only one period, in which case the choice of boxes is driven by their
equilibrium net expected value. In this sense, these articles are complementary. In addition,
this article is concerned with how the research incentives are affected by the market structure,
which is not studied in Fershtman and Rubinstein (1997).
Chatterjee and Evans (2004) present a dynamic model where two firms are searching for
an innovation in a model of a hidden treasure. There are two possible research projects and
only one can yield the innovation, with the winner take all feature. However, unlike Fershtman
and Rubinstein (1997) and this article, developing the “right" project yields the innovation only
with some exogenously given probability. They find that the amount of correlation between
research of the two firms can be too high or too low depending on the nature of asymmetry
between the two research paths. Akcigit and Liu (2016) also consider a setup with two firms
and two possible avenues for research, one is more profitable (in expectation) but may result in
a dead-end and another which always yields a less profitable innovation if it is researched long
enough. As opposed to Chatterjee and Evans (2004) they assume that firms cannot observe
which research path their competitor is pursuing and they find that firms duplicate dead-end
research and at the same time leave the risky research path too early. In contrast to the present
article, this strand of literature assumes that firms can research only one project at a time, so
the question of the choice of variety of research projects and the amount of duplicative research
does not arise. This is, however, the main focus of the present article.
Most closely related to the present article is the literature on multiproject innovation, which
has been studied by Sah and Stiglitz (1987) and in the related work by Reynolds and Isaac
(1992) and Farrell et al. (2003). Sah and Stiglitz (1987) assume that all projects are identical.
The probability of success of any individual project depends only on the effort invested in this
project and is independent of anything that might be happening with other projects. Using
this setting and the Bertrand model of the product market, Sah and Stiglitz (1987) show that
the number of projects is invariant to the number of firms in the market, a result they refer to
as the “strong invariance result." Reynolds and Isaac (1992) and Farrell et al. (2003) explore
this setting further and show that the invariance result is sensitive to type of product market
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competition. In particular, they show that the invariance result does not hold under Cournot
competition.
The main difference between this article and the literature in tradition of Sah and Stiglitz
(1987) is that here projects are assumed to be heterogeneous and that more than one firm can
invest in the same project. Hence, firms need to decide which projects to develop and have to do
so in a strategic manner, keeping in mind which projects their competitors are developing. In
this article, R&D portfolio is the main object of interest, whereas in the Sah and Stiglitz (1987)
tradition it does not appear at all. There, projects are identical and it is immaterial which
projects firms or their opponents develop. Thus, the model of Sah and Stiglitz (1987) does not
capture the effects of variety of projects or the duplication of projects which is the main focus
of analysis here.
1.3 A model of stochastic multiproject innovation
There are N symmetric firms4 that compete in the pre-innovation market and that can invest
in innovation. There is a continuum of research projects Ω, but only one project jˆ ∈ Ω leads
to the innovation.5 We can normalize the set of possible projects to the unit interval, that is
Ω = [0, 1). I assume that the successful project is drawn from the uniform distribution over the
set [0, 1). Furthermore, each project has a fixed cost of development. Investing less than this
cost means that firm will fail to develop the project and investing more will not improve the
probability of the project being successful. In essence, the innovation mechanism is a lottery —
developing different projects is akin to buying lottery tickets, the more lottery tickets you have
the higher the probability you will win, but offering to pay more for a ticket will not increase its
chances of winning. This fixed cost, fixed probability mechanism is similar to the one developed
in Quirmbach (1993), the difference being that here firms can invest in multiple projects.
The projects are assumed to differ in terms of the investment cost needed to develop them.
Denote the cost of developing project j ∈ [0, 1) as C(j). We can view C as a function such that
C : [0, 1) → R+. I assume that C is continuous, differentiable and strictly increasing. The fact
that the function C is increasing is simply a matter of ordering the projects j in the right way,
strictness is assumed so that marginal reasoning will yield unique results. Continuity is assumed
to make the problem more tractable. Furthermore, assume limj→1C(j) =∞. As rewards from
innovation are finite, this assumption ensures that firms will not want to invest in all possible
projects. No exogenous restrictions are placed on the research budgets of firms, except in the
Appendix A.2.3, which studies the consequences of limited research budgets and costly financing
of research.
There are two possible levels of technology — old and new. The new technology is available
only to the firms which invested in the successful innovation project, whereas the old technology
is available to all firms. Let n ≤ N be the number of firms which developed the new technology.
Denote with R(n,N) the payoff of a firm with the new technology, where n is the number of
firms with the new technology and N is the total number of firms. Analogously, denote with
4Asymmetric firms are studied in Section 1.7.
5The stochastic mechanism used to model innovation is adapted from Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997).
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r(n,N) the profits of a firm with the old technology. The difference between process and product
innovations is not explicitly modeled. As long as the product market payoffs can be expressed in
terms of the reward functions, the present model can be used to study both types of innovation.
Next, I list assumptions that will be used in the article. However, note that only Assumption
1.1 is used throughout.
Assumption 1.1 (Non-increasing reward to subsequent innovators).
For all N and n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} it holds:
R(n,N)− r(n− 1, N) ≥ R(n+ 1, N)− r(n,N).
This assumption implies that the gain from innovation does not increase as the number of
innovators increases. It captures the intuition that a firm prefers that its competitors do not
innovate. Thus innovations are strategic substitutes. Although intuitive, this assumption needs
to be checked for each model of product market competition. The consequences of relaxing this
assumption will be considered in Section 1.7.
I assume that the innovation is drastic, in the sense that if there is at least one firm which
has successfully developed the innovation, all firms which do not have the innovation cannot
compete. That is, the laggards receive a payoff of zero and do not exert competitive pressure on
the firms which have successfully innovated. For process innovations, this implies that the price
of a monopolist with the innovation is below the marginal cost of any firm without the innovation.
For product innovation this implies that the old product is made obsolete and it cannot be sold
on the market. This assumption will be relaxed in a Section 1.7, where the equilibrium will
be characterized for non-drastic innovations and robustness of comparative static effects will be
discussed. In the notation used here we have:
Assumption 1.2 (Drastic innovation).
For all n,N and N ′ such that 1 ≤ n ≤ N ≤ N ′ it holds: (i) r(n,N) = 0 and (ii) R(n,N) =
R(n,N ′).
Expression (i) ensures that laggards have zero profits and (ii) ensures that laggards do not
exert competitive pressure on the innovators. Under Assumption 1.2, R(n,N) is constant for
any N , so from now on just R(n) will be used to indicate the payoff of an innovator when there
are n innovators. Furthermore, if Assumption 1.2 holds then Assumption 1.1 simplifies to the
following two conditions: R(n) ≥ R(n + 1) for all n ≥ 1 and R(1) − r(0, N) ≥ R(2). The first
expression states that the payoff per innovator weakly decreases as the number of innovators
increases. The second expression states that the incentives of a prospective monopolist are
greater than those of a single innovator when two firms innovate.
Assumption 1.3. For every N it holds: r(0, N) ≥ r(0, N + 1).
This assumption states that as the number of firms which are active in the pre-innovation
market increases, the profits of each individual firm do not increase. The intuition is simple: the
additional firm will either not be competitive and have no effect on the profits of other firms, or
it will put competitive pressure on other firms and decrease their profits, but it cannot increase
their profits.
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The unmodeled product market game that determines payoffs to the firms, R(n,N) and
r(n,N), also determines the consumer surplus. This consumer surplus is the result of the
competition among N firms, n of which have the new technology, and who face some demand
curve on the product market. Denote this consumer surplus in reduced form with CS(n,N).
Then, the social welfare, when there are n innovators, is the sum of consumer and producer
surplus: W (n) = CS(n,N) + nR(n,N) + (N − n)r(n,N).6 That is, W (0) denotes the welfare
without the innovation,W (1) denotes the welfare when there is only one firm with the innovation,
and so on.
Assumption 1.4 (Non-increasing welfare returns).
For every n ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1} it holds W (n)−W (n− 1) ≥W (n+ 1)−W (n).
Each firm is assumed to be risk neutral and to maximize its expected profits. Profit maxi-
mization requires that firms either invest zero in a project or exactly the amount that is required
to open the project. Thus, we can identify the strategy of a firm simply by the set of the projects
in which it invests. Denote the strategy of a firm i with Ii and call it the investment plan of
firm i. In principle, Ii could be any measurable subset of the unit interval or the empty set. To
simplify exposition, assume that unless it is empty, the set Ii consists only of a finite number of
intervals, each closed from below and open from above.7 Formally, the strategy space of firm i
is the set Ii where:
Ii :=
{
Ii ⊂ [0, 1) : Ii = ∪k¯k=1[ak, bk)
}
∪ {∅} ,
for k¯ ∈ N and 0 ≤ ak < bk < 1 for all k ∈ {1, . . . , k¯}.
In particular, note that this assumption ensures that the investment plan will not contain
any isolated zero-mass points.
Let I = [I1, . . . , IN ] be a vector of investment plans of all N firms. Define the function
indicating the number of firms investing in a project, given a vector of investment plans I, as
n(j, I) : [0, 1)→ N0 as:
n(j, I) =
N∑
i=1
1
(
j ∈ Ii
)
,
where 1(·) is the indicator function.
Let Ici := [0, 1) \ Ii. The expected profit of a firm i is then
pii(I) = −
∫
Ii
C(j)dj +
∫
Ii
R(n(j, I))dj +
∫
Ici
r(n(j, I), N)dj. (1.1)
The first part of the equation above represents the investment costs of firm i, the second part
gives the expected profits from the new technology, whereas the third part gives the expected
profits from the old technology. By Assumption 1.2, r(n(j, I), N) = 0 whenever n(j, I) > 0.
6We can suppress the dependence of W on N as N will be fixed whenever welfare is analyzed.
7Because adding or removing zero-mass points does not change the payoff of any of the firms, allowing Ii to be
general would mean that all statements regarding the properties of the equilibrium would have to be qualified by
“almost everywhere". This assumption does not affect the mechanics of the model. For any measurable investment
plan Ii which does not satisfy the assumption above, there always exists plan I ′i which does satisfy the assumption
and only differs from Ii by zero-mass points, hence delivers the same payoff to all firms.
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However, it will be positive whenever n(j, I) = 0, which will occur in equilibrium with positive
probability.8
When N = 1, that is, when there is a monopolist in the market, the above becomes a pure
maximization problem. When there are more firms in the market we have to consider the effects
of strategic interaction among firms. Specifically, n(j, I) depends on the actions of other firms
and thus the expected profit of one firm depends on the actions of other firms.
Finally, assume that investment in innovation is profitable. That is R(1)− r(0, N) > C(0).
This assumption guarantees positive investments in the equilibrium. If this assumption was not
met, even the monopolist’s return on the investment in the cheapest project would not justify
its cost. As C(j) is strictly increasing and rewards are non-increasing in n, then no project could
be profitable. Thus, if this assumption failed there would be a simple equilibrium in which firms
did not invest at all.
The model is developed and analyzed in general terms. In the appendix A.1.10, I provide an
example with three firms, process innovation and Cournot competition, which shows how the
general model can be applied to a more specific setting. In the example, I analyze the effects
of a merger, a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition as well as compare the market
portfolio of R&D projects with the socially optimal portfolio.
1.4 Equilibrium
The vector of investment plans summarizes all decisions of all firms that are relevant for this
problem. A vector of investment plans I∗ is a pure strategy equilibrium (PSE) if no firm can
increase its expected profit by unilaterally choosing an alternative investment plan I ′i. That is
I∗ is a pure strategy equilibrium if, for any firm i, there does not exist an investment plan I ′i
such that pii(I ′i, I∗−i) > pii(I∗). In the main text, I will only consider pure strategy equilibria.
Mixed strategy equilibria exist and are considered in a special case in the Appendix A.2.2. As
it is shown there, the insights from pure strategy equilibria, both in terms of the structure of
the equilibrium and the comparative static effect, are robust.
Proposition 1.1 (Existence, non-uniqueness and equivalence of equilibria).
Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds. Then:
1. A pure strategy equilibrium always exists.
2. If I∗ is a PSE and 0 < n(j, I∗) < N for some j ∈ [0, 1), then infinitely many PSE exist.
3. If there are multiple PSE they all result in the same market portfolio of research projects.
That is, if I∗1 and I∗2 are PSE investment plans, then n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I∗2 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1).
Furthermore, if I∗1 is a PSE then any investment plan I∗3 such that n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I∗3 ) for
all j ∈ [0, 1) is also a PSE.
An equilibrium in pure strategies will always exist. However, typically there will also exist
infinitely many equilibria. The proof of statement 2 in Proposition 1.1 (see the Appendix A.1.1)
8Furthermore, the magnitude of r(0, N) will determine the strength of the Arrow replacement effect, which is
crucial for the equilibrium variety of research projects.
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reveals the nature of the multiplicity. In equilibrium, identities of firms investing in any given
project are in general not determined, only the number of firms investing is determined. Only
when either all firms invest in a project or no firm invests in a project, we can infer the behavior
of individual firms. Thus, when 0 < n(j, I∗) < N for some j ∈ [0, 1), there are projects for
which the identities of firms investing are not determined and as there is an infinite number of
ways to assign investments to firms, there must be infinitely many equilibria.
Statement 3 of Proposition 1.1 clarifies this point further. It states that every equilibrium
induces the same market portfolio of research projects — that is in every equilibrium the set of
developed projects will be the same and the number of firms investing in each project will be the
same. Thus, although there is a multiplicity of equilibria, the equilibrium market portfolio is
unique. As firms are identical, welfare does not depend on the identity of firms doing research.
From the social welfare perspective, any two equilibria are equivalent.
Furthermore, not only do all equilibria induce the same market portfolio of research projects,
but any investment that induces the equilibrium portfolio is itself an equilibrium. The intuition
for this result is straightforward — the profitability of any research project depends only on the
cost of the project and the number of competitors who are investing in the same project. In
particular, it does not depend on any other investment that the firm or its competitors may be
making. Hence, if in an equilibrium all profitable investments are exhausted and no unprofitable
investments are made, then any other investment plan that prescribes the same investment port-
folio in the same manner exhausts all profitable investments and has no superfluous investments.
Statement 3 of Proposition 1.1 implies that if I∗ is an equilibrium then the function n(j, I∗)
fully characterizes the equilibrium portfolio of research projects. As n(j, ·) is the same for
any equilibrium, we can denote the function characterizing the equilibrium portfolio of research
projects as n∗(j). Using the equilibrium constructed in the proof of statement one of Proposition
1.1 and applying Assumption 1.2 yields the following result.
Proposition 1.2 (Characterization of equilibrium portfolio).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Denote with m the maximum number of firms
investing in any project:
m = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > 0
and with αk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} the most expensive project in which k firms can profitably
invest. That is:
R(1)− r(0, N)− C(α1) =0
R(2)− C(α2) =0
...
R(m)− C(αm) =0.
Let αm+1 = 0 and α0 = 1. Then the PSE portfolio n∗(j) is given by
n∗(j) = k if j ∈ [αk+1, αk).
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium market portfolio.
An illustration of the equilibrium market portfolio for N = 3 and a process innovation in
a Cournot market (which is the example from the appendix A.1.10) is provided in Figure 1.1.
Here, m = 3 represents the maximum number of firms that can profitably invest in any project.
Because project 0 is by assumption the cheapest to develop, then m firms will invest in this
project. Each point αk is constructed so that, at the margin, if k firms invested the profit
from investment would be zero. As C(j) is assumed to be strictly increasing, then at any point
j > αk strictly fewer than k firms can profitably invest. As rewards are finite and costs to
innovation approach infinity as j → 1, values α1, α2, . . . , αm always exist. Furthermore, as C(j)
is increasing and by Assumption 1.1 the rewards to innovation are non-increasing it is easy to
see that α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.9 From this observation it follows directly that the function n∗(j)
is weakly decreasing.
It is interesting to note that the present model would be equivalent to the level-of-investment
models if (i) the successful project was drawn for each firm separately and (ii) the draws were
independent. In such a setting, a firm would have no incentive to choose more expensive R&D
projects. Thus, in equilibrium, all firms would invest in some interval of R&D projects [0, j),
where investing in a marginal project increases the probability of discovering the innovation at
the marginal cost C(j). In such a setting duplication of research and variety of research would
be meaningless.
The set of all projects the market invests in is [0, α1). Thus, I will refer to α1 as the variety
of research projects undertaken. I will say that the variety of research projects increases if α1
increases. The probability that the market develops an innovation is equal to α1. Hence an
increase in the variety of research projects implies an increase in the probability that the market
will develop an innovation. The function n∗(j) captures the number of firms investing in any
given project j in equilibrium. Hence, I will refer to the number n∗(j) as the market amount of
9Note that the inequality is weak (because the inequality in Assumption 1.1 is weak), so that it might happen
for some k ≤ m that αk = αk+1. In this case, define [αk+1, αk) = ∅. Thus there will be no project that exactly k
firms will develop.
Chapter 1 19
duplication of project j.
1.5 Comparative statics
In this section, I will study how the market portfolio of research projects changes as the market
structure changes. In particular, I will look at how a change in the number of active firms in
the market and the intensity of competition among them affects the market portfolio of research
projects. As can be seen from Proposition 1.2, the equilibrium portfolio is characterized by
the maximum number of firms m investing in any project and the k-firm frontiers αk, for
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. I will analyze how a change in N and a change in the intensity of competition
affect these variables.
Change in the number of firms
Consider first the case where the number of active firms in the market changes, but all other
characteristics of the market remain the same.
Proposition 1.3 (Increase in the number of firms).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 hold. Let the number of firms in the pre-innovation
market increase from N to N ′ so that the PSE investment plan changes from I to I ′.
1. In PSE, the variety of projects developed and the probability of developing an innovation
weakly increases, that is α1 ≤ α′1.
2. The maximum number of firms investing also increases, that is m ≤ m′.
3. Apart from the increase in variety of projects developed and in the maximum number of
firms investing, the PSE portfolio remains the same. That is, n(j, I) = n(j, I ′) for all
j ∈ [0, 1) \ {[0, α′m′ ] ∪ [α1, α′1]}.
If a firm innovates, it replaces its profits without the innovation with the profits with the
innovation. Thus, holding everything else equal, the larger the pre-innovation profits of firms,
the weaker its incentive to innovate. The increase in the variety of developed projects is driven
solely by the Arrow replacement effect. In this setting, the firm investing near α1 replaces r(0, N)
with R(1). As r(0, N) ≥ r(0, N + 1), the Arrow replacement effect is weaker when there are
N + 1 firms in the market. Consequently, firms attempt to escape the competition by investing
in more expensive research projects than before and the variety of developed projects increases.
This is equivalent to saying that the probability of discovering an innovation increases.
An increase in the number of active firms weakens the Arrow replacement effect both in this
model and in the usual level-of-investment models. A difference, however, arises in the effect on
the ex post profits of firms. Here the firms are free to choose in which projects to invest. The
number of firms investing in any given project, and hence the ex post number of competitors,
is endogenously determined. Following Vives (2008), call the reduction in innovation incentives
due to competition ex post as the Schumpeter effect. Then, the Schumpeter effect in this model
does not change as the number of ex ante active firms changes (except in those cases where the
number of firms ex post was limited by the number of active firms). This leads to the clear effect
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Figure 1.2: Merger in a 3-firm Cournot market.
of an increase in the number of firms on the variety of projects developed, as only one firm will
invest in the most expensive projects.
Consider in this context the invariance result of Sah and Stiglitz (1987), which states that
the number of research projects is invariant to the number of firms in the market. The invariance
can only hold if r(0, N) = r(0, N + 1), that is, only if the Arrow replacement effect is constant.
Clearly this will hold under homogeneous goods Bertrand competition as Sah and Stiglitz (1987)
have originally assumed, because r(0, N) = 0 for any N ≥ 2. Conversely, it will not hold (in
general) under Cournot competition as r(0, N) will be decreasing in N , which is in line with the
results derived in Reynolds and Isaac (1992) and Farrell et al. (2003).
Merger analysis
One implication of this result is that a merger in an imperfectly competitive industry will poten-
tially lead to a loss of variety of approaches to innovation (see Figure 1.2). Thus, competition
authorities should take this loss of variety of approaches to innovation into account when review-
ing merger cases, especially if innovation is important in the industry, as it was in the proposed
Lockheed-Northrop merger.10 As the loss of the variety of approaches to innovation is driven
by the Arrow replacement effect, the magnitude of the loss of variety will be proportional to the
increase in profits (in the market without the innovation) due to the merger.
This result depends on the assumption that the merger merely reduces the number of active
firms in the industry, without changing the production or the innovation cost functions of the
merged firms.11 However, if the merged firm is more efficient than the individual firms, then this
efficiency gain can outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the merger. As a matter of fact, U.S.
Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (2010) Horizontal Merger Guidelines
10For details see Robinson (1999) and Rubinfeld and Hoven (2001).
11I would like to thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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explicitly recognize this efficiency defense when analyzing the effects of mergers on innovation.12
The result in Proposition 1.3 shows that a merger can lead to a decrease in the variety
of approaches to innovation. Two extensions I develop in the Appendix (Section A.2.1) show
how this result can be overturned if the merger in question leads to efficiency gains. The first
extension (Proposition A.1) supposes that the merged firm can invest in innovation at a lower
cost than its competitors. Importantly, the efficiency is not dependent on the identity of the
merging firms. Proposition A.1 shows that, for a general specification of cost efficiencies, a
pure strategy equilibrium exists, the variety of approaches developed in equilibrium is uniquely
determined and the variety does not decrease in the post-merger market if the efficiency is large
enough. The second extension (Proposition A.2) considers an alternative form of efficiency gains.
There, the efficiencies depend on the identities of merging firms, so that each merger reduces
the cost of innovation in a merger-specific interval of approaches to innovation. Proposition A.2
shows that also in this setting a pure strategy equilibrium exists and the variety of approaches
developed in equilibrium is uniquely determined. However, in this case it is not sufficient for
the efficiency gains to be large enough. In order for such a merger to not decrease the variety of
approaches to innovation, the merger has to be of the right kind — namely, the efficiency gains
must affect those approaches to innovation which would not have been developed in the absence
of the efficiency gains.
These results suggest that a merger in a highly innovative but imperfectly competitive indus-
try might lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches to innovation, as has been suggested in
the Lockheed-Northrop case. Thus, the competition authorities should take this potential effect
into account when reviewing merger applications. At the same time, if a merger would lead
to efficiency gains which are large enough and of the right kind, the merger need not decrease
variety and could even lead to an increase in the variety of approaches to innovation. Thus, an
efficiency defense should be considered also in the case where the effect of the merger on variety
of approaches to innovation is a cause for concern.
Change in the intensity of competition
The competitive structure of the market is not only determined by the number of firms which
are active in the market, but also by the intensity of competition among firms. Suppose that
there are two sets of reward functions {R, r} and {R′, r′} such that R(n) > R′(n) for every
n > 1, R(1) = R′(1) and r(0, N) > r′(0, N). Then we can interpret the move from {R, r} to
{R′, r′} as an increase in the intensity of competition. Most standard examples of an increase in
the intensity of competition correspond to this definition. In particular, in the appendix A.1.10 I
will consider a move from Cournot to Bertrand type of competition, but models of differentiated
Cournot/Bertrand also correspond to this definition. The next result considers the effect of an
increase in the intensity of competition on the market R&D portfolio.
Proposition 1.4 (Increase in the intensity of competition).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold. Let N ≥ 2 and suppose the intensity of competition
increases so that the PSE investment plan changes from I to I ′. Then the variety of research
12“When evaluating the effects of a merger on innovation, the Agencies consider the ability of the merged firm
to conduct research or development more effectively." See Section 10 of the Guidelines.
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projects undertaken and the probability of discovering the innovation increase. That is α1 < α′1.
The amount of duplication of research decreases. That is for each j such that n(j, I) ≥ 2 we
have n(j, I) ≥ n(j, I ′) with n(j, I) > n(j, I ′) for at least some projects.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
4
Project
N
um
be
r o
f f
irm
s i
nv
es
tin
g
 
 
Cournot
Bertrand
Arrow effect
increases the variety
of projects undertaken
Schumpeter effect
decreases the duplication
of projects undertaken
Figure 1.3: An illustration of an increase in intensity of competition.
An increase in the intensity of competition decreases the profits firms receive if no firm suc-
cessfully innovates, thereby weakening the Arrow replacement effect and leading to an increase
in the variety of developed research projects. On the other hand, it also decreases payoffs to
firms if there are multiple innovators, leading to a (weakly) decreasing number of firms investing
in duplicative research projects. An increase in the intensity of competition “flattens out" the
equilibrium research portfolio, reducing the duplication of costs (see Figure 1.3). However, it is
not clear that an increase in the intensity of competition will lead to higher social welfare. On
the one hand, duplication of costs is reduced and the variety of research projects is increased. On
the other, less duplication of costs also implies fewer firms (though competing more vigorously!)
in the product market leading to a possible efficiency loss. Which effect prevails will depend on
the exact specification of the product market competition and the demand function.
An increase in the number of firms is sometimes used as a way to model an increase in
the intensity of competition. The preceding results highlight the difference between an increase
in the number of firms and an increase in the intensity of competition as defined here. An
increase in the intensity of competition reduces firm profits whenever there are multiple firms
competing. That is, it reduces firm profits both ex ante and ex post. The number of firms, due
to the endogeneity of the ex post market structure, affects firm profits only ex ante. Thus, the
Schumpeter effect is present only in the case of an increase in the intensity of competition and
not in the case of an increase in the number of firms.
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1.6 Optimal portfolio
There are several reasons to suspect that a market R&D portfolio will not be optimal. When the
innovator cannot appropriate the entire surplus because a part of the surplus is captured by the
consumers, the incentive to innovate may be too low. On the other hand, if innovation enables
firms to become more competitive in the market and steal business from their competitors, the
incentive to innovate may be too high.13 However, as this article argues, looking solely at the
levels of investment in innovation is misleading. Rather, the question to be posed is whether the
market invests in the optimal variety of projects and whether it optimally duplicates projects.
That is, the question is how the market R&D portfolio compares to the socially optimal portfolio.
The approach here is to ask what is the R&D portfolio that maximizes the expected social
welfare. That is, the social planner can determine the R&D portfolio, but given the portfolio
the firms will be profit maximizing. In particular, firms do not share the results of research,
so some duplication of research will be optimal, as duplication of the successful project implies
higher product market efficiency ex post.
Recall that W (n) denotes the social welfare generated by the product market if there are
n firms with the new technology, for every n ≤ N . That is, W (0) is welfare if no firm has
successfully innovated and W (N) is welfare if all firms have the new technology. The welfare is
the sum of consumer surplus and producer surplus, that is W (n) = CS(n) + nR(n,N) + (N −
n)r(n,N).
Analogously to Proposition 1.2, the optimal portfolio is characterized:
Proposition 1.5 (Characterization of the optimal portfolio).
Suppose that Assumption 1.4 holds. Denote with mo the optimal number of firms developing the
least expensive project:
mo = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. W (n)−W (n− 1)− C(0) > 0
and with αok for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} the most expensive project in which at most k firms can
optimally invest. That is:
W (1)−W (0)− C(αo1) =
W (2)−W (1)− C(αo2) =
...
W (mo)−W (mo − 1)− C(αom) = 0.
Let α0m+1 = 0 and αo0 = 1. Then the optimal portfolio no(j) is given by
no(j) = k if j ∈ [αok+1, αok).
13For an example of the under- and over-investment in innovation due to the two effects outlined here see Bester
and Petrakis (1993).
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Market investment in variety
It is now possible to directly compare the market R&D portfolio with the optimal portfolio. In
this way it is possible to identify if and how the market portfolio differs from the optimum and
to suggest a way in which a policy intervention can improve the market outcome.
The net externality from investing in marginal variety (a research project that is not devel-
oped by any other firm) is given by:
σ = −(N − 1)r(0, N) + [CS(1)− CS(0)] .
The first expression captures the negative externality imposed on the competitors of the firms
making the marginal investment. They lose the profits they would obtain if no firm invested in
the marginal project and the marginal project turned out to be successful. The second expression
captures the positive externality imposed on the customers — who receive the surplus associated
with one firm innovating as opposed to the surplus associated without innovation. Corollary
1.1 states that the optimality of investment variety depends on the sign of the net externality
imposed by the marginal variety.
Corollary 1.1 (Market investment in variety).
Suppose that assumptions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 hold. Then the market will underinvest in the variety
of R&D projects if and only if σ > 0. The market will invest in the optimal variety of R&D
projects if and only if σ = 0. The market will overinvest in the variety of R&D projects if and
only if σ < 0.
In principle the sign of σ should be checked for each model. However, as will be shown later,
in a large class of homogeneous goods models the assumption that the innovation is drastic
implies that CS(1) ≥ W (0) ≥ CS(0) + (N − 1)r(0, N). Thus, the market will in this case
underinvest in the variety of R&D projects. The intuition for this is as follows. A process
innovation is drastic if the monopolist’s price is below the marginal cost of production without
the innovation. Hence, consumer surplus with a monopolist (i.e., CS(1)), which is equal to the
difference between the reservation price and the price paid, is greater than total welfare without
the innovation (i.e., W (0)), which is equal to the difference between the reservation price and
the cost of production.
To illustrate the market underinvestment in variety, consider a simple homogeneous product
market similar to the one analyzed in Mankiw and Whinston (1986). Suppose that the inverse
market demand function is given by P (Q), where Q is the aggregate output in the market and
P ′(Q) < 0 for all Q. There are N symmetric firms, each of which possesses a technology given
by the cost function c¯(q), where c¯(0) = 0, c¯′(·) ≥ 0 for all q ≥ 0. Firms can invest in R&D to
develop a drastic process innovation, in which case their technology is given by the cost function
c(q), where c(0) = 0, c′(·) ≥ 0 for all q ≥ 0. A process innovation is drastic if a monopolist
facing the cost function c(q) chooses a price which is below the marginal cost of production of
a firm with the old technology. Formally, an innovating monopolist would choose a quantity q1
such that P (q1) < c¯′(0).
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Proposition 1.6 (Underinvestment in homogeneous product markets).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 hold. Then an industry à la Mankiw and Whinston
with a potential drastic process innovation always underinvests in the variety of R&D projects.
As the case of homogeneous product market illustrates, a decentralized market will tend
to underinvest in drastic innovations. It should be noted that the critical assumption in this
example is not the type of the product market competition. Rather, it is the assumption that
the innovation is drastic which drives the result.
Proposition 1.6 offers insights relevant to research policy. Suppose that society cannot affect
the market structure or the behavior of firms in the market but can offer subsidies for research.
The market will tend to underinvest in the variety of drastic innovation by failing to develop
high-cost projects which should optimally be developed. Thus, the research subsidies should be
directed toward research projects with (1) high costs; and (2) and high potential payoffs.
Market investment in duplication
Typically, the market R&D portfolio will involve some duplication of research projects. As this
is duplication of identical projects, it does not increase the probability that an innovation will
be discovered. However, duplication is not entirely wasteful either. If multiple firms develop
the same project and this project turns out to be the successful one, then there will be more
competitors on the product market. So for the cost of duplicating research the society receives
the (weakly) higher product market efficiency. The efficient duplication of R&D projects is
captured by the optimal portfolio.
In equilibrium, a firm duplicating a research project imposes both negative externalities on its
competitors (in the form of business stealing effect) and positive externalities on the consumers
(in the form of the efficiency effect). Define the net externalities effect of the k-th duplication
as:
δ(k) =
[
(k − 1)(R(k)−R(k − 1))]+ [CS(k)− CS(k − 1)].
The first bracket captures the negative externalities generated by the investment of the k-
th innovator, which are the reduction of profits of k − 1 firms from R(k − 1) to R(k). The
second bracket captures the positive externalities which accrue to the consumers, and which are
captured by the difference between CS(k) and CS(k− 1), the consumer surplus when there are
k competitors and k − 1 competitors on the product market, respectively.
Corollary 1.2 (Market investment in duplication).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 hold. Denote with m the maximum number of firms
investing in the market equilibrium and with mo the maximal number of firms investing in the
optimal equilibrium. For 2 ≤ k ≤ min{m,mo} , denote with αk the k-firm frontiers in the
market portfolio and with αok the k-firm frontiers in the optimal portfolio.
If δ(k) < 0 then αok < αk and the market overinvests in duplication of all projects j ∈
(αok, αk). If δ(k) > 0 then αk < αok and the market underinvests in duplication of all projects
j ∈ (αk, αok). If δ(k) = 0 then αok = αk and the market optimally invests in duplication of all
projects in the neighborhood of αk.
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If m ≥ mo and δ(k) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,mo}, then the market (weakly) overinvests in
duplication of all R&D projects. Conversely, if m ≤ mo and δ(k) ≤ 0 for all k ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, then
the market (weakly) underinvests in duplication of all R&D projects. If the net externalities
are negative (δ(k) < 0), then it would be optimal to reduce the equilibrium number of firms
investing in projects (αok, αk) from k to k − 1. If the externalities are positive then the number
of firms should be increased in the interval (αk, αok).
From the perspective of a fixed project j, the question of whether the amount of duplication
is optimal or not is essentially equivalent to the question whether the free entry in an industry
with fixed costs is optimal or not. Here, the question is of an entry in a ‘potential’ industry, fixed
costs are the cost of developing this specific project C(j), and the number of firms that can enter
is limited by the number of firms which are active in the pre-innovation market. Keeping in
mind the upper bound on the number of firms imposed by N , the results derived in Mankiw and
Whinston (1986) apply in this setting as well. For the homogeneous product market and ignoring
the integer constraint, Mankiw and Whinston find that the free-entry equilibrium number of
firms is not less than the socially optimal number of firms (i.e., there is no underinvestment in
duplication in our terminology), and furthermore if the equilibrium price is above the marginal
costs, then the equilibrium number of firms is strictly greater than the optimal number (i.e.
there is overinvestment in duplication).14 That is, Mankiw and Whinston identify conditions
under which an industry equilibrium would tend toward excessive entry. In the context of the
present model, this implies that there should be a tendency toward overinvestment in duplication
of R&D projects. Taking into account the integer constraint weakens this result somewhat —
Mankiw and Whinston establish that the free-entry equilibrium number of firms is not lower
than the optimal number of firms less one.15 In the notation of this article, that would be
n∗(j) ≥ no(j) − 1 for appropriate project j. This suggests that even though there might be
underinvestment in the duplication of R&D projects, it will be bounded from below.
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Figure 1.4: Optimal and market portfolios of research projects.
14Proposition 1 in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
15Proposition 2 in Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
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1.7 Extensions and robustness
This section relaxes several assumptions made in the model. For simplicity, in all following
subsections except the first one, I will assume that there are only two firms in the market.
Non-drastic innovations
The assumption that innovation is drastic significantly simplifies the analysis, as it allows us to
ignore all firms which have failed to innovate whenever at least one firm has innovated. However,
there are many innovations which are incremental and which give only a slight advantage to the
innovating firm over its rivals. This section relaxes Assumption 1.2 and provides a more general
characterization of the market equilibrium portfolio.
First observe that Proposition 1.1 does not rely on Assumption 1.2. Hence, an equilibrium
of the investment game exists and except in trivial cases an infinite number of equilibria exists.
However, the equilibrium market portfolio is unique and any investment plan that generates the
equilibrium market portfolio is itself an equilibrium of the investment game. The next result
characterizes the equilibrium market portfolio without Assumption 1.2.
Proposition 1.7 (Characterization of equilibrium portfolio).
Suppose that Assumption 1.1 holds. Denote with m the maximum number of firms investing in
any project:
m = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. R(n,N)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > 0
and with αk for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} the most expensive project in which k firms can profitably
invest. That is:
R(1, N)− r(0, N)− C(α1) =
R(2, N)− r(1, N)− C(α2) =
...
R(m,N)− r(m− 1, N)− C(αm) = 0.
Let αm+1 = 0 and α0 = 1. Then the PSE portfolio n∗(j) is given by
n∗(j) = k if j ∈ [αk+1, αk).
The basic form of the equilibrium portfolio is the same as in the case with the drastic inno-
vation — it is still a step function with a declining number of firms investing as projects become
more expensive. There are two differences however. First, the payoffs with the innovation
R(·, N) are now functions of N , because the firms without the innovation can put competitive
pressure on the firms with the innovation. Second, firms without the innovation can now obtain
positive profits, which decreases the incentive to duplicate research.
As a consequence, the comparative statics results become ambiguous if Assumption 1.2 does
not hold. Consider a merger, so that the number of firms in the industry is reduced from N to
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N − 1. If Assumption 1.2 holds, then Proposition 1.3 holds and the merger leads to a decrease
in the variety of projects undertaken. If Assumption 1.2 does not hold, the variety of projects
undertaken will (weakly) decrease if and only if
r(0, N − 1)− r(0, N) ≥ R(1, N − 1)−R(1, N),
or, in words, only if the merger increases profits without the innovation more than it does for
the single innovator. An analogous condition is required for any other n-firm frontier as well as
for the changes in the intensity of competition among firms.
Figure 1.5 illustrates the Cournot duopoly example from the appendix A.1.10 with drastic
and with non-drastic innovation and shows that the essential structure of the model does not
depend on Assumption 1.2.
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Figure 1.5: Drastic versus non-drastic innovation.
Asymmetric firms
Suppose that two firms are producing homogeneous goods with different technologies, so that
one firm has lower marginal costs of production than the other. Call the more efficient firm the
leader and denote its marginal production cost with c¯lead. Call the less efficient firm the laggard
and denote its marginal production cost with c¯lag. Suppose that the firms are symmetric in
all other aspects and furthermore suppose that firms can invest in the development of a new
production technology which would lower the production costs of whichever firm develops it to
c, such that c¯lag > c¯lead > c. Suppose that Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold.
First observe that if neither firm develops the innovation, firms will continue competing
with the old technology and the leader’s profits rlead(0, 2) will be greater than the laggard’s
profits rlag(0, 2). However, as the innovation is drastic, the profits post-innovation will be the
same for both firms Rlead(1) = Rlag(1) and Rlead(2) = Rlag(2). To simplify exposition, assume
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C(0) < R(2). Analogously to before, denote the k-firm frontiers as
α1,lag = C−1
(
R(1)− rlag(0, 2)
)
,
α1,lead = C−1
(
R(1)− rlead(0, 2)
)
,
α2 = C−1
(
R(2)
)
,
where α1,lag is the most expensive project in which the laggard would invest and α1,lead is
the most expensive project in which the leader would invest. It is straightforward to see that
α2 ≤ α1,lead < α1,lag. In equilibrium, both firms will invest in the interval [0, α2), for any project
in the interval [α2, α1,lead) either the leader or the laggard will invest (but only one will), and only
the laggard will invest in the interval [α1,lead, α1,lag), whereas no firm will invest in the interval
[α1,lag, 1). Hence this model predicts that the laggard firms will be more likely to invest in the
most expensive projects. Furthermore, if one is willing to assume that where both firms can
invest they do so symmetrically, the laggard will be more likely to develop drastic innovations.
This prediction is consistent with the results in Akcigit and Kerr (2010), who find that smaller
firms tend to have higher R&D expenses per employee and more patents per employee than
larger firms.
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
Project
N
um
be
r o
f f
irm
s i
nv
es
tin
g
Interval in which
only the laggard 
invests
Figure 1.6: Asymmetric firms.
Figure 1.6 illustrates the equilibrium market portfolio of research projects, using the Cournot
duopoly from the appendix A.1.10.
Innovations as strategic complements
Consider a case with two firms in the industry and relax Assumption 1.1. Assumption 1.1 will
not hold if innovations are sufficiently strong complements, for example in the case of research
spillovers. If Assumption 1.1 does not hold then it must be true that:
R(2, 2)− r(1, 2) > R(1, 2)− r(0, 2).
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Assumption 1.2 is immaterial for the following discussion and it is not assumed to hold. Anal-
ogous to the use of k-firm frontiers before, let:
α1 = C−1
(
R(1, 2)− r(0, 2)),
α2 = C−1
(
R(2, 2)− r(1, 2)),
where C−1(·) is the inverse of the function C(·). As C(·) is a strictly increasing function, we
have α2 > α1. This introduces ambiguity in the number of firms that will, in equilibrium, invest
in the interval [α1, α2). A single firm cannot profitably invest in any project in this interval, but
two firms can. Hence, in equilibrium, it must hold that in any project in this interval, either
no firm invests or both do. In the interval [0, α1) both firms will invest, whereas in the interval
[α2, 1) neither firm will invest. If Assumption 1.1 does not hold, there will be an infinity of
equilibrium market portfolios. In this sense, Assumption 1.1 is essential for the model. Figure
1.7 illustrates the equilibrium market portfolio of research projects.
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Figure 1.7: Violating Assumption 1.1.
1.8 Conclusion
This article studies how the market structure, that is the number of firms competing on the
market and the nature of competition among them, influences the choice of research projects
undertaken. The main object of analysis is the R&D portfolio, an object that captures both the
variety of research projects undertaken, as well as the amount of duplicative research.
It is shown that, even though the effect of an increase in competition on the total level
of investment in innovation is ambiguous, the increase in competition increases the variety of
approaches to innovation and increases the probability that an innovation is discovered. The
policy recommendation drawn from this conclusion is that competition authorities should take
into account this negative effect on the investment in innovation when reviewing merger cases.
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Comparing the equilibrium market portfolio with the optimal equilibrium portfolio, it is
shown that the market will tend to underinvest in drastic innovation. This underinvestment
will be more severe the higher the potential benefit from innovation and the lower the overall
intensity of competition in the industry. This suggests that R&D subsidies should be targeted
at high cost and high potential benefit projects (so-called blue sky projects) — especially in the
industries with few firms and low intensity of competition.
This article presents an innovation model where firms choose R&D projects in which to
invest. In this model, the variety of approaches to innovation as well as the duplication of R&D
projects can be explicitly analyzed. This opens up at least two avenues for future research.
First, a choice-of-R&D-projects model could be embedded into a growth framework, which
could be used to analyze how different market structure and government policies could influence
variety and duplication of R&D projects and through it long-term economic growth. Second, as
eloquently argued in Segal and Whinston (2007), competition policy needs to focus more on the
long-term effects such policy has on innovation in any given industry. The present model could
be extended into a dynamic framework, so that questions of variety and duplication of R&D
projects could be analyzed in a dynamic setting.
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2 Inducing Variety: A Theory of Innovation Contests1
Joint with Armin Schmutzler
2.1 Introduction
The use of contests to procure innovations has a long history, and it is becoming ever more
popular. Recently, private buyers have awarded the Netflix Prize, the Ansari X Prize, and the
InnoCentive prizes. Public agencies have organized, for instance, the DARPA Grand Challenges,
the Lunar Lander Challenge and the EU Vaccine Prize.2 Reflecting the increasing importance
of these prizes, a literature on contest design has developed. This literature focuses almost
exclusively on how incentives for costly innovation effort can best be provided. However, effort
is by no means the only important requirement for a successful innovation. A case in point
is the 2012 EU Vaccine Prize to improve the so-called cold-chain vaccine technology. The
ultimate goal of the prize was to prevent vaccines from spoiling at higher temperatures, which
is particularly challenging in developing countries. The rules of the competition contain the
following statement:
"It is important to note that approaches to be taken by the participants in the
competition are not prescribed and may include alternate formulations, novel pack-
aging and/or transportation techniques, or significant improvements over existing
technologies, amongst others."3
This statement explicitly recognizes the fundamental uncertainty of the innovation process:
Even an innovator who is pursuing a clear goal (such as finding a way to prevent vaccine spoilage)
will often not know the best approach to achieving this goal. He will therefore have to choose
between several conceivable approaches without being sure whether they lead to the goal. If in-
novators pursue different approaches, chances are higher that the best of these approaches yields
a particularly valuable (high-quality) innovation. Thus, even if variety of research approaches
has no intrinsic value, it has an option value. Our first question is therefore: Can innovation con-
tests be used to incentivize suppliers to diversify their research approaches, thereby generating
a high expected value of the innovation?
In addition to efficiency, contest design may also affect distribution. A contest that induces
diversity may yield a high expected value of the innovation and thereby foster efficiency, but
1This paper should be cited as Letina, I. and A. Schmutzler (2016), “Inducing Variety: A Theory of Innovation
Contests,” Mimeo. This paper has been submitted to the RAND Journal of Economics.
2See "Innovation: And the winner is. . . ", The Economist. Aug 5, 2010.
3European Comission (2012), "Prize Competition Rules." August 28, 2012 (accessed on April 3, 2015).
http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/pdf/prize-competition-rules_en.pdf
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at the same time leave high rents to the suppliers. Thus, the main question of our paper will
be: Which contests are optimal for the buyers, when the expected value (reflecting the induced
variety of approaches) as well as the expected payments to the suppliers are taken into account?
The diversity of potential approaches, which is highlighted in the guidelines of the Vaccine
Prize cited above, played an important role in many other examples of innovation procurement.
First, the often cited Longitude Prize of 1714 for a method to determine a ship’s longitude at sea
featured two competing approaches.4 The lunar method was an attempt to use the position of the
moon to calculate the position of the ship. The alternative, ultimately successful, approach relied
on a clock which accurately kept Greenwich time at sea, thus allowing estimation of longitude
by comparison with the local time (measured by the position of the sun). Second, when the
Yom Kippur War in 1973 revealed the vulnerability of US aircraft to Soviet-made radar-guided
missiles, General Dynamics sought to resolve the issue through electronic countermeasures, while
McDonnell Douglas, Northrop, and eventually Lockheed, attempted to build planes with small
radar cross-section.5 Third, the announcement of the 2015 Horizon Prize for better use of
antibiotics contains a similar statement as the announcement of the vaccine prize.6
Architectural contests share some important properties with innovation contests. A buyer
who thinks about procuring a new building usually does not know what exactly the ideal build-
ing would look like, but once she examines the submitted plans, she can choose the one she
prefers. Guidelines for architectural competitions explicitly recognize the need for diversity. For
example, the Royal Institute of British Architects states: “Competitions enable a wide variety
of approaches to be explored simultaneously with a number of designers.”7
Motivated by this long list of examples, we focus in the following on the design of contests
for innovation, with a view towards the induced variety of research approaches. As we will
sketch below, however, our analysis also has interesting implications for the case that suppliers
on anonymous markets decide on the introduction of new products.
In line with the examples, we consider innovation contests in a setting where both the
buyer (the contest designer) and the suppliers (contestants) are aware that there are multiple
conceivable approaches to innovation. Furthermore, none of the participants knows the best
approach beforehand. However, after the suppliers have followed a particular approach, it is
often possible to assess the quality of innovations, for instance, by looking at prototypes or
detailed descriptions of research projects. In such settings, can buyers design contests in such a
way that suppliers have incentives to provide variety? And will they benefit from doing so?
A large literature has dealt with the optimal design of innovation contests, reflecting their
ever-increasing importance. However, this literature mainly focuses on the problem of providing
4See, e.g., Che and Gale (2003) for a discussion of the Longitude Prize.
5See Paul Crickmore (2003), Nighthawk F-117: Stealth Fighter. Airlife Publishing Ltd.
6“The rules of the contest specify the targets that need to be met but do not prescribe the methodol-
ogy or any technical details of the test, thereby giving applicants total freedom to come up with the most
promising and effective solution, be it from an established scientist in the field or from an innovative new-
comer.” European Commision (2015), "Better use of antibiotics." March 24, 2015 (accessed on April 3, 2015).
http://ec.europa.eu/research/horizonprize/index.cfm?prize=better-use-antibiotics
7See Royal Institute of British Architects (2013), "Design competitions guidance for clients." (accessed on Apr
3, 2015); http://competitions.architecture.com/requestform.aspx.
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incentives for costly innovation effort.8 To our knowledge, we are the first to analyze the optimal
design of innovation contests with multiple conceivable research approaches.
In our main model, there are two homogeneous suppliers who decide whether to exert costly
research efforts and which research approach to choose. The research approach is captured as
a point on the unit interval. We assume all approaches are equally costly, so as to focus on
suppliers’ incentives to diversify. Crucially, the quality of an innovation and thus the value
to the buyer depends inversely on the distance between the chosen research approach and an
ideal approach that is unknown to all parties. The suppliers and the buyer agree about the
distribution of this ideal approach, which has a strictly positive, symmetric and single-peaked
density. If different suppliers try different approaches, this creates an option value for the buyer
who can choose the preferred innovation once uncertainty is resolved.
In line with the literature on innovation contests, we assume that neither research inputs
(approaches) nor research outputs (qualities) are verifiable, because they are both difficult to
evaluate and the relation between them is stochastic. The lack of verifiability of research activity
precludes any kind of contract that conditions on research inputs or outputs, and it motivates
the focus on contests.9 The notion of contest design that we use was suggested by Che and Gale
(2003). The buyer prescribes a possible set of prices and commits herself to paying the price
chosen by the supplier from which the innovation is procured. The class of such contests is very
rich.10 Examples include fixed-prize tournaments (when the price set is a singleton) as well as
auctions (when the price set is the set of non-negative real numbers). We also allow the buyer
to pay subsidies to the suppliers to induce them to participate in the contest and exert costly
research effort. Moreover, we consider the cases with and without participation fees. Contest
design in this setting is the choice of the allowable price set and the subsidy (or participation
fee).
The sequence of moves in our model is as follows: After the buyer has communicated the rules
of the game (and, in particular, the price set), the suppliers choose whether to enter and, if so,
which approach to pursue. Then qualities become common knowledge. After having observed
qualities, suppliers choose bids from the price set. Finally, the buyer selects the preferred
supplier.
We show that, no matter whether participation fees are allowed or not, the optimal contest
for the buyer is what we call a bonus tournament. In a bonus tournament, the price set consists
of two elements — a low price and a high (“bonus”) price. After qualities have been realized,
the suppliers thus can only choose whether to ask for the high price or the low price. The
selected supplier will be paid his bid. Anticipating this, the suppliers diversify in the hope that
their quality advantage over the competitor will be sufficiently high that they can bid the bonus
price and win even so. It will turn out that the amount of diversity implemented in a bonus
tournament is determined by the difference between the bonus price and the low price. We show
that, with a bonus tournament, the buyer can implement essentially any level of diversity. In
particular, a bonus tournament with suitably chosen prices (and possibly a subsidy) implements
8Section 2.6 discusses this literature.
9For an extensive discussion see Che and Gale (2003) and Taylor (1995).
10See Che and Gale (2003) for a detailed discussion.
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the socially optimal diversity. When sufficiently high participation fees are possible, the buyer
implements the social optimum and appropriates the surplus with the participation fees.
When unlimited participation fees are not allowed, the analysis is more subtle. Full rent
extraction is not always possible, and the buyer must trade off efficiency against rent extraction.
Bonus tournaments are still optimal for the buyer: They induce any desired level of diversity while
minimizing rent extraction. We show that the optimal contest leads to just enough diversity
that expected supplier revenues are equal to the cost needed to develop the innovation. This
will imply less diversity than socially optimal, except when research costs are very high. Thus
the buyer resolves the trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction in favor of the latter.
The existing literature on innovation contests has put particular emphasis on auctions and
fixed-prize tournaments. We therefore also analyze how these institutions perform in our setting
and why they fail to be optimal for the buyer. Unrestricted auctions induce the social optimum,
while auctions with price ceilings induce less variety. The price ceiling determines the amount
of variety. While auctions can in general implement the same diversity as the optimal bonus
tournaments, they always generate higher revenues for the suppliers. Thus the buyer prefers
bonus tournaments to auctions. Fixed-prize tournaments do not induce any diversity and are
therefore less efficient than auctions and optimal bonus tournaments. Nevertheless, for low
research costs, the buyer prefers the inefficient fixed-prize tournaments to the socially efficient
unrestricted auctions.
We then extend the analysis, and show that, with some caveats, bonus tournaments perform
well even in more general environments. In particular, we study contests with multiple suppliers,
and contests with more general distributions and quality functions. In addition, we discuss het-
erogeneous suppliers, multiple prizes and multiple approaches per supplier. Under very general
conditions, bonus tournaments still induce the social optimum. The buyer continues to prefer
them to fixed-prize tournaments, even though the latter induce some diversity (but suboptimal
amounts) when there are multiple suppliers. However, when research costs are sufficiently high,
the buyer may prefer auctions to bonus tournaments. Moreover, she may benefit from inviting
a large number of suppliers, which is a straightforward implication of the option value provided
by additional suppliers.
As we discuss in more detail in the conclusion, our analysis has potential applications beyond
innovation contests organized by a single buyer. Our model can be applied to situations when
suppliers in a new market choose products in the face of uncertain demand by a potentially
large number of homogeneous buyers. If we interpret the prize as the expected product market
profit of a successful innovator, contest design then corresponds to the choice of alternative
regulatory frameworks for the new market. Our approach shows that unregulated markets
provide incentives for suppliers to choose the socially optimal products, but at the cost of
endowing them with ex-post market power. As a result, regulation may yield higher expected
consumer surplus, even though it does not induce the optimal expected product quality.
While our main application is to the design of innovation contests, the model is not limited
to innovation settings. Our results have important implication for any contest where contestants
can choose some measure of correlation of outcomes. In particular, prize rules that award winners
based on the margin by which they outperform the second-best contestant (like auctions or bonus
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tournaments) will incentivize the contestants to choose less correlated outcomes. Alternatively,
fixed-prize contests will cause contestants to choose too correlated outcomes.
In Section 2.2, we introduce the model. Section 2.3 deals with the design of optimal con-
tests for the buyer. Section 2.4 compares several commonly used contests, such as fixed-prize
tournaments and auctions with and without price ceilings. Section 2.5 presents extensions of the
model. Section 2.6 discusses the relation of our paper to the literature. Section 2.7 concludes,
pointing in particular to the above-mentioned re-interpretation of our model for a world with
many buyers. Proofs are in the Appendix.
2.2 The Model
A risk-neutral buyer B needs an innovation that two risk-neutral suppliers (i ∈ {1, 2}) can
provide. Each supplier simultaneously chooses whether to carry out costly research and which
approach vi ∈ [0, 1] to pursue. Without loss of generality, we assume that v1 ≤ v2; if the
ordering of approaches does not matter, we use the generic notation vi (and vj 6= vi). The cost
of approach vi is C (vi) ≡ C ≥ 0. Thus all approaches are equally costly. The quality qi of
the resulting innovation and thus the value to the buyer depends on a state σ ∈ [0, 1], which is
distributed with density f (σ), and corresponds to an (ex-post) ideal approach. We thus assume
that qi = Ψ− δ (|vi − σ|), where Ψ > 0 is large enough and δ is an increasing function.11
0 1v1 v2σˆ
f(σ)
Figure 2.1: Illustration of an outcome given v1 and v2 where the ideal approach is σˆ.
Figure 2.1 illustrates one particular outcome of the model. Suppose that the uncertainty is
given by the distribution f (σ) and that the suppliers have chosen the approaches v1 ≤ v2.
The quality difference between the ideal approach σˆ and vi is proportional to the distance
between vi and σˆ (the dashed line for i = 1, and the horizontal dotted line for supplier i = 2).
Unless specified otherwise, we will maintain assumptions (A1) and (A2) below.
Assumption (A1) The density function f (σ) is (i) symmetric: f (1/2− ε) = f (1/2 + ε)
∀ε ∈ [0, 1/2], (ii) single-peaked: f(σ) ≤ f(σ′) ∀σ < σ′ < 1/2, (iii) has full support: f (σ) > 0
∀σ ∈ [0, 1] and (iv) satisfies f(x) ≤ 2f(y) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1].
Assumption (A2) δ (|vi − σ|) = b |vi − σ| with b ∈ (0,Ψ].
11Ψ needs to be large enough so that it is worthwhile for the buyer to hold a contest. A simple sufficient
condition is Ψ > δ(1) + 2C. This assumption is innocuous as none of our results depend on Ψ.
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A wide class of distributions satisfies (A1). For each of these distributions, there is an
approach which has the highest expected quality ex ante, namely the median. Furthermore,
single-peakedness makes it more difficult to induce diversity: As there is less mass on approaches
that are further away from the median, contestants will not choose them without additional
incentives. Part (iv) excludes the possibility that some states are much less probable than
others, that is, it requires that the amount of uncertainty about the ideal approach is sufficiently
high. Using (A2), we denote the quality resulting from approach vi in state σ as q (vi, σ) =
Ψ− b |vi − σ|. Thus quality is bounded below by Ψ− b and bounded above by Ψ.
In this setting, the buyer chooses an innovation contest determining the procedure for choos-
ing and remunerating suppliers. These contests are closely related to those analyzed by Che and
Gale (2003), where suppliers choose efforts rather than approaches. In line with these authors,
we assume that neither vi nor qi is contractible.12 The environment (b,Ψ, C) of a contest con-
sists of the utility and cost parameters. The buyer chooses a set P of allowable prices (bids),
where P is an arbitrary finite union of closed subintervals of R+.13 We denote the minimum of
P as P and the maximum, if it exists, as P . Moreover, the buyer can offer subsidies t ≥ 0 to
the suppliers. An innovation contest is thus the extensive-form game between the buyer and the
suppliers given by the buyer’s choice of {P, t} and the following rules:
Period 1: Suppliers simultaneously choose whether to engage in research and
they select approaches vi ∈ [0, 1].
Period 2: The state is realized. All players observe qualities q1 and q2.
Period 3: Suppliers simultaneously choose prices pi ∈ P.
Period 4: The buyer observes prices; then she chooses a supplier i ∈ {1, 2}. She pays
pi + t to the chosen supplier and t to the other supplier.
Importantly, the suppliers receive two types of payments, namely the revenue from the
contest (that is paid only to the successful supplier) and the subsidies paid to both suppliers.
For ease of exposition, we sharpen the requirement that qualities are observable by assuming
that all players observe vi and σ, as this allows us to apply the subgame perfect equilibrium
(SPE). It will be obvious that the observability of vi and σ plays no role whatsoever; as these
variables are payoff-relevant only inasmuch as they affect qualities. As long as all players can
observe qualities, all results still hold with the SPE replaced by a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium
with suitably specified beliefs.14
Moreover, we provide an extensive discussion of the case when not even quality is observable in
the working paper (Letina and Schmutzler 2015); we summarize the discussion briefly in Section
2.5.2.2.
12For example, Che and Gale (2003) and Taylor (1995) assume that neither inputs nor outputs of innovative
activity are verifiable. As an example of the verifiability problem, Che and Gale (2003) point to the protracted
battle between John Harrison, the inventor of the marine chronometer, and the Board of Longitude, over whether
his invention met the requirements of the 1714 Longitude Prize. See also references in Taylor (1995).
13Formally, P is chosen from I(R+) :={P ⊆ R+ : P = ∪k¯k=1[ak, bk] or P = ∪k¯k=1[ak, bk] ∪
[
a
k+1,∞
)
for
ak ≤ bk ∈ R+, k¯ ∈ N}.
14Proof available on request.
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The following are examples of innovation contests:
1. P = R+: an auction without a price ceiling.
2. P =
[
0, P
]
: an auction with a price ceiling P .
3. P = {A}, where A ≥ 0: a fixed-prize tournament (FPT).
4. P = {A, a}, where A > a ≥ 0: a bonus tournament.
The first three examples are well-known. The last example differs from an FPT in that the
supplier has to specify whether she accepts a low price a if chosen, or asks for the higher "bonus"
price A instead. The bonus tournament will turn out to be the optimal contest for the buyer.
To finish the description of the contests, we require several further conventions. First, we
apply the following tie-breaking rules, which can be interpreted as second-order lexicographic
preference for winning and for higher quality.
(T1) (Preference for quality) If suppliers offer the same surplus, the buyer prefers the higher
quality one. If both have the same quality, the tie is randomly broken.
(T2) (Preference for winning) Given equal monetary payoffs, the suppliers prefer to participate
in the contest rather than to stay out and to win the contest rather than not.
(T1) and (T2) guarantee that the outcomes are robust to infinitesimal changes in the reward
structure.
Second, we assume that, in cases where only one supplier decides to participate, the contest
is called off and players obtain zero overall payoff.
Third, we will confine our analysis to the case of pure-strategy equilibria for simplicity.
2.3 The Optimal Contest for the Buyer
In this section, we characterize the optimal contest for the buyer.15 We start with some auxiliary
results. These results characterize the social optimum, and they deal with the pricing subgames.
2.3.1 Auxiliary Results
We introduce the following terminology which applies when both suppliers participate. For
(v1, v2) ∈ [0, 1]×[0, 1], the (expected) total surplus is ST (v1, v2) ≡ Eσ [max {q (v1, σ) , q (v2, σ)}]−
2C. The social optimum is (v∗1, v∗2) ≡ arg max(v1,v2)∈[0,1]2 ST (v1, v2). Thus, we are focusing here
on the optimal choice of approaches for a given number of suppliers (two). In Section 2.5.1, we
deal with the optimal number of suppliers.
15An attentive reader might conjecture that the buyer could implement arbitrary outcomes with a mechanism
where he just pays unconditional transfers t = C and sets a singleton prize set P = {0}. The suppliers are
then indifferent between entering and not entering, and, in monetary terms, between all approaches. However,
our "preference for winning" assumption (T2) would ensure that the such a mechanism would have a unique
equilibrium with v1 = v2 = 1/2. Even if we dispensed with assumption (T2), the equilibrium structure of such a
mechanism would not be robust to small changes in the cost of different approaches or to assuming that duplicating
an approach is less costly than developing an original one.
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For (v1, v2), implemented as an equilibrium of a contest (P, t), S(P,t)i (v1, v2), the (expected)
surplus of supplier i in an equilibrium, is the sum of the expected revenue and the subsidies, net of
research costs. The (expected) buyer surplus, S(P,t)B (v1, v2), is expected maximal quality minus
the expected revenues and subsidies of the suppliers. We usually drop the superscript (P, t)
when there is no danger of confusion. For precise definitions of S(P,t)B (v1, v2) and S
(P,t)
i (v1, v2),
we refer the reader to Appendix B.1.1.
As the costs of each approach are the same, the social optimum (v∗1, v∗2) maximizes the ex-
pected maximal quality Eσ [max {q (v1, σ) , q (v2, σ)}] or, equivalently, minimizes the expected
minimal distance to the ideal approach, Eσ [min {δ (|v1 − σ|) , δ (|v2 − σ|)}]. With only one po-
tential supplier i, the optimal approach would correspond to vi = 1/2, as this maximizes the
expected quality. With two suppliers, the optimization needs to take into account the option
value generated by having different choices once qualities have been observed. It is always so-
cially optimal to have at least some diversification. This simple but important observation holds
without the restrictions on distributions coming from (A1), as long as there is any uncertainty
about the ideal approach. The intuition is simple: Starting from a situation with identical ap-
proaches, suppose one of the suppliers chooses an arbitrary alternative approach, whereas the
other supplier continues to choose the same one. After this modification, the minimal distance
decreases for a set of ideal states with positive measure. There can be no σ for which the ex-
pected minimal distance to the best approach increases, as the initial approach is still available.
The following result provides a sharper characterization of the social optimum:
Lemma 2.1. The unique social optimum with v∗1 ≤ v∗2 satisfies F (v∗1) = 1/4 and F (v∗2) = 3/4
and thus v∗2 = 1− v∗1.
Hence v∗1 and v∗2 are symmetric around 1/2. The result relies on (A1(iv)), which states that
the ideal state distribution is sufficiently dispersed.16 The social optimum is fully determined
by the distribution F , whereas research costs have no influence on the optimal diversity. We
now characterize the equilibria of the pricing subgames, using the following notation:
Notation 1. p (σ) ≡ max {p ∈ P| p ≤ |q(v1, σ)− q(v2, σ)|+ P}.
In words, for any realization of σ, p (σ) is the maximal allowed price which guarantees that the
supplier with higher quality wins the contest, irrespective of the price chosen by the supplier with
the lower quality. The following result is closely related to the familiar “asymmetric Bertrand”
logic that inefficient firms choose minimal prices, whereas efficient firms translate their efficiency
advantage into a price differential.17
16The condition guarantees that the expected quality is a strictly concave function of the approaches. It is
thus more restrictive than necessary. A simple necessary condition for the optimum to satisfy F (v∗1) = 1/4 and
F (v∗2) = 3/4 is f(1/2) < 2f(v∗1); otherwise the objective function is not even locally concave. Moreover, this
condition turns out to be necessary for the existence of a social optimum with v∗2 = 1− v∗1 . It is simple to provide
examples where f(1/2) < 2f(v∗1) is violated. For instance, consider the kinked distribution defined by the density
f (σ) =
{
0.6 if σ ∈ [0, 0.45) ∪ (0.5, 1]
4.6 if σ ∈ [0.45, 0.55] .
17The adequacy of pure-strategy equilibria in asymmetric Bertrand games has received some attention, in
particular, but not only, because they tend to involve weakly dominated strategies (see Blume 2003 and Kartik
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Lemma 2.2. The subgame of an innovation contest corresponding to (qi, qj) has an equilibrium
such that pi (qi, qj) = p (σ) if qi ≥ qj and pi (qi, qj) = P if qi < qj. In any equilibrium of any
contest, pi (qi, qj) = p (σ) if qi ≥ qj.
Lemma 2.2 sharpens the Bertrand logic to account for bounded and/or non-convex price
sets: The price differential will only fully reflect the quality differential when the corresponding
bid of the high-quality supplier is in the price set P. In many cases, the equilibrium described
in Lemma 2.2 is unique.18 We need further notation:
Notation 2. ∆q(vi, vj) ≡ |q(vi, vi)− q (vj , vi)| is the maximum quality difference given (vi, vj).
To understand why ∆q(vi, vj) is the maximum quality difference, note that, for σ ∈ [0, v1]∪
[v2, 1] the quality difference between the two approaches is equal to |q(vi, vi)− q (vj , vi)| and thus
constant; whereas it is smaller for σ ∈ (v1, v2). By Lemma 2.2, in any subgame the successful
supplier chooses the highest available price not exceeding the sum of the quality differential
and the minimum bid. We now sharpen this result for subgames following equilibrium choices
(v1, v2).
Lemma 2.3. Let v1 ≤ v2. (i) If a contest implements (v1, v2), then ∆q (v1, v2) +P ∈ P. (ii) If
σ ∈ [0, v1] ∪ [v2, 1], the successful supplier bids pi (qi, qj) = ∆q (vi, vj) + P .
Lemma 2.3 is a key result. It implies that the amount of diversity that any contest can
implement is limited by the highest price that the contest allows. Intuitively, (i) states that, if
∆q (v1, v2) + P /∈ P, suppliers could increase their chances of winning by small moves towards
the approach of the other party, without reducing the price in those cases where they win. (ii)
shows that in all states outside the interval (v1, v2) the buyer pays a constant price, reflecting the
(maximal) quality difference between the two suppliers. Therefore, to implement any (v1, v2), a
buyer has to pay at least ∆q (v1, v2) (F (v1) + 1− F (v2)) in expectation to the suppliers.
2.3.2 Characterizing the Optimum
We now turn to our main results. Before identifying the optimal contest for the buyer, we first
show that bonus tournaments can implement a wide range of allocations.
Proposition 2.1. Any (v1, v2) such that 0 < v1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ v2 < 1 can be implemented by a
bonus tournament with sufficiently high subsidies. In particular, the social optimum can be
implemented.
Thus, the buyer can implement any desired diversity in a bonus tournament. The proof shows
that implementation works with P = {A, 0} and A = ∆q(v1, v2), so that A is the corresponding
maximal quality difference. For instance, to induce the social optimum, the buyer has to set A =
2011). In our setting, these issues are resolved by the appeal to the "preference for quality" (T1) and "preference for
winning" (T2). In some of our contests (in particular, in auctions with and without price ceilings), constructions
as in Blume (2003) and Kartik (2011) exist, where the low-quality firm mixes over a small interval of prices.
18If P is convex and supP > p¯ (σ) for all σ, then pi (qi, qj) = P for qi < qj in every equilibrium. To see this,
note that, according to Lemma 2.2, pj = p (σ) = P + q (vj , σ) − q (vi, σ) in any equilibrium for the high-quality
supplier j. If pi > P , then j can choose a slightly higher prize, and he still wins. Hence, this is a profitable
deviation.
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∆q(v∗i , v∗j ). The equilibrium pricing strategies turn out to be p1(), p2() such that pi (qi, qj) = A if
qi− qj ≥ A and 0 otherwise: The supplier only asks for the bonus A when his quality advantage
is maximal (σ ∈ [0, v1] ∪ [v2, 1]); otherwise she accepts the low price. Therefore, the buyer pays
the lowest price compatible with Lemma 2.3 for σ ∈ [0, v1] ∪ [v2, 1]. Clearly, the price 0 is also
minimal on (v1, v2). The bonus tournament is thus a flexible instrument with which the buyer
can fine-tune diversity with low supplier revenues. This suggests that the optimal contest is in
this class. However, this intuition is incomplete, as it does not account for subsidies. We now
show that it is nevertheless always optimal for the buyer to use bonus tournaments. However,
she will not always implement the social optimum.
Theorem 2.1. (i) The buyer optimum can be implemented with a suitable bonus tournament
({A, 0}, t) where the suppliers break even on expectation.
(ii) If C ≥ F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), the optimal contest for the buyer is a bonus tournament that
implements the social optimum, with subsidies used to ensure break even.
(iii) If C < F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), the optimal contest for the buyer is a bonus tournament that
implements just enough diversity that the suppliers break even without subsidies.
Whereas (i) only states the optimality of bonus tournaments, (ii) and (iii) specify the details
for the two different parameter regions. When research costs are high enough and quality differ-
ences in the social optimum are low, the buyer implements the social optimum. When research
costs are low, the buyer induces just enough diversity that the maximal quality differences are
sufficiently large that suppliers break even without subsidies.19 In any event, the suppliers earn
zero surplus. Thus, whenever there is a tradeoff between rent extraction and efficiency, the
buyer resolves it in favor of rent extraction by reducing variety relative to the social optimum.
As C increases, the buyer can implement more diversity without leaving rents to the suppliers.
Therefore, we obtain the comparative statics result that an increase in C leads to an increase in
the buyer-optimal diversity from 0 to the social optimum.
To understand the desirable properties of bonus tournaments, recall from Lemma 2.3 that
in any contest implementing (v1, v2), the price ∆q(v1, v2) + P has to be in the price set. This
fixes the price that the buyer has to pay in any state of the world when the quality difference
is maximal. What contest design can achieve, then, is to reduce prices paid in those states
of the world when σ ∈ (v1, v2), implying that the quality difference is not maximal. With a
bonus tournament (A, a), the buyer commits herself not to pay prices between a and A in these
states: Even when the quality difference is greater than a, she only pays a. Setting a = 0
clearly minimizes the revenues of the suppliers. The only remaining question is how much
diversity the buyer optimally induces. Through the option value it generates, diversity can
increase efficiency. However, it is costly for the buyer to induce. As mentioned before, the
theorem shows that whenever there is a tradeoff between efficiency and rent extraction, the
buyer sacrifices efficiency.
Even when subsidies are not feasible, the buyer can still implement the same outcome as
with subsidies unless research costs are too high. For C < F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), this is evident, as
the bonus tournament in Theorem 2.1(iii) does not require subsidies. For higher research costs
19Recall that, to implement (v1, v2), the buyer sets A = ∆q(v1, v2). Thus, for small diversity the bonus price
is small.
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the buyer can increase the low price a in order to make sure that the participation constraints
of the buyers hold.
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that (A1) and (A2) hold and that the buyer cannot use subsidies.
If F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ) < C ≤ F (v∗2) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), the buyer surplus is maximized by the bonus
tournament implementing (v∗1, v∗2) with P ={A, a}, where A = 2C + ∆q(v∗i , v∗j )/2 and a =
2C −∆q(v∗i , v∗j )/2.
The low positive price acts as an imperfect substitute for subsidies. In particular, when
C > F (v∗2) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), the difference ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ) between prices A and a is too small relative to
the size of the price a. Thus, suppliers are willing to sacrifice the bonus price in order to increase
their probability of winning the low price.
The buyer can increase her surplus if she is allowed to charge entry fees e > 0. She would
charge such fees only if C < F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), in which case the optimal fee e∗ satisfies C+e∗ =
F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), so that she achieves the first-best.20 With or without entry fees, the buyer
thus designs the contest so that the suppliers exactly break even on expectation.
2.4 Auctions and Fixed Prize Tournaments
In Section 2.3.2, we characterized the optimal contest. We now study two other types of contests
that are discussed in the literature, namely auctions and fixed prize tournaments. Auctions
generally have good incentive properties; for example, auctions are the optimal contest in the
setting of Che and Gale (2003). On the other hand, fixed prize tournaments are very common
innovation contests. Next, we examine how these contests perform in our setting, where the
choice of research approaches is important.
Proposition 2.2. (i) For any t such that the suppliers’ participation constraints are met, the
auction mechanism (P = R+) implements the social optimum. (ii) For any A ≥ 2C, the
unique equilibrium of an FPT (P = {A}) implements (v1, v2) = (1/2, 1/2). (iii) Whenever
C < F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ), the buyer prefers the inefficient FPT to the efficient auction.
Proposition 2.2(i) states that the auction induces the efficient amount of diversity. It is
intuitively clear that an auction implements some diversity: With identical approaches, no
supplier will earn a positive revenue. Any move away from the other supplier will lead to quality
advantages in a measurable set of states and thereby to positive expected revenues. Auctions
implement the socially efficient outcome because they align the externalities of the choice of
an approach vi with the private benefits. For example, fix some v2 and consider a marginal
change of v1. Such a change generates externalities only in the states of the world for which
the quality of supplier 2 is greater than the quality of supplier 1. Furthermore, the size of the
externality is exactly the change in the quality difference. Since supplier 1 wins the auction
only when his quality is higher and he bids exactly the quality difference, the private incentives
and the externalities are aligned. While we prove Proposition 2.2(i) directly in Appendix B.4,
an analogous result also applies for more general state distributions and quality functions and
20If the buyer is limited to setting fees below e∗, she will charge the maximum allowable fee.
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for arbitrary numbers of suppliers. It also holds when suppliers are heterogeneous. This result
extends beyond auctions to any type of institution that gives the chosen supplier a positive share
of the quality difference to the next-best alternative.
Proposition 2.2(ii) states that an FPT induces no diversity at all. The intuition for the
absence of diversity is straightforward. As the size of the prize is independent of quality differ-
ences in an FPT, the suppliers care only about maximizing the expected winning probability.
By (A1), this requires moving to the center. In particular, there is no diversity.
As to (iii), even though an auction implements the social optimum, it leaves rents to the
successful supplier whenever research costs are low enough. Because it avoids such rents, the
buyer may prefer to use a suitable FPT. On the other hand, a bonus tournament can achieve
the same efficiency as an auction, while reducing supplier rents, as the Figure 2.2 illustrates. If
the realized state of the world is σ ∈ [0, v1]∪ [v2, 1], the payment is the same in the auctions and
in the bonus tournament by Lemma 2.3. However, for σ ∈ (v1, v2) the winning supplier captures
the entire quality difference in the auction, while in the bonus tournament the winning supplier
receives only the low price a.
Auction
BT
0 1 σ
Payment
∆q(v1, v2)
v1 v2
Figure 2.2: Comparison of payments in an auction and a bonus tournament.
The trade-off between efficiency and rent extraction also shows up when analyzing the price
ceiling in auctions.
Corollary 2.2. An outcome (vi, vj) that is implemented in an auction with price ceiling P¯
satisfies ∆q(vi, vj) ≤ P¯ . Thus diversity is bounded by the price ceiling.
If the maximal quality difference between the two suppliers were above the maximum feasible
bid, the supplier could not charge the buyer for this quality difference. He could thus choose an
approach slightly closer to the competitor to increase his chances of winning without reducing
the price.
Corollary 2.2 embeds the auction without price ceiling and the FPT as polar cases. In an
auction without price ceiling, suppliers are free to choose the bid and thus capture the benefits
of diversification. This results in optimal diversity. By Corollary 2.2, price ceilings limit this
possibility: They determine an upper bound on equilibrium diversity. A reduction in the price
ceiling leads to lower equilibrium diversity. Thus, the choice of the price ceiling involves a trade-
off between efficiency-increasing diversity and market power for the suppliers. Consistent with
the logic of Theorem 2.1(iii) and Proposition 2.2(ii), the following result shows that the buyer
never resolves the trade-off in favor of efficiency when costs are low.
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Corollary 2.3. Let C = 0. Among all contests where P is convex, the buyer’s surplus is
maximal in an FPT with A = 0.
The proof of Corollary 2.3 relies heavily on the fact that higher quality suppliers bid the sum
of the quality differential and the minimum P whenever available (Lemma 2.2). Thus the buyer
surplus, as the difference between the expected maximal quality and the expected payment,
is the difference between the expectation of the minimum quality and the minimum bid. The
buyer’s best choice is an FPT with A = 0, because this maximizes the minimum quality and
minimizes the minimum bid.
Remember that the price set in a bonus tournament is of the form {A, a}. The last result
thus clearly underlines the role of non-convex price sets in a bonus tournament for the buyer
optimum. A buyer who is confined to the class of contests with convex price sets (including
auctions and FPTs) cannot profitably induce diversity.
The discussion in this section needs to be qualified if the buyer can charge entry fees. Ob-
viously, in this case any contest which implements the social optimum will lead to the first-best
outcome for the buyer, as the buyer can use the entry fees to extract any surplus from the sup-
pliers. In particular, both a bonus tournament and an auction lead to the first best. However,
while an auction is only optimal when entry fees are available, bonus tournaments are optimal
both with and without entry fees.
2.5 Extensions
In this section, we extend the model in several directions and study the robustness of our main
results. We show that with multiple suppliers bonus tournaments still have desirable properties.
Bonus tournaments are usually still preferable to FPTs, and they still implement the social
optimum with the lowest revenues. However, they may require higher subsidies than alternative
contests. For instance, auctions may implement the social optimum with lower supplier surplus
than bonus tournaments when research costs are high or when the number of suppliers is large.
We also study more general distributions and quality functions and briefly sketch several other
extensions.
2.5.1 Number of Suppliers
In innovation contests there are usually more than two suppliers. For example, there were
49 registered competitors in the EU Vaccine Prize, 12 of which submitted final designs for
evaluation.21 We therefore now deal with the possibility that there are many suppliers. For
simplicity, we assume that the distribution of ideal states is uniform.
Assumption (A1)” f (σ) = 1 ∀σ ∈ [0, 1].
With this assumption, we can characterize the social optimum and the equilibria of the main
contests previously discussed. Though most results also apply to the case n = 3, an FPT does
21European Commision (2014), "German company has won the EU’s e 2 million vaccine prize." March 10, 2014
(accessed on April 3, 2015). http://ec.europa.eu/research/health/vaccine-prize_en.html
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Figure 2.3: Equilibria when n = 6.
not have a pure strategy equilibrium in this case. To allow for simple formulations, we confine
ourselves to n > 3.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose there are n > 3 suppliers and (A1)” and (A2) hold.
(i) The social optimum is (v∗1, ..., v∗n) = (1/2n, 3/2n, 5/2n, ..., (2n− 1) /2n).
(ii) The social optimum can be implemented with a bonus tournament where P = {b/n, 0} and
t = C or with an auction with appropriate t ≥ 0.
(iii) In any equilibrium of an FPT with n suppliers, there is duplication, and the amount of
diversity is inefficiently low. As n increases, the difference between the socially optimal diversity
and the minimal diversity in any FPT equilibrium converges to zero.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the result for n = 6. In line with Lemma 2.4(i), there is no duplication
in the social optimum, and the approaches are evenly spread. The buyer can implement the
social optimum with a bonus tournament or an auction. The two other constellations describing
the equilibria of the FPT highlight implications of Lemma 2.4(iii). First, the two most extreme
approaches are not as far apart as the most extreme approaches of the social optimum; in this
sense, there is less than optimal diversity. Second, there is duplication.22
Lemma 2.4 allows us to compare different institutions.
Proposition 2.3. Suppose there are n > 3 suppliers and (A1)” and (A2) hold.
(i) The buyer prefers to implement the social optimum with a bonus tournament rather than an
auction if and only if C < (n− 1) b/2n3.
(ii) The buyer strictly prefers the bonus tournament (b/n, 0) to any FPT for n > 4; she is
indifferent for n = 4.
Proposition 2.3(i) qualifies the result for the case n = 2, in which the buyer always prefers
bonus tournaments to auctions under assumptions (A1) and (A2), which include uniform state
distributions and linear quality functions. Intuitively, with n > 3 suppliers bonus tournaments
still implement the social optimum with the lowest possible supplier revenue: Mirroring the logic
22The remaining features of the depicted FPT hold in a class of FPT equilibria given in Lemma B.3 in Appendix
B.5: The two most extreme approaches are always chosen by two suppliers. Moreover, depending on the specific
equilibrium, there may be additional duplication for intermediate approaches.
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for the case of two suppliers, the price is zero except for σ ≤ v1 and for σ ≥ vn, when it just
compensates for the quality difference to the second-best supplier. This leads to asymmetric
revenues of suppliers. In auctions the revenues are more symmetric than in bonus tournaments,
so that subsidies for which all suppliers break even involve less rents for the suppliers whose
expected revenues are highest.23 Proposition 2.3(ii) generalizes the corresponding result for the
benchmark model, with a small qualification for n = 4.
Lemma 2.4 has another simple but important implication: It may be socially optimal to
invite a large number of suppliers. This differs from the case of contests that merely influence the
suppliers’ efforts: Several papers show that, in those settings, the optimal number of participants
is typically two.
Corollary 2.4. Suppose research costs are C > 0 and that (A1)” holds. Define n− (C) =
max
{
n ∈ N| 2 ≤ n ≤ √b
/
2
√
C
}
and n+(C) = n− (C) + 1. Auctions or bonus tournament with
n− (C) or n+(C) suppliers maximize total surplus in the set of all contests with an arbitrary
number of suppliers.
With straightfoward additional arguments, Corollary 2.4 is implied by the previous results.
Lemma 2.4(i) characterizes the socially optimal allocation for given n, and auctions and bonus
tournaments implement this allocation. Corollary 2.4 describes the number of suppliers that
optimally balances the gains from higher expected quality against the losses from higher research
costs. The result implies that the optimal number of suppliers increases in b and decreases in
C. While the corollary is stated for the socially optimal contest, it is simple to show that the
buyer can also often benefit from inviting more than two suppliers and that the comparative
statics are similar. In particular, in a bonus tournament an increase in n leads not only to an
increase in the expected quality (reflecting higher option value), but also to a reduction in rents
that suppliers 1 and n obtain (reflecting an increase in competition).
2.5.2 Other Extensions
We now discuss several other extensions. We deal with heterogeneous suppliers, multiple prizes
and multiple research approaches of each supplier. In particular, the first issue is treated in
much more detail in the working paper (Letina and Schmutzler 2015).
2.5.2.1 Generalized distributions and quality functions.
In this subsection, we still assume that there are only two suppliers, but we generalize the
assumptions as follows:
Assumption (A1)’ The density function f (σ) is (i) symmetric and (ii) has full support:
f (σ) > 0 ∀σ ∈ [0, 1].
Assumption (A2)’ δ(|vi − σ|) is increasing and continuous.
Thus, we relax the requirements that the distribution be single-peaked and relatively flat
and that the distance function be linear.
23This issue obviously does not arise when differentiated subsidies are possible.
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Lemmas 2.2, 2.3 and Proposition 2.1 also hold under the relaxed assumptions (A1)’ and
(A2)’. The proofs are analogous and are therefore omitted here. As a result, the main contests
that we previously dealt with have the same properties as before:
Corollary 2.5. Suppose that (A1)’ and (A2)’ hold. Then, (i) the bonus tournament (P =
{∆q(v∗1, v∗2), 0}) and the auction mechanism (P = R+) implement the social optimum with ap-
propriate t ≥ 0. Moreover, (ii) in any FPT (P = {A} for A ≥ 2C), the unique equilibrium is
such that v1 = v2 and F (vi) = 1/2 for i = 1, 2.
The rankings between the contests are similar to the benchmark model of Section 2.2. How-
ever, there are cases where the buyer prefers auctions to bonus tournaments. The intuition is
essentially the same as for the case with multiple suppliers: While the bonus tournament imple-
ments the social optimum with lower supplier revenues than the auction, it may require higher
subsidies. The following result clarifies the circumstances under which bonus tournaments are
preferable even so.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose that (A1)’, and (A2)’ hold. Then, (i) the buyer strictly prefers
a suitable bonus tournament to the FPT whenever C > 0. (ii) The buyer weakly prefers a
suitable bonus tournament to the auction if at least one of the following conditions holds: (a)
C ≤ min {F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) , (1− F (v∗2)) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2)}, (b) v∗1 + v∗2 = 1, or (c) f (σ) is single-
peaked. Whenever (a) holds, the preference is strict.
According to (i), a suitable bonus tournament is still always preferable to an FPT in the
more general set-up. Together, the conditions in (ii) show that a suitable bonus tournament
dominates an auction under quite general conditions: Counterexamples require that research
costs are high, that the social optimum is not symmetric and that f (σ) is not single-peaked.
2.5.2.2 Heterogeneous Suppliers
The assumption of homogeneous suppliers simplifies the analysis. In many contexts, it is nev-
ertheless natural to allow for exogenous heterogeneity: Suppliers may differ with respect to
expertise or research capabilities. Architects may have different and essentially fixed styles. In
Letina and Schmutzler (2015), we extend the model to allow for such exogenous heterogeneity.
To this end, we consider a two-dimensional state space to capture both exogenous and endoge-
nous heterogeneity. We focus on uniform state distributions and the case C = 0. We show that
the social optimum only involves diversification if exogenous heterogeneity is not too strong. As
in the case of homogeneous suppliers with low research costs, however, fixed-prize tournaments
do not induce any diversification, but buyers prefer them to auctions.
The framework with heterogeneous suppliers has an additional advantage: For sufficiently
heterogeneous buyers, the modified framework allows us to use the alternative informational
assumption that suppliers cannot observe qualities when they submit bids, which is intractable
for homogeneous suppliers. We show that there is no diversification in this equilibrium for an
auction.
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2.5.2.3 Fixed-Prize Tournaments with Multiple Prizes
The US military research agency DARPA carried out various contests to foster the development
of unmanned vehicles capable of navigating in rugged terrain. In the 2005 DARPA Grand
Challenge, only the winner of the contest was eligible for the prize ($2 million), while the other
contestants received nothing. This corresponds to an FPT as introduced above. However, in the
subsequent DARPA contest, known as the 2007 Urban Challenge, rules specified that not only
would the winner receive a prize (which was again $2 million), but the next two participants
would also receive prizes ($1 million and $0.5 million).24 While a full analysis is beyond the
scope of this paper, we can show that a buyer is worse off in an FPT with two prizes than with a
single prize.25 The following result shows that the buyer has nothing to gain from using multiple
prizes.
Lemma 2.5. Suppose that n > 3 and that (A1)” and (A2) hold. Further, suppose that t is
sufficiently large, and that the two prizes are A1 > A2 > 0. For any equilibrium in an FPT
with two prizes, there exists an equilibrium in an FPT with a single prize which makes the buyer
strictly better off.
Clearly, when there are only two suppliers, a second prize has no effect, as the suppliers
would consider it as a pure subsidy, and the effective prize would be the difference between the
first and the second prize. The proof of Lemma 2.5 shows that any equilibrium of an FPT with
two prizes involves more duplication than the chosen equilibrium of an FPT with a single prize,
which leads to a lower buyer surplus. This result suggests that multiple prizes do not improve
diversity.26
2.5.2.4 Multiple Designs by the Same Supplier
We have assumed so far that each supplier can only develop a single approach. However, in the
2005 DARPA Grand Challenge, vehicles designed by the Red Team from Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity took the second and third place. By developing multiple designs, a supplier internalizes
some of the resulting option value. It is thus natural to allow for multiple approaches of different
suppliers. The modified model is analytically intractable, but a numerical analysis suggest that
our main results are robust. We study the cases with n ∈ {2, ..., 5} suppliers, each of which can
develop m = 2 approaches, and the case with n = 2 suppliers, each of which can develop m = 3
approaches. We assume that (A1)” and (A2) hold and that C = 0. We also fix values of Ψ and
b.27
Numerical Result: If there are n suppliers and each develops m approaches, then: (i) Both
a bonus tournament and an auction implement the socially optimum described in Lemma 2.4(i),
24See Section 1.4 of the DARPA Urban Challenge Rules (2007) (accessed on June 24, 2015).
http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge/docs/Urban_Challenge_Rules_102707.pdf
25The results can be extended to more than two prizes.
26Of course, there may be reasons outside of the model which would make multiple prizes a desirable choice for
a contest designer. For example, if suppliers are risk averse, providing multiple prizes may be a way of increasing
their expected utility.
27For details and the code used to obtain numerical results, see Supplementary Material for Section 5.2.4,
available at https://sites.google.com/site/iletina/research.
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with n replaced by n ·m. (ii) In an FPT, there exists an equilibrium which is identical to the
maximally duplicative equilibrium of an FPT with n ·m suppliers, each of which develops one
approach.
The notion of a maximally duplicative equilibrium is made precise in Lemma B.3 in Appendix
B.5: There, we consider a class of equilibria where maximal duplication occurs when each active
research approach is chosen by two suppliers. While the analysis is clearly incomplete, the
numerical result suggests that the case where n suppliers each develop m approaches can be
analyzed using the framework where n · m suppliers each develop one approach (see Section
2.5.1).
2.6 Relation to the Literature
This paper contributes to the literature on optimal contest design, especially the design of inno-
vation contests. The existing design literature focuses exclusively on effort incentives. In models
of fixed-prize tournaments, Taylor (1995) shows that free entry is undesirable, and Fullerton and
McAfee (1999) show that the optimal number of participants is two. Fullerton et al. (2002) find
that buyers are better off with auctions rather than fixed-prize tournaments. In a very general
framework, Che and Gale (2003) show that an auction with two suppliers is the optimal con-
test. Contrary to the previous literature, our paper focuses on the suppliers’ choice of research
approaches rather than on effort levels. We characterize the optimal contests in such settings,
highlighting in particular the useful role of bonus tournaments.
Letina (2016) also studies the diversity of approaches to innovation, but the objects of analy-
sis and the employed models are very different. He focuses on a market context with anonymous
buyers, and he deals with comparative statics rather than optimal design. In particular, the
paper finds that a merger decreases the diversity of approaches to innovation.
While we are not aware of any other paper that considers optimal contest design when di-
versity plays a role, some authors compare contests in related, but different settings. In Ganuza
and Hauk (2006), suppliers choose both an approach to innovation and a costly effort.28 How-
ever, these authors focus exclusively on fixed-prize tournaments, while we study the optimal
contest design. Erat and Krishnan (2012) analyze a fixed-prize tournament where suppliers can
choose from a discrete set of approaches.29 The authors find that suppliers cluster on approaches
delivering the highest quality. This result is related to our result that there is duplication of
approaches in the equilibria of fixed-prize tournaments. In addition to allowing for alterna-
tive contests, our model also considers correlated rather than independent qualities; it is thus
meaningful to speak of similar approaches.30 Schöttner (2008) considers two contestants who
influence quality stochastically by exerting effort. She finds that, for large random shocks, the
buyer prefers to hold a fixed-prize tournament rather than an auction to avoid the market power
28In Ganuza and Pechlivanos (2000), Ganuza (2007) and Kaplan (2012), the buyer has to choose the design or
alternatively can reveal information about the preferred design.
29See also Terwiesch and Xu (2008) for the effect of number of suppliers when exogeneous random shocks are
large. For empirical evidence see Boudreau et al. (2011).
30See also Konrad (2014) for a variant of Erat and Krishnan’s model where first best is restored if the tie-breaking
is decided via costly competition (for example lobbying) as opposed to randomly.
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of a lucky seller in an auction. This resembles the trade-off underlying our Proposition 2.2. How-
ever, her analysis does not speak to optimal design and the role of bonus tournaments. It also
does not address the setting with n > 3 suppliers.31
Our paper is also related to the literature on innovation contests with exponential-bandit
experimentation (see Halac et al. (forthcoming) and references therein). In these models, it
is uncertain whether the innovation is feasible. Suppliers participating in the contest expend
costly effort to learn the state, and they also learn from the experimentation of their opponents.
The goal of the contest is to induce experimentation. However, each supplier experiments in the
same way. In our model, experimentation arises at the industry level for suitable contests, as
the heterogeneity of approaches allows the buyer to pick the best available choice.
More broadly, our paper is related to the literature on policy experimentation. For instance,
Callander and Harstad (2015) show that decentralized policy experimentation yields too much
diversity. In their model, there are two heterogeneous political districts which choose whether
or not to experiment with policy. In addition, they choose which policy to experiment with. A
policy experiment is successful with some probability and a successful experiment increases the
value of that policy (for all districts) by a fixed amount. Since experimentation is costly, there
is a free riding problem, which is especially severe when the districts want to experiment with
similar policies. To reduce the free riding problem, a district will choose to experiment with a
policy which is not desirable from the perspective of the other district. Hence, in equilibrium the
policy experiments will be inefficiently diverse. Next, they show that centralization of political
power can improve the outcome by reducing diversity. Contrary to our model, Callander and
Harstad (2015) assume that the success probabilities of different experiments are independent,
no matter how similar the policies are. This assumption removes the option value of having
different experiments, which is central to our model. If there existed an ideal policy (in terms of
quality) as in our model, then the option value would have to be traded off against the benefits
of convergence emphasized by Callander and Harstad (2015). It would be interesting to see
whether and how centralization would help to resolve this trade off.
In a related paper, Bonatti and Rantakari (2016) consider a setting where two agents choose
which project to develop. To successfully develop a project, an agent exerts effort until a success
occurs. For a successful project to be adopted (and yield a positive payoff) both agents have
to consent to the adoption. By assumption, the agents have opposite preferences over the set of
projects. The agents have an incentive to pursue extreme projects (which they like the most)
but the veto power of the other agent forces them to compromise. As in Callander and Harstad
(2015) the success of one approach is unrelated to the success of any other approach. This
removes the option value of diversity that we identify in our paper.
31More broadly related is Bajari and Tadelis (2001) who do not deal with innovations, but with construction
projects. The issue of the right approach to the problem arises in such settings as well. The supplier obtains
new information during the period when the contract is being executed, which allows him to adapt the original
approach at some cost. Since the relationship is between a buyer and only one supplier, the question of diversity
of approaches does not arise. This is also true for the related work by Arve and Martimort (2016) who study
risk-sharing considerations in the design of contracts with ex-post adaptation. Additionally, Ding and Wolfstetter
(2011) consider a case where a supplier can choose to bypass the contest and negotiate with the buyer directly in
an environment where innovation quality is obtained by expending costly effort.
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2.7 Conclusions and Discussion
The ideal approach to solving an innovation problem is usually unknown to suppliers and buyers.
Our paper investigates the implications of this uncertainty for contest design. Under very general
conditions, it is socially optimal for suppliers to take diverse research approaches, and the social
optimum can be obtained with both bonus tournaments and auction mechanisms. Inducing
diversity of approaches to innovation is costly for the buyer. To reduce supplier rents, she may
therefore want to induce suboptimal diversification. Bonus tournaments are in the set of optimal
contests under quite general conditions. The difference between the bonus and the low price
provides incentives for suppliers to diversify, which allows the buyer to fine-tune the amount
of diversity induced. At the same time, bonus tournaments minimize the power of suppliers to
exploit their quality advantage. The non-convexity of the price set is decisive for this feature.
Our results have practical implications for the design of innovation contests. While today
most innovation contests feature fixed prizes, our results suggest that a better outcome could be
achieved if an additional bonus prize was paid whenever the winner outperformed the second-
best contestant by a sufficient margin. Such bonus prizes would be easy to implement and would
not make the innovation tournaments significantly more complicated then they are today. Bonus
prizes would give incentives to contestants to not only win the contest, but to win with a large
margin. Our model suggests that this incentive would lead to an increase in the diversity of
approaches to innovation.
Beyond innovation contests, our model can be used to analyze how institutions affect the
incentives for experimentation when the optimal approach to solving a given problem is not
known. We can think of our model as capturing product choice in markets with a unit mass of
homogeneous buyers, each of which has unit demand. We can then interpret the uncertainty
about the ideal state in two ways. First, it may reflect uncertainty about the buyers’ taste.
Second, it may capture an "engineering uncertainty" where the suppliers know what the buyers
would like, but are uncertain about how to achieve this. Our results imply that an unregulated
market maximizes expected total surplus. The unregulated market gives incentives for firms to
optimally diversify, but leaves them with market power. The trade-off resembles the one between
ex-ante incentives and ex-post monopoly power in the innovation literature. In our case, however,
the higher expected quality from the unregulated market does not result from higher innovation
incentives at the individual firm level, but rather from the higher diversification incentives at
the market level. Our results point to a novel source of potential inefficiency stemming from
price regulation: Firms in industries with regulated competition will be less likely to sufficiently
experiment by introducing diverse products. At the same time, this result also points to the
importance of vigorous competition. The incentive to diversify would be diminished if firms
colluded or divided the market.
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3 Designing Dynamic Research Contests1
Joint with Jean-Michel Benkert
3.1 Introduction
Research contests2 have a long history as mechanisms for inducing innovation. From navigation
and food preservation, to aviation,3 research contests have been used to find solutions to some
of society’s most pressing problems. Recently, the use of research contests by both private and
public sector has been expanding rapidly. As in the past, research contests are used in order to
foster innovation in some of the most pressing and difficult issues that society is facing. Some
examples of problems to which research contests have been applied include vaccine technology,
antibiotics overuse, space flight, robotics and AI, as well as environment and energy efficiency.4
Given that the 2010 America Competes Reauthorization Act authorized US Federal agencies to
use prizes and contests, it can be expected that the importance of research contests will only
grow in the coming years.
Mistakes in contest design can waste R&D funds and slow the development of important
innovations. While some aspects of contest design, like the effect of the number of competitors
or the allocation of prizes, are well studied,5 less is known about the dynamic aspects of contest
design. At the same time, as Lang et al. (2014) point out, “there are surprisingly few multi-
period contest models in which each player’s decision problem is dynamic.” This paper deals
with the (buyer-)optimal design of dynamic research contests in precisely such an environment.
We identify a novel design lever that the contest designer can use in order to increase efficiency
of the contest — namely the fact that the prizes can differ depending on the time when they
are awarded.6
We build on the model of Taylor (1995), where N sellers choose in each of the T periods
whether to invest in research or not. Investment is costly, but in each period a seller does
research he obtains an innovation, the quality of which is a random draw from some distribution
1This paper should be cited as Benkert, J.-M. and I. Letina (2016), “Designing Dynamic Research Contests,”
University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 235.
2Research contests are sometimes referred to as innovation contests or inducement prizes.
31714 Longitude Prize, 1795 Napoleon’s Food Preservation Prize and 1919 Orteig Prize, respectively.
42012 EU Vaccine Prize; 2015 Better Use of Antibiotics Prize; 1996 Ansari X Prize, 2006 Northrop Grumman
Lunar Lander XCHALLENGE and 2007 Google Lunar X-Prize; 2004 DARPA Grand Challenge, 2007 Urban Chal-
lenge, 2014 A.I. presented by TED XPRIZE; 1992 Super-Efficient Refrigerator Program, Progressive Insurance
Automotive X PRIZE and 2015 NRG Cosia Carbon XPRIZE.
5See Che and Gale (2003), Moldovanu and Sela (2001) and Moldovanu and Sela (2006).
6To the best of our knowledge dynamic prizes have not been studied in the context of contest design before. Of
course, dynamic payoffs have been used in other context, for example in bandit models like in Green and Taylor
(forthcoming).
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F . The investment decisions, and the current highest quality of their innovations are private
information to the sellers. If a seller reveals the innovation to the buyer, the buyer can costlessly
and accurately determine its quality. However, the quality of innovations is not verifiable by
outside parties. In particular, a contract which conditions on the innovation quality is not
enforceable by courts. These assumptions are standard in the literature.7 In order to incentivize
the sellers to invest in innovation, the buyer commits to a scheme that will, in some enforceable
way, pay out a prize to the winning supplier(s). For example in Taylor (1995), the seller commits
to paying a prize P at the end of the T periods. Following the literature, will call this institution
a research tournament.
We deviate from Taylor’s model in two important ways. First, we assume that the buyer
can commit to a time-dependent prize scheme. This assumption only requires that the contracts
can be time-dependent. There are many examples of such contracts — bills have to be paid
by a certain date, with penalties for late payment, savings can be deposited for a fixed period
of time, and delivery of parcels can be guaranteed within a specified time period. Even in the
context of research contests we find examples of time-dependent contracts: in the 2006 Netflix
prize in addition to the final Grand Prize, a $50,000 Progress Prize could be awarded each year
before the contest ended.
Second, in the main section we assume that the innovations have what we will call a break-
through structure. That means that each innovation falls broadly into two categories — it is
either a breakthrough or not. All breakthrough innovations are worth approximately the same
to the buyer and all non-breakthrough innovations are worth approximately the same. As the
name suggests, breakthrough innovations are worth substantially more. This does not imply
that there are only two quality levels – there may be many. What is important is that there
is a distinction between the very valuable breakthrough innovations and relatively less valuable
other innovations. For example, many contests explicitly state the goal of the contest. Then
a breakthrough is any innovation that reaches the goal. In the Ansari X Prize, the sponsors
used the objectively verifiable goal of “build[ing] and launch[ing] a spacecraft capable of carry-
ing three people to 100 kilometers above the Earth’s surface, twice within two weeks”.8 While
the spacecraft that met the proxy could be better or worse, the difference to the organizer did
probably not matter as much as achieving that publicly stated goal. Thus, we believe that the
breakthrough innovation structure fits well with many research contests.
Given the breakthrough innovation structure, we show that in the first-best9 all suppliers
invest and conduct research until at least one of them achieves a breakthrough, at which point
all research stops. This is an example of a global stopping rule. However, giving just a single
prize at the end of the T periods of the contest cannot implement a global stopping rule. Indeed,
it uniquely implements an individual stopping rule, where each seller performs research until he
achieves some threshold value which is determined by the size of the prize (Taylor, 1995). In
order to implement a global stopping rule, the sellers must be incentivized to conduct research
in every period and to truthfully reveal that they have achieved an innovation, while the buyer
7See for example Taylor (1995) and Che and Gale (2003).
8See the Ansari X Prize website http://ansari.xprize.org.
9By first-best we mean maximizing total surplus in the absence of informational barriers.
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has to be incentivized to stop the other firms from conducting further research. We show that a
dynamic prize tournament, which is essentially a research tournament with the value of the prize
potentially changing over time, can achieve this. By appropriately choosing a prize schedule, so
that the prizes increase in each period the contest continues, the buyer can be incentivized to
stop the tournament as soon as a seller submits a breakthrough. This is done by setting the
slope of the increase in prizes such that it is exactly equal to the marginal benefit to the buyer
of one more round of research. At the same time, if the intercept of the prize schedule is high
enough, the sellers will have an incentive to conduct research in every period and to truthfully
reveal their breakthroughs as soon as they have them, because otherwise they would risk losing
the tournament entirely. Thus, by appropriately choosing the slope and the intercept of the
prize schedule the seller can implement any global stopping rule, and the first-best stopping rule
in particular.
Next, we relax the assumption on breakthrough innovations. First we characterize the opti-
mal global stopping rule with the more general innovation structure and show that it satisfies
the property that the marginal benefit of one more round of research equals the marginal cost.
We then show that any global stopping rule can be implemented with an appropriately designed
schedule of prices. Thus, our implementation result is robust to the specification of the inno-
vation structure. Moreover, we show that any global stopping rule can be implemented even
if the number of sellers doing research changes from period to period, as long as the sequence
is fixed ex ante. That is, our implementation result does not depend on the assumption that
the set of sellers is constant for the entire duration of the contest. This is especially important
as some contests proceed in stages, so that some participants are eliminated in every stage.10
Finally, we consider the effect of a change in the horizon T of the contest. We show that, with a
global stopping rule, an increase in T always increases the payoff of the buyer. The intuition is
that, with a global stopping rule, the contest is stopped whenever an innovation of high enough
quality is realized. Thus, the contest only continues past the time T if it was beneficial to do so.
Whereas in a research tournament, an increase in the horizon T can lead to a decrease in buyer
payoff. The reason for this is that with individual stopping rules the longer the time horizon is,
the higher the chance of wasteful duplication.
Generally, research contests are classified into research tournaments and innovation races.11
To win a research tournament a seller needs to have the best innovation at some specific date,
whereas a seller needs to have a specific innovation as quickly as possible to win an innovation
race. Thus, for an innovation race to be feasible, verifiability is necessary in order to determine
whether some proposed innovation is indeed the innovation required to win the race. When
innovation races are implemented in practice, a verifiable proxy is commonly used to determine
whether an innovation meets the buyer’s requirements. Recall that in the case of the 1996
Ansari X Prize, the objectively verifiable proxy was to have two manned space flights within
two weeks using the same spacecraft. The larger objective of the organizer, however, was to
“incentivize the creation of a safe, reliable, reusable, privately-financed manned space ship to
demonstrate that private space travel is commercially viable”. The advantage of a race is that it
10See for instance the IBM Watson AI XPRIZE.
11See the discussion in Taylor (1995).
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proceeds until an appropriate innovation has been developed and that it minimizes the wasteful
duplication. When implementing research tournaments, the buyer in general does not have to
use a proxy. However, other problems arise. In contrast to innovation races the sponsor of a
research tournament needs to announce an end date at which the submissions will be judged. If
the competitors are not given enough time, they may fail to produce a good enough innovation.12
If the deadline is very late, however, there is a risk of wasteful duplication.
Our dynamic prize tournament offers a solution to these problems. We show that when im-
plementing a global stopping rule the buyer benefits from increasing the duration of the contest,
thereby allowing for very late deadlines which increase the chance of getting a sufficiently good
innovation. At the same time, the nature of the global stopping rule ensures that throughout
the contest an innovation race is taking place, thus avoiding the risk of duplication arising in
research tournaments. Moreover, this innovation race is implemented without requiring a proxy,
hence eliminating this source of inefficiency. Effectively, a dynamic prize tournament inherits the
best properties of both innovation races and research tournaments. Overall, our results indicate
that using dynamic prizes could result in substantially more efficient research contests.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the relevant literature. Section
3.3 presents the model. Section 3.4 characterizes the first-best and shows that it can be imple-
mented with a dynamic prize tournament. Section 3.5 considers extensions to the main model
and in particular relaxes the assumption of breakthrough innovation. Section 3.6 concludes. All
proofs are relegated to the appendix.
3.2 Related Literature
The seminal paper on dynamic research contests is Taylor (1995) on which we build our model.13
He shows that a T -period research tournament with N sellers, that is, a fixed prize is awarded
at the end of the contest, uniquely implements an individual stopping rule among the sellers.
Further, Taylor shows that it is optimal to limit the number of sellers in the contest and that
the buyer can extract the entire ex ante surplus using appropriate entry fees. As Taylor himself
notes, however, his contest generally fails to implement the first-best, which entails a global
stopping rule instead of an individual stopping rule (Gal et al., 1981). Moreover, Morgan (1983)
shows that holding the number of sellers conducting research fixed across time is generally not
optimal either, as the optimal number should vary over time depending on the currently highest
quality among the sellers and the number of periods left.14 Fullerton et al. (2002) compare
Taylor’s research tournament to an auction in the same setting. That is, the only change to
Taylor’s framework is that at the end of the contest an auction is used to allocate the prize
among the sellers. The authors argue that this lowers the buyer’s informational requirements
12The objective of the 2004 DARPA Grand Challenge was to “accelerate the development of autonomous
vehicle technologies that can be applied to military requirements” but none of the competitors managed
to fulfill the requirements of the tournament. Eventually, the requirements were matched in the 2005
DARPA Grand Challenge, suggesting that more time was needed to be succesful. See the official website on
http://archive.darpa.mil/grandchallenge04/.
13Konrad (2009) provides an excellent overview of the literature on contests. See also Siegel (2009) for general
results on all-pay auctions.
14See Morgan and Manning (1985) for general results on the first-best search rule in this environment.
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and they provide experimental evidence that this is more cost-effective when the buyer cannot
charge entry fees. It is noteworthy that the buyer continues to employ an individual stopping
rule when using an auction and therefore still fails to implement the first-best. Rieck (2010)
considers a variation of Taylor’s framework which enables him to study the role of information
revelation. He shows that when the sellers’ research outcomes are publicly revealed there are
essentially two thresholds instead of one. If the highest quality among the sellers is above the
upper threshold all sellers stop research, if the highest quality is between the two thresholds
only the leading seller stops research and if all qualities are below the lower threshold all sellers
continue to do research. Depending on the parameters the buyer may be better off with or
without information revelation.
Recently a number of papers have used bandit models to study the problem of incentive
provision for dynamic research activity. Halac et al. (forthcoming) consider the optimal design
of contests for innovation when it is unclear ex ante whether or not the innovation in question can
actually be successfully realized. Thus, in contrast to our setting the reason for research activity
is not to get as good an innovation as possible, but rather to determine an innovation’s feasibility.
The buyer who designs the contest can choose the prize-sharing scheme and a disclosure policy
which determines what information is revealed to the sellers about their respective outcomes.
Similarly to our setting, the first-best features a global stopping rule. However, Halac et al.
(forthcoming) find that a contest which does not entail a global stopping rule can be optimal
in the presence of private effort provision by the sellers. More generally, they show that in a
broad class of contests it is optimal to stop the contest only once a certain number of sellers
had a success and to share the prize between them. Bimpikis et al. (2014) study a closely
related question to Halac et al. (forthcoming) but allow for partial progress, i.e., in order for an
innovation to be feasible a milestone or breakthrough is necessary before the potential success
is realized, and the buyer may set a prize for the breakthrough and the eventual success each.
While they do not consider the question of optimal design, they show that the buyer may
benefit from not revealing a partial success. Along similar lines Green and Taylor (forthcoming)
consider the role of breakthroughs in a single-agent contracting environment. In contrast to our
framework, the research outcome can be contracted upon and the problem the buyer faces is
how to optimally induce effort over time using a first deadline for the breakthrough, a second
deadline for the final outcome and a monetary transfer. In their paper the monetary transfer is
decreasing over time, which induces the agent to aim for an early success. Thus, the slope of
the prize schedule is used to affect the seller’s incentives. In contrast, in our paper the increase
in prizes over time serves to align the buyer’s incentives.
The seminal paper in the literature on optimal design of research contests in the static
context is Che and Gale (2003). The authors consider a model where the innovation technology
is deterministic. Once the innovations are developed, the sellers bid for a price at which the
buyer can obtain their innovation. The buyer then chooses the bid which offers her the highest
surplus, that is, the highest difference between the value of the information and the bid. The
contest design consists of the choice of the set from which the sellers can choose their bids.
This set of mechanisms turns out to be very flexible and includes the fixed-prize structure
of the research tournament (when the set of allowable bids is a singleton) and the auction
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(when the set is R+). The authors show that with symmetric sellers the optimal contest is an
auction and the optimal number of sellers is two. When sellers are asymmetric, the optimal
contest is still an auction with two sellers, but the optimal auction handicaps the more efficient
sellers.15 The major difference between Che and Gale (2003) and our paper is that we focus
on the dynamic aspects of contest design. Thus, the question of wasteful duplication of effort,
which is the central issue we address with the dynamic prize tournament, does not show up
in Che and Gale (2003). Another difference is the choice of innovation technology — when
innovation is deterministic, as in Che and Gale (2003), there is no sampling benefit from having
more than two sellers.16 Additionally, an auction gives market power to the sellers, and when the
innovation technology is sufficiently random, an auction might perform badly as the seller profits
from the good realizations.17 Several other directions have been explored in the static setting.
Letina and Schmutzler (2016) consider the optimal contest design when the sellers can choose
their approach to innovation and the buyer attempts to give them incentives to diversify their
approaches because of the resulting option value. They find that the optimal contest is what
they call a bonus tournament, where a winner gets a fixed prize, plus a bonus if he outperforms
the second best seller with a high enough margin. Moldovanu and Sela (2001) consider how a
total prize sum should be split by a buyer who is maximizing the expected effort. They find
that if the cost functions are concave or linear in effort, then it is optimal to allocate the entire
prize sum to the winner. If, on the other hand, cost functions are convex, it may be optimal to
offer multiple prizes.
Lang et al. (2014) consider a two-player, fixed-price contest where sellers exert effort over time
and breakthroughs arrive according to a Poisson process. The seller with the most breakthroughs
wins. The authors consider the effect of changing the time T when the contest ends. They
find that the buyer can be better off with a shorter deadline, which is exactly our finding in
Proposition 3.6 for a research tournament. However, we also show that this result does not hold
for arbitrary contests — in our setting, a buyer is always better off with a longer deadline when
implementing a global stopping rule.
More broadly related are papers examining if buyers should be split into several subcontests
or eliminated over time. Moldovanu and Sela (2006) find that if the buyer is maximizing the
expected value of the highest effort it is beneficial to split the sellers into preliminary subcontests
and to have the finalists compete against each other. In a different setting,18 Fu and Lu (2012)
find that maximizing expected effort involves eliminating one seller in each round. An additional
question that has been examined in the literature on dynamic contests is the question of how
the information about the relative performance during the contest should be used. Gershkov
and Perry (2009) study a contest with two agents and two stages and ask if a review should
be conducted after stage one. They show that, assuming reviews are aggregated optimally, it
is always beneficial to conduct a midterm review. In a related setting, Klein and Schmutzler
(forthcoming) consider how a prize sum should be allocated for the first and second period
15Discrimination in contests is also studied in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2016).
16See for example Terwiesch and Xu (2008) and Letina (2016).
17This is the case in Schöttner (2008) who shows that when innovation technology is sufficiently random, a
research tournament can outperform an auction.
18They use nested contest as in Clark and Riis (1996).
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performance, and how information about it should be used. They show that for large parameter
regions, entire prize sum should be paid to the winner but both first-period and second-period
performance should be weighted when determining the winner.
There is relatively little empirical work on dynamic research contests. Using data on software
contests Boudreau et al. (2011) find that increasing the number of participants reduces average
effort but increases the chance of getting a very high quality innovation. Also using data on
software contests Boudreau et al. (2016) find that the results derived in Moldovanu and Sela
(2001) generally perform quite well. In particular, they find that the response of participants to
an increase in the number of competitors yields heterogeneous responses. Namely, low ability
agents respond weakly, medium ability agents decrease their efforts while high ability agents
increase their efforts. We refer to the recent survey Dechenaux et al. (2015) for experimental
work on contests.
3.3 The Model
There is a risk-neutral buyer who wants to procure an innovation and N ≥ 2 ex ante identical
risk-neutral sellers who can potentially produce the innovation by conducting research. If the
buyer obtains the innovation in any period t ∈ {1, . . . , T} with T <∞, her payoff is θ−p, where
θ is the quality of the innovation and p is the sum of any transfers. A seller’s payoff is m − c,
where m is the sum of any transfers received and c is the total cost incurred through research
activities. The innovations are of no intrinsic value to the sellers.
A seller can conduct research in any period t at per-period cost C > 0. In each period in
which the seller performs research he obtains an innovation of value θ ∈ Θ. The innovation
value obtained is an independent draw from some distribution F with full and finite support
where Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θK}. Suppose without loss that θk+1 > θk and we normalize θ1 = 0.
Sellers can repeatedly conduct research and have perfect recall, that is, they can access all
their own previous innovations at any point in time. Initially, every seller is endowed with a
worthless innovation and in each period a seller does not perform research he receives a worthless
innovation.
We say a research contest features a breakthrough innovation structure if there exists some
innovation θb ∈ Θ such that all innovations below θb are worth very little to the buyer, while all
innovations at or above θb are worth approximately the same. Thus, there are essentially two
levels of innovation — breakthroughs and low-value innovations. In Section 3.5 we will relax
the assumptions on Θ. Formally, we will say that the innovation process has a breakthrough
innovation structure if the following assumption is satisfied.
Assumption 3.1 (breakthrough innovation structure). There exists θb ∈ Θ such that (i) θK −
θb < C and (ii) θb ≥ θ¯, for some threshold value θ¯.19
This assumption captures the intuition that (i) all innovations in which a breakthrough was
realized are of roughly the same value to the buyer, and (ii) reflects that all breakthroughs are
of sufficiently high value. A very simple example of breakthrough innovation structure would be
19See the proof of Proposition 3.1 for the precises statement of the threshold θ¯.
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Θ = {0, ε, B,B + ε} for sufficiently large B and small ε. Then B and B + ε are breakthrough
innovations.
The sellers’ research activity (whether or not they conduct research in any given period)
and research outcomes (the value of an innovation obtained in any given period) are private
information. If a seller submits an innovation to the buyer, the buyer can determine the value of
the innovation at no cost. However, the value of an innovation is not verifiable by a court. Thus,
contracts conditioning on the value of innovation are not credible.20 To overcome the hold-up
problem, the buyer commits to holding a contest and to paying a prize p to the winner of the
contest. We assume that the buyer can commit to paying a prize pt if the tournament ends in
period t. This requires that the courts can verify (i) when the contest was declared over, and
(ii) if the correct prize was paid.
In period 0 the buyer announces the contests 〈E,p, n〉 which consists of an entry fee E, a prize
schedule p = [p1, p2, . . . , pT ] and the maximal number of participants n. Sellers observe 〈E,p, n〉
and decide whether to pay the (possibly negative) entry fee E.21 If less than two sellers decide
to participate, the contest is canceled. If more than n sellers wish to participate, n are selected
randomly. In each period t ∈ {1, . . . , T} the participants in the contest can simultaneously
conduct research and subsequently decide whether or not to submit an innovation to the buyer.
At the end of the period the buyer can declare any of the submissions the winner in which case
the contest ends and the seller who submitted the winning innovation receives the prize pt.22
If no winner is declared in period t or there have been no submissions, the contest proceeds to
period t+ 1 unless it was already the last period of the contest. In this case, all sellers submit
an innovation and the buyer must declare a winner.
This model of dynamic research contests is essentially the same as the one proposed in
Taylor (1995). We make only two changes. First, we assume that the buyer can commit to
a schedule of period-specific prizes p. This assumption only requires that the contracts can
be time-dependent, which we view as uncontroversial. Second, to derive our main results we
impose some structure on the set of innovations Θ. Namely, we assume that innovations have a
breakthrough structure as discussed above and that the set Θ is a discrete set.23
The contest 〈E,p, n〉 induces a T -period dynamic game of incomplete information with the
set of players being the buyer and the sellers who participate in contest. The set of players, their
payoff functions, the research technology and the contest structure are common knowledge. The
seller’s research activity and outcomes are private information. The timing of the game is as
follows.
20Non-observability and non-verifiability is a typical feature of research activity. As Taylor (1995, p. 873) notes
“research inputs are notoriously difficult to monitor” and “courts seldom possess the ability or expertise necessary
to evaluate technical research projects”.
21The assumption that the buyer can charge an entry fee is taken from Taylor (1995). It is essentially an
assumption that the sellers are not liquidity constrained. Alternatively, the results would remain unchanged if we
assumed that the buyer cannot charge an entry fee, but instead maximizes social welfare. Many research contest
are motivated exactly by social welfare and not by the private profit of the contest organizer.
22In principle, the buyer could commit to not end the contest early. We assume that this is not possible in
order to reduce the dimension of the buyer’s strategy space. The assumption is without loss, as setting very high
pt essentially commits the buyer to not end the contest in period t.
23The discreteness assumption is made to avoid the technicalities of defining beliefs in a dynamic game with
continuous spaces. As already noted we will relax the breakthrough structure in Section 3.5.
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Period 0:
- All N invited sellers decide whether to enter or not. If they enter they pay the entry fee
E.
Period t < T :
- Stage 1: Each seller simultaneously decides whether to perform research at cost C. Sellers
do not observe the actions taken by their competitors.
- Stage 2: Each seller i who conducted research receives quality which is a random draw
from F . All other sellers receive quality 0.
- Stage 3: Having privately observed the value of their innovation, sellers simultaneously
decide whether to privately submit their best innovation.
- Stage 4: The buyer observes the set of submissions. If it is empty the contest continues.
If not, the buyer decides whether to declare a winner or not. If a winner is declared the
contest stops, the buyer obtains the winning innovation and the seller who submitted the
winning innovation receives the prize pt.
Period T :
- Stages 1-3: As above.
- Stage 4: The contest stops and the buyer has to declare a winner whose submissions
the buyer then obtains in exchange for the prize pT . If no seller submitted, the prize is
randomly allocated.
3.4 Optimal Contest
In this section we characterize the optimal research contest. We first show that given our
assumptions on the breakthrough innovation structure, the first-best is equivalent to a global
stopping rule with all N firms conducting research — that is, all firms do research in every
period until at least one firm achieves a breakthrough. As soon as a breakthrough is achieved,
all sellers stop doing research. Next, we show that using an appropriately designed dynamic
prize tournament, where the prize that the buyer awards is increasing in t, any global stopping
rule can be implemented. Finally, combining these two results, we show that in the optimal
contest the buyer implements the first-best outcome. The optimal contest features a dynamic
prize structure which gives the buyer the incentives to stop the contest as soon as at least one
seller has had a breakthrough, and to the sellers the incentives to do research in every period
and to truthfully report as soon as they have a breakthrough.
Proposition 3.1. Consider a breakthrough innovation structure such that Assumption 3.1 holds.
Then, in the first-best, all N firms conduct research in every period until a breakthrough is
achieved after which research is stopped completely.
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In general, the first-best is characterized by a function n(θ, t), which specifies the number of
sellers which optimally do research as a function of time and the current highest quality θ. Gal
et al. (1981) and Morgan (1983) have shown that in the first-best there exists a global stopping
quality θg such that n(θ, t) = 0 for θ ≥ θg and that the first-best number n(θ, t) is decreasing in
θ and increasing in t. In particular, the optimal number of sellers doing research will generally
change non-monotonically over time.24 However, given our assumption about the breakthrough
innovation structure, the first-best plan takes a very simple form. Since the breakthrough is very
valuable, it is optimal to have all firms perform research as long as no breakthrough has been
achieved. However, as all innovations with a successful breakthrough have roughly the same
value, continuing the research effort is not worth its cost once a breakthrough was achieved and
it is optimal to stop all research activities.
Taylor (1995) shows that any research tournament, that is, a contest with a fixed prize paid
out at the end of the contest, uniquely implements an individual stopping rule, where each
firm does research until it has reached its individual threshold level, irrespective of the qualities
discovered by other sellers. Such an individual stopping rule consequently entails a fairly large
risk of wasteful duplication across sellers. Intuitively, a global stopping rule seems better than
any individual stopping rule, as it reduces the amount of wasteful research by stopping research
once any seller has discovered an innovation of high enough quality. However, in general a global
stopping rule can not be implemented with a research tournament. In a research tournament as
in Taylor (1995) with a fixed prize, the buyer cannot credibly commit to stop the contest after
the threshold quality has been achieved because she does not bear the marginal cost of continued
research, while she stands to benefit from any marginal increase in quality. In contrast, our next
proposition shows that if it is possible to commit to a dynamic prize schedule, then any global
stopping rule can be implemented using a dynamic prize tournament.
Proposition 3.2. Any global stopping rule θg ∈ Θ with N sellers can be implemented using a
dynamic prize tournament 〈E,p, N〉 with a prize schedule p= [p1, p2, ..., pT ] such that
pt = p1 + (t− 1)∆(θg, N),
where
∆(θg, n) = F (θg)n θg +
K∑
j=g+1
(
F (θj)n − F (θj−1)n
)
θj − θg,
for t ∈ {2, . . . , T} and p1 ≥ p¯, where p¯ is some cutoff value and E is sufficiently low to induce
entry of all N sellers.
The proposition shows that for any θg ∈ Θ, there exists a dynamic prize tournament 〈E,p, N〉
with a prize schedule p, and an entry fee E, such that in equilibrium all N sellers enter. Fur-
24Given the finite time-horizon there is the basic trade-off between increasing the chance of getting a high
quality innovation by having many sellers do research in a given period and risking wasteful duplication. As the
deadline approaches the buyer becomes more willing to risk duplication for a given quality level as there are less
research opportunities in the future. Having a relatively high quality innovation early on reduces the pressure to
get a better innovation in the future and the buyer is therefore less willing to risk duplication by having many
sellers do research simultaneously.
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thermore, each seller performs research until it reaches quality θg. Once this occurs, the seller
reports the discovered innovation to the buyer, who immediately stops the contest, declares a
winner and pays out the prize corresponding to the period.25 The dynamic prize schedule in
Proposition 3.2 increases by ∆(θg, N) in every period, which is exactly the marginal benefit
of one additional round of research when the current highest quality is θg and N sellers will
be conducting research in the next period. Thus, the marginal cost of an additional round
equals its marginal benefit, which makes this commitment credible, as the buyer is indifferent
between continuing and stopping the tournament when the current highest quality is θg. Since
the marginal benefit of research is decreasing in θ, the buyer strictly prefers to continue the
tournament whenever the highest quality is below θg and strictly prefers to stop it whenever
it is above. Thus, it is the slope of the prize schedule that provides incentives to the buyer
necessary to implement a global stopping rule.
On the other hand, the intercept of the prize schedule gives the incentives to the sellers to
perform research in every period and to report their outcomes truthfully. Intuitively, as in the
research tournament, each seller pursues an individual stopping rule which is determined by the
expected prize. Increasing the expected prize increases the individual stopping threshold. If
the individual stopping threshold is above the global stopping threshold, the sellers will conduct
research as long as the tournament is ongoing. Similarly, it is the size of the prizes that induces
the sellers to truthfully report their research outcomes. By not reporting an innovation above
the threshold, a seller could win a higher prize in the future. However, not reporting exposes the
seller to the risk that another seller will win in the current period and end the tournament. As
long as the increase of the prize in the next period is sufficiently small relative to the current-
period prize, the seller will report truthfully. Thus, incentives of the sellers can be satisfied by
making the average prize large enough by shifting up the prize schedule sufficiently. Since such
a shift in the prize schedule does not affect its slope, which is the sole determinant of the buyer’s
incentives across periods, both buyer and seller incentives can be satisfied simultaneously, such
that a global stopping rule results in equilibrium. Finally, the entry fee E can be chosen such
that N sellers indeed want to participate in such a tournament by making it an entry subsidy
if necessary.
The above intuition also serves as a sketch of the proof. Alternatively, we could prove the
first part of the result regarding the buyer’s credibility using the results in Kruse and Strack
(2015). They prove in a very general setting that a stopping rule can be implemented using a
transfer which depends only on the stopping decision (i.e., the prize paid out in the period in
which the tournament ends) if and only if it is a cut-off rule (i.e., stopping the tournament once
the threshold θg is reached). They consider a choice problem and not a game as we do here. We
can nevertheless apply their result to prove the credibility of the buyer to stop the tournament
once the threshold is reached and to derive the prize sequence. The second part of the proof
which relates to the sellers’ incentives can then be proved following the intuition above, that is,
by choosing sufficiently high average prizes.
Note that the Proposition 3.2 does not rely on the breakthrough innovation structure. That
25In case of multiple breakthroughs of equal quality being reported simultaneously, the buyer randomly declares
a winner among these innovations.
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is, it holds for any vector of feasible innovation qualities Θ. In fact, the only strengthening of
the assumptions from Taylor (1995) required to implement a global stopping rule instead of an
individual stopping rule is that the buyer can commit to a dynamic prize schedule instead of
only a fixed prize at the end of the tournament. We view this assumption as uncontroversial as
time-dependent contracts are pervasive.
Proposition 3.2 establishes that N participants would wish to take part in such a tournament
and behave such that a global stopping rule is implemented. However, we still need to show if
the buyer would wish to announce this dynamic prize tournament in the first place. The next
proposition answers this question in the case of a breakthrough innovation structure.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 is satisfied. Then the optimal contest is a
dynamic prize tournament and it implements the first-best.
The proof of this result is straightforward. We know from Proposition 3.1 that under As-
sumption 3.1 the first-best is a global stopping rule in which all N sellers conduct research in
every period until a breakthrough was had and then stop. Thus, the first-best is characterized
by a constant number of sellers doing research until a global threshold is reached. However, this
is precisely what Proposition 3.2 tells us we can achieve using an appropriate dynamic prize
tournament. Moreover, with the contest implementing the first-best they buyer would obviously
want to announce it.
Taylor (1995) notes that the first-best could be achieved if the buyer, instead of holding one
multi-period contest, held a series of one-shot contests. In this case the buyer could choose the
optimal number of sellers in each period given the current highest quality and compensate them
for the one-period effort. However, if inspecting the sellers’ submissions is costly, running a
sequence of one-period tournaments and inspecting submissions after every period may be very
costly. This points to another advantage of the dynamic prize tournament. Namely, the buyer
only has to inspect submissions once and only from the sellers who have developed an innovation
of high enough quality. As mentioned in the introduction, we commonly distinguish between
innovation races and research tournaments. Interestingly, our dynamic prize tournament acts like
an innovation race as long as the tournament runs, as the first seller who makes a breakthrough
wins and eventually turns into a classic research tournament with the best innovation available
in the last period winning. Moreover, this innovation race is implemented without requiring
verifiability, a sharp contrast to regular innovation races.
3.5 Robustness
In this section we show that we can implement global stopping rules more generally using dy-
namic prize tournaments and we compare their performance to research tournaments, which have
a fixed prize. Throughout this section we do not impose any structure on Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θK}
except θk+1 > θk and the normalization θ1 = 0.
We stated in Proposition 3.1 that it is optimal to stop research once a breakthrough has
been achieved. The next result characterizes the threshold at which research should stop in the
absence of the breakthrough structure, i.e., it gives the optimal stopping rule for N sellers.
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Proposition 3.4. The optimal global stopping rule with N sellers is given by the smallest θk ∈ Θ
such that
FN
(
θk
)
θk +
K∑
j=k+1
(
FN (θj)− FN (θj−1)
)
θj − θk ≤ NC. (3.1)
When the number of sellers is not fixed the global stopping level is determined by the point
at which the marginal gain of doing another round of research with exactly one seller equals
its marginal cost. Essentially, there is a quality level at which another round of research with
even only a single seller is not worth the cost, irrespective of how many opportunities to do
research are yet to arrive. If the buyer could reduce the number of sellers further, another round
of research might be optimal. However, as she has hit the lower bound, there is no room to
reduce the number further and the research optimally stops. Inspecting equation (3.1) we see
that this intuition is also present in the case where the number of sellers is fixed across time.
In contrast to the case with a flexible number of sellers, the buyer compares the marginal gain
of doing another round of research to its marginal cost with N sellers instead of only one. But
given that the number of sellers is fixed, there is no possibility to continue doing research with
less sellers and, hence, she has hit the lower bound and research optimally stops.
In practice we observe that the number of participants in a tournament may change over time.
Typically, participants are being eliminated as the end of the contest draws closer.26 Moreover,
we noted earlier that the first-best may include both elimination and addition of participants
over time. We showed in Proposition 3.2 that we can implement any global stopping rule with
a fixed number of participants using a dynamic prize schedule. However, this result can be
generalized considerably. The following result shows that a dynamic prize schedule allows us
to implement any global stopping rule with any, arbitrarily changing number of participants.
Formally, a dynamic prize tournament is then described by 〈E,p,N〉, where N = [N1, . . . , NT ]
is the fixed number of participants in each in period. Note that the numbers Nt are fixed ex
ante and do not depend on the actual research outcomes of the sellers. However, the identity
of the sellers who continue can depend on their research outcomes. Given this environment, we
obtain the following result.
Proposition 3.5. Any global stopping rule θg ∈ Θ with a sequence of N = [N1, . . . , NT ] sellers
participating in each period can be implemented using a dynamic prize tournament 〈E,p,N〉
with some increasing prize schedule p = [p1, . . . , pT ] and some sequence of entry fees E =
[E1, . . . , ET ].
The intuition for the result is analogous to the result in Proposition 3.2. Namely, the slope of
the prize schedule takes care of the buyer’s incentives while the size of the prizes incentivizes the
sellers to conduct research, truthfully reveal their innovations and to stay in the tournament for
as long as possible. The difference is that the slope of the prize schedule is no longer constant
but changing over time. Recall that the prizes increase from period to period to equate the
marginal benefit of an additional round of research to the buyer with its marginal cost when the
26For example, the 2015 NRG COSIA Carbon XPRIZE consists of three rounds. Only up to 15 par-
ticipants will proceed to the second round and only up to 5 five will proceed to the third round. See
http://carbon.xprize.org/about/overview.
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threshold is reached. Since the marginal benefit changes when the number of sellers is changed,
the prize schedule has to increase less strongly following a round of elimination and more strongly
following an addition of new sellers. Moreover, it is easier to incentivize the sellers to conduct
research and report their innovations when there is a round of elimination ahead, because the
threat of elimination makes truthful reporting more attractive and increases the rewards of
research, as this increases the chances of not being eliminated and therefore retaining a chance
at getting the prize. Similarly, the prospect of increasing the number of sellers in the next period
increases the incentives to report truthfully and conduct research, as more competition in the
future makes trying to win in the current period more attractive.
We noted earlier that the finite time-horizon of the contest induces a fundamental trade-
off between increasing the chance of getting a high quality innovation and risking wasteful
duplication when increasing the number of sellers. What if the buyer instead had the possibility
to relax the time constraint, i.e., what if the buyer could choose a later deadline T ′ > T?
Intuitively, a longer time-horizon should be beneficial to the buyer, as it should allow the buyer
to lessen the risk of duplication while keeping the chance of getting a high innovation. It turns
out that this is not necessarily the case as our final result in this section shows.
Proposition 3.6. A buyer who implements a global stopping rule is strictly better off by in-
creasing the duration of the contest. A buyer who implements an individual stopping rule may
be worse off by increasing the duration of the contest.
There are two opposing effects at play when the length of the contest is increased. First,
the buyer benefits because it increases the expected quality of the innovation she will eventually
obtain. Second, it increases the risk of wasteful research in the form of duplication. The
beneficial effect is clearly present in both a research and a dynamic prize tournament. However,
in contrast to the research tournament, there is no change in the amount of duplication when
a global stopping rule is implemented, as it ensures that research stops conditional on reaching
the threshold. This effect is not present with an individual stopping rule. Thus, depending on
which effect dominates, increasing the duration of the contest may be harmful for the buyer
under an individual stopping rule, whereas the buyer is unambiguously better off under a global
stopping rule.
Moreover, suppose that Assumption 3.1 was satisfied and that the buyer could choose T ∈ N,
the ending of the contest. By Proposition 3.3 we know that the optimal contest is a dynamic
prize tournament with a global stopping rule. From Proposition 3.6, we know that the buyer
would optimally set the highest feasible T .
3.6 Conclusion
The goal of the present paper is to increase our understanding of the optimal design of research
contests, which have recently seen a rapid expansion in practice. Research contests are inherently
dynamic by the nature of research itself and by virtue of the contest taking place over a longer
period of time. It turns out that taking into account the dynamic nature of research improves
contest design. Indeed we show that using a prize schedule with increasing prizes over time
instead of a fixed prize yields a strict improvement for the buyer in the face of a breakthrough
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structure. In particular, it gives rise to the optimal contest and allows the buyer to implement
the first-best. More generally, we show that a dynamic prize tournament with an increasing
prize schedule allows us to implement any global stopping rule. The great appeal of this finding
lies in the fact that the first-best features a global stopping rule. Moreover, the channels through
which this is achieved are strikingly simple: the slope of the prize schedule and its intercept align
the buyer’s and the sellers’ incentives, respectively. Hence, an intuitive and simple departure
from a research tournament which has a fixed prize delivers the ability to implement a central
feature of the first-best solution.
Our results have important implications for the design of research contests. As mentioned be-
fore, we can usually distinguish between innovation races and research tournaments. Recall that
in an innovation race the winner is the first seller to achieve a pre-determined quality, whereas
in a research tournament the winner is the seller with the best quality at some pre-determined
date. Naturally, both innovation races and research tournaments have their advantages and
disadvantages. An innovation race avoids wasteful duplication as research stops once the goal
has been reached. Moreover, it does not end until the goal is reached. However, it requires a
verifiable outcome, so often an imperfect proxy of innovation has to be employed. On the other
hand, a research tournament does not have to rely on proxies but there is a risk of wasteful du-
plication and premature ending. Quite remarkably, a dynamic prize tournament with a global
stopping rule allows us to implement a hybrid of the two. Namely, throughout the duration
of the tournament an innovation race is taking place, as the tournament ends as soon as an
innovation above the stopping threshold is realized. However, there is an end date at which
the race ends and turns into a classic research tournament in which the best innovation wins
without requiring verifiability. Hence, a dynamic prize tournament allows us to get the best out
of the innovation race (long horizon with no wasteful duplication) and the research tournament
(no proxy required).
We derive our results under assumptions that are barely stronger than those in the seminal
work by Taylor (1995). Yet, even within this rich framework there are further avenues to pursue.
Comparative static results along the lines of Proposition 3.6 which considered extending the
length of the contest would allow us to increase our understanding of the optimal mechanism
in the absence of the breakthrough innovation structure. Further, one can study the scope
for beneficial information revelation between the sellers, both from the sellers’ and the buyer’s
perspective. Moreover, although quite ambitious, deriving the optimal contest in the absence of
the breakthrough structure would be valuable and an interesting direction for future work.
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4 Delegating Performance Evaluation1
Joint with Shuo Liu and Nick Netzer
4.1 Introduction
Principals often lack the information or expertise needed to make appropriate decisions. A
common response to this problem is to delegate the decision to a better informed party. For
example, funding agencies delegate the choice of research projects which will be funded to
an expert committee. Within a firm, the CEO usually delegates to a mid-level manager the
decision regarding the assignment of bonuses to subordinates. Humanitarian aid is distributed
by specialized agencies on behalf of the donor countries.
If the preferences of the principal and the expert who makes the decision are not aligned,
then delegation can lead to distorted decisions. The principal can attempt to influence the
decision taken by the expert by limiting the set of outcomes from which the expert can select.
The literature on optimal delegation studies how this delegation set should be designed.2 In
these papers, the principal wants to base her decision on some stochastic state of nature, the
value of which is known only to the expert. Crucially, this state of nature is assumed to be
exogenous. However, in the examples above the state of nature (the quality of research projects,
the performance of employees, the cooperativeness of receiving countries) is determined in part
in anticipation of the decision that the expert will make. As a matter of fact, the goal of
the principal is exactly to incentivize the agents to exert effort. For example, the goal of the
funding agencies is to stimulate creation of high quality research. Similarly, bonuses in firms
are instruments that incentivize employees to work hard, and aid is in part allocated to bring
about reforms.
In this paper, we study the optimal delegation problem for performance evaluation. A
principal wishes to incentivize agents to exert costly effort. The efforts are not observable to
the principal. However, an expert, which we will from now on refer to as the reviewer, can
costlessly observe the exerted efforts.3 The principal thus delegates the decision on how to
reward the agents to the reviewer, but possibly restricts the set of allowable decisions. The
reviewer’s preferences may not be perfectly aligned with the principal. While the reviewer takes
into account the effect of his actions on the principal’s payoff, maybe because he owns shares
1This paper should be cited as Letina I., S. Liu and N. Netzer (2016), “Delegating Performance Evaluation,”
Mimeo.
2See, for example, Holmström (1977, 1984), Melumad and Shibano (1991), Alonso and Matouschek (2008),
Armstrong and Vickers (2010), Amador and Bagwell (2013), and Frankel (2014).
3We do not consider the problem of incentivizing the reviewer to exert costly effort in order to learn the state
of nature. This is an interesting but distinct incentive problem which is studied in Aghion and Tirole (1997),
Szalay (2005), Rahman (2012), and Pei (2015b).
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of the company or he cares intrinsically, he may also care about the agents. For instance, as
we will discuss below, there is ample evidence that managers care about the payoffs of their
subordinates. Exactly how much the reviewer cares about the agents is the reviewer’s private
information. Importantly, a reviewer who cares sufficiently much about the agents will be
reluctant to punish them even if they do not exert sufficient effort. Anticipating this, the agents
will exert less effort. The principal thus has to design the delegation set in a way that restricts
the scope of possible leniency of the reviewer.
One could also imagine that the principal tries to correct the distortions by paying transfers
to the reviewer conditional on the action that he takes. However, contingent transfers are often
not observed in reality. Committees deciding which research projects get funded do not get paid
conditional on how many projects they approve or reject. Mid-level managers do not get paid
differently depending on how they allocate bonuses among their subordinates. In fact, paying
an expert for performing a particular evaluation is often referred to as a conflict of interest and
is explicitly forbidden. The delegation approach, which rules out direct monetary incentives, is
therefore particularly plausible for our setting of performance evaluation.
Our first main result is that a contest among the agents is an optimal mechanism. That is,
the principal defines a set of prizes and the reviewer only decides how to allocate these prizes to
the agents. The reviewer does not have the additional freedom to choose the overall size or the
split of the agents’ compensation. This strongly limits the degree of leniency he can exercise.
In particular, the reviewer is always forced to punish some agents by assigning them a small
prize, which is crucial for the preservation of incentives. Without this commitment, the reviewer
would be lenient and the agents would shirk. The downside of the contest mechanism is that
someone needs to be punished (at random) even when all agents provide a sufficient level of
effort. Somewhat counter-intuitively, if the reviewer was not averse to punishing, then no agent
would have to be punished.
This result is interesting for several reasons. First, while contests are a commonly used and
often-studied incentive scheme,4 there is not much work on the question whether and under
which conditions contests are actually optimal mechanisms.5 Exceptions are the seminal paper
of Lazear and Rosen (1981), as well as some papers which stress that contests can filter out
common shocks when agents are risk-averse (Green and Stokey, 1983; Nalebuff and Stiglitz, 1983)
or ambiguity-averse (Kellner, 2015). In our model, contests are optimal because they act as a
commitment device. A contest provides two types of commitment. It commits the principal to
the announced prizes and thus prevents any manipulation of the sum of payments to the agents.
The literature has observed previously that this “commitment to pay” can be beneficial when the
agents’ efforts are not verifiable. For instance, Malcomson (1984, 1986) argues that piece-rate
contracts are not credible in that case, as the principal would always claim low performance ex
post in order to reduce payments, while a contest remains credible.6 However, this credibility
4See e.g. Prendergast (1999) and De Varo (2006), and the references therein.
5Prendergast (1999, p. m36) writes: “Rather surprisingly, there is very little work devoted to understanding
why this is the case, i.e., why the optimal means of providing incentives within large firms (at least for white-collar
workers) seems to be tournaments rather than the other means suggested in the previous sections.” We find this
still to be the case in the years since Prendergast published his paper.
6Similarly, Carmichael (1983) considers a setting where the final output is verifiable but depends on the efforts
of both the principal and the agents. With a contract that pays agents based on total output, the principal has
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can also be achieved by simply committing to a total sum of payments without setting fixed
prizes. In fact, as we will show by example, such a scheme would outperform a contest when the
agents are risk-averse, by removing uncertainty from equilibrium payments. Hence the second
type of commitment, the above described “commitment to punish,” is crucial in explaining the
optimality of contests with fixed prizes.7 Second, a contest is a remarkably simple mechanism.
Even though we allow for arbitrary stochastic delegation mechanisms with possibly sophisticated
transfer rules, the optimum can be achieved by a simple mechanism characterized by a prize
profile and a suggestion how to distribute the prizes in response to the agents’ efforts. The
principal does not attempt to screen reviewer types, in spite of the fact that the first-best may
be achievable if the principal knew the reviewer’s type. This makes the strategic considerations
of the agents simple. In particular, their behavior does not depend on beliefs regarding the
reviewer type. This robustness property is important because principal and agents may well
have different beliefs (for instance, in the example with managers allocating bonuses, it seems
reasonable to assume that the employees working directly with a manager have more precise
information about their manager’s type than a CEO does).
Our second result characterizes the prize structure of an optimal contest. Given n agents,
an optimal contest will have n − 1 equal positive prizes and one zero prize. Thus, while the
contest acts as a commitment to punish, the punishment is kept at the minimum required to
incentivize effort. The delegation set forces the reviewer to punish only one agent, such that the
optimal contest exhibits a “loser-takes-nothing” rather than a “winner-takes-all” structure. In
equilibrium, when all agents have provided sufficient effort, the reviewer randomly chooses the
agent to be punished. Thus all agents are facing the risk of punishment in equilibrium. If agents
are risk-averse, they respond to this risk by reducing the amount of effort they are willing to
exert. A corollary of this result is that the first-best is implementable if and only if the agents
are risk-neutral. We also show that an optimal contest implements an outcome close to the
first-best if the agents’ risk-aversion is moderate or the number of agents is large.
Our third result shows that a familiar all-pay auction with a slight twist also implements the
optimum, and it does so in unique equilibrium.8 As in a standard all-pay auction (with n − 1
identical prizes), the agent with the lowest effort receives the zero prize. However, efforts at or
above the desired equilibrium level are not differentiated, and ties are broken randomly. This
removes the incentive of the agents to exert slightly more than the equilibrium effort in order to
guarantee themselves a positive prize with probability one. We refer to this mechanism as an
all-pay auction with censoring.
In addition to the all-pay auction, we show as our fourth result that the optimum can also
an incentive to reduce own effort in order to reduce the payments to agents.
7The problem of committing to punishment is related to Konrad (2001) and Netzer and Scheuer (2010). They
study the problem of a planner who would like to implement redistribution after agents have chosen their actions,
the anticipation of which may destroy incentives to choose costly but socially desirable actions. In the context
of optimal income taxation, Konrad (2001) shows that private information about labor productivity provides a
commitment against excessive redistribution. In the context of insurance and labor markets, Netzer and Scheuer
(2010) show that adverse selection provides a commitment by generating separating market equilibria. In both
cases, agents who choose socially less desirable actions are punished by having to forego information rents.
8As we will explain in Section 4.3, uniqueness only refers to the agents’ choice of efforts in the given contest.
The reviewer will be indifferent among several actions, and in particular a “babbling” equilibrium exists where
his assignment of prizes is unresponsive to the agents’ efforts and they exert zero effort.
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be achieved with an imperfectly discriminating contest, such as the well-known Tullock contest.
The Tullock-type contest success function arises endogenously as part of an optimal contract
in our analysis. In summary, the optimum can be achieved with all of the commonly studied
formats of contests (see Konrad, 2009). This shows that the essential feature of our main result
is the fixed profile of prizes, and not the exact procedure how these prizes are awarded.
We then consider extensions where the reviewer observes only effort differences between
the agents or noisy signals of individual efforts. We show that, by using stochastic allocation
rules, the principal can often still implement the optimal allocation with a contest. Next, we
consider a model of cheap talk where the reviewer does not make the allocation decision himself
but communicates the observed effort levels to the principal. We show that our results for the
delegation model continue to hold in the cheap talk model. This adds robustness to our results,
especially in the view of experimental findings which show that principals may be reluctant to
delegate authority even when it is in their interest to do so.9 Finally, we discuss how our analysis
can be extended to settings with non-separable and/or asymmetric preferences.
Our contribution is related to three strands of literature: on the optimality of contests, on
biased reviewers, and on optimal delegation. A more detailed discussion of the literature is
postponed to Section 4.5. Another paper that also contributes to all three strands is Frankel
(2014). Like in our paper, he considers a multidimensional delegation problem with uncertainty
about the expert’s preferences. He assumes that the state of the world is exogenous and is not
affected by the choice of the delegation mechanism. In contrast, our prime concern is how the
delegation mechanism affects the state of the world, i.e., how it provides incentives for agents
to exert effort. Another difference is that Frankel (2014) derives max-min mechanisms, which
are optimal for the worst possible realization of the expert’s bias, while we are interested in
mechanisms that maximize the principal’s expected payoff given her beliefs about the expert’s
type. Frankel (2014) shows that, when the set of possible preferences of the expert is rich enough,
a specific contest is max-min optimal, because it is a very robust mechanism.10 We show that
contests maximize the principal’s expected payoff because they provide optimal incentives to the
agents. Furthermore, since the principal’s payoff turns out to be independent of the reviewer’s
type in our optimal contests, they not only maximize expected payoffs but are also max-min
optimal.
Our model applies to many situations where a principal wants to incentivize agents but
cannot directly supervise them. Here we will discuss two possible applications, which are meant
to illustrate the range and scale of our model. One application is the design of performance
evaluation schemes in firms. The performance evaluation scheme is designed by the CEO,
but the CEO does not observe the individual efforts of the employees to which the scheme
applies. Hence, the actual performance evaluation is delegated to the employees’ supervisor.
By virtue of working closely with the employees, the supervisor observes their efforts but also
cares about their payoffs. There is ample evidence (both empirical and experimental) that
supervisors tend to be too lenient when judging the performance of their subordinates, and
9See Fehr et al. (2013) and Bartling et al. (2014).
10Richness requires that the set of preferences includes all (concave) utility functions over states and actions
which exhibit increasing differences. The resulting max-min optimal mechanism corresponds to a standard all-pay
auction. For a general treatment of contests with all-pay structure see Siegel (2009).
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that the degree of leniency varies and depends on (among other things) social ties between the
supervisor and the team.11 Our results have direct implications for the controversial debate
over the use of the so-called “forced rankings,” a review system which was most famously used
by General Electric under Jack Welch during their fast growth in the 1980s and 90s.12 Our
contribution to this discussion is (i) to show that forced rankings are optimal for motivating
effort under the assumptions of our model, (ii) to show how optimally forced rankings should be
constructed, and (iii) to show that some elements of forced rankings which are usually criticized
are actually necessary for incentivizing effort. In particular, forced rankings are criticized for
forcing managers to assign low rankings even when all workers are performing well: “What
happens if you’re working with a superstar team? You’ve just forced a distribution that doesn’t
exist. You create this stupid world where [great] people are punished.”13 Similarly, Brad Smart
who worked with Jack Welch on developing GE’s forced ranking system criticized GE’s decision
to assign 10% of the workers a low evaluation: “To force those distributions when the percentages
don’t meet the reality is nuts.”14 Our results show that, far from being “stupid” or “nuts,”
punishing some workers even when they perform well is necessary, since if the managers were
given an option not to punish, they may choose it irrespective of the actual performance, which
would destroy any incentive effect of the evaluation system.
A very different situation for which our model offers insights is foreign aid. Donors have been
trying for decades to use foreign aid to incentivize reforms in recipient countries, but there is little
empirical evidence that it has been effective (see e.g. Easterly, 2003; Rajan and Subramanian,
2008). In response, funding agencies and governments have tried to improve mechanisms for the
allocation of foreign aid in ways that link aid to improvement in governance and other policy
reforms. One early approach has been the so-called “conditional aid,” where donors promise to
withdraw future aid if the agreed policy reforms have not been achieved. However, the donors’
threats to withdraw aid were not credible and, unsurprisingly, reforms were usually not carried
out. As Easterly (2009) somewhat amusingly points out, the World Bank conditioned aid on the
same agricultural policy reform in Kenya five separate times – and the conditions were violated
each time. In a very interesting paper, Svensson (2003) proposes a solution to this problem.
Instead of allocating the budget for each country to a different aid officer, similar countries could
be pooled together and the total budget for all these countries could be allocated to a single aid
officer. This way, if one country does not reform, the aid officer has the option of reallocating the
aid from that country to another. Our paper points to a potential problem with this approach
and offers a solution. A benevolent aid officer may still be tempted to split the aid more or less
equally among the countries, their efforts towards reform notwithstanding. Our paper suggests
11For example, Bol (2011) and Breuer et al. (2013) find evidence of leniency bias which depends on the strength
of the employee-manager relationship. Bol (2011) cites studies documenting leniency bias going back to the
1920s, while citations to similar findings in the 1940s can be found in Prendergast (1999). Berger et al. (2013)
find experimental evidence of leniency bias, and Bernardin et al. (2000) document that the degree of leniency
bias in an experiment depends on personality traits of the reviewer. More generally, Cappelen et al. (2007) show
experimentally that individuals exhibit a variety of different fairness preferences.
12For example, see “’Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January 31,
2012) and “For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls” (J. McGregor, The Washington Post, November 20, 2013).
13Quote of a management adviser in “For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls” (J. McGregor, The Washington Post,
November 20, 2013).
14In “’Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2012).
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that holding a contest among recipient countries can overcome this problem. That is, instead
of giving the aid officer full discretion over the total budget for multiple countries, the budget
could be partitioned into fixed “prizes” that the officer allocates to the countries. Our results
show that this would indeed be an optimal mechanism. Obviously, it may be politically difficult
to implement a contest where a country receives zero aid even if it invested effort in reforms.
However, some variant of our mechanism, where all countries receive aid but some countries
receive “bonus aid” through a contest might be both politically feasible and desirable from the
incentive point of view.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model. In
Section 4.3 we show that the set of optimal contracts contains a contest, we characterize all
optimal contests, and we deal with unique implementation of the second-best outcome. In
Section 4.4 we develop several extensions of the baseline model. Section 4.5 contains a discussion
of the related literature, and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Environment
A principal contracts with a set of agents I = {1, ..., n} where n ≥ 2. Each agent i ∈ I chooses
an effort level ei ≥ 0 and obtains a monetary transfer ti ≥ 0. The agents have an outside option
of zero. The payoff of agent i is given by
pii(ei, ti) = u(ti)− c(ei),
where u : R+ → R is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, weakly concave and satisfies u(0) =
0, and c : R+ → R is twice differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly convex and satisfies c(0) = 0
and c′(0) = 0. The assumption of additive separability of transfers and efforts is standard in
contract theory, mechanism design, and contest theory. Some of our results depend on this
assumption, so we will discuss robustness with respect to non-separable and also asymmetric
preferences in Section 4.4.3. We denote effort profiles by e = (e1, ..., en) ∈ E and transfer profiles
by t = (t1, ..., tn) ∈ T . We assume that E = Rn+ and T = {t ∈ Rn+ |
∑n
i=1 ti ≤ T¯}, where T¯ > 0
can be arbitrarily large. Our results hold no matter whether T¯ is binding or not. The payoff of
the principal from an allocation (e, t) is
piP (e, t) = z(e)−
n∑
i=1
ti,
where z : E → R+ is interpreted as the production function that converts efforts into output.
For clarity of exposition we will focus only on the case where z(e) = ∑ni=1 ei. Our main results
continue to hold if we assume more generally that z is symmetric, weakly concave, and strictly
increasing in each of its arguments.
Example. We will use a parameterized example to illustrate our results throughout the paper.
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In this example, each of the n agents has the payoff function
pii(ei, ti) = tαi − γeβi ,
where α ≤ 1 parameterizes risk-aversion, β > 1 describes the degree of cost convexity, and γ > 0
determines the relative weight of effort costs. We will always assume that T¯ is large enough to be
non-binding in the example. The first-best effort level eFB is what the principal would demand
from each agent if she could perfectly control effort and would only have to compensate the agent
for his cost, thus paying tFB = u−1(c(eFB)). In our example, maximization of e − u−1(c(e))
yields
eFB =
(
α
βγ1/α
) α
β−α
and tFB =
(
α
βγ1/β
) β
β−α
.
The principal’s first-best profit is n(eFB − tFB). 
The effort exerted by the agents is not verifiable to outside parties (e.g. a court) and is not
observable to the principal. However, the efforts can be observed by a reviewer. Consequently,
the evaluation of the agents’ performance and the decision on how to reward the agents are
delegated to the reviewer. In line with the literature on delegation, we assume that the principal
cannot pay the reviewer based on the decision made (but can in principle pay a fixed fee to the
reviewer, which we normalize to zero). Specifically, the payoff of the reviewer from an allocation
(e, t) is given by
piR(e, t, θ) = piP (e, t) + θ
n∑
i=1
pii(e, t),
where θ is a parameter that captures how much the reviewer cares about the well-being of
the agents, and thus by how much the reviewer’s preferences are misaligned with those of the
principal. The parameter θ can be thought of as a fundamental preference or as a reduced-form
representation of concerns due to other interactions with the agents. We assume that θ is private
information of the reviewer, observable neither to the principal nor to the agents. It is drawn
according to a commonly known continuous distribution with full support on Θ = [θ, θ¯], where
θ < θ¯. We describe this distribution by an (absolutely continuous) probability measure τ over
Θ. Our results will be independent of the shape of this distribution. In particular, τ could be
arbitrarily close to a probability measure with atoms.
4.2.2 Implementation with Credible Contracts
The timing is as follows. First, the principal delegates the evaluation and remuneration of the
agents to the reviewer, by endowing the reviewer with a set D of possible actions. An action is a
probability measure µ ∈ ∆T on the set of transfer profiles, describing the potentially stochastic
payments made to the agents. Next, the agents choose their efforts simultaneously. The reviewer
then observes the efforts and chooses an action from D to reward or punish the agents.
Since e and θ are observable only to the reviewer, he is always free to choose any action that
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he prefers. We model this by defining a contract Φ = (µe,θ)(e,θ)∈E×Θ as a collection of probability
measures µe,θ ∈ ∆T , one for each (e, θ) ∈ E×Θ. The interpretation is that the principal suggests
that a reviewer of type θ should reward an effort profile e by transfers according to µe,θ.15 The
following incentive constraint makes sure that the reviewer indeed has an incentive to follow this
suggestion:
ΠR(e, µe,θ, θ) ≥ ΠR(e, µe′,θ′ , θ) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ, (IC-R)
where
ΠR(e, µe
′,θ′ , θ) = Eµe′,θ′
[
piP (e, t) + θ
n∑
i=1
pii(ei, ti)
]
.
We say that a contract Φ is credible if it satisfies (IC-R). Given a credible contract, the delegation
set is implicitly given by D = {µ ∈ ∆T | ∃(e, θ) s.t. µ = µe,θ}.
Denote by σi ∈ ∆R+ agent i’s mixed strategy for his effort provision. We also write ei ∈ ∆R+
for Dirac measures that represent pure strategies. Strategy profiles are given by σ = (σ1, ..., σn) ∈
(∆R+)n. We also use σ to denote the induced product measure in ∆E. We say a contract Φ
implements a strategy profile σ if it is credible and satisfies
Πi((σi, σ−i),Φ) ≥ Πi((σ′i, σ−i),Φ) ∀σ′i ∈ ∆R+,∀i ∈ I, (IC-A)
where
Πi(σ,Φ) = Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]]
− Eσi [c(ei)] .
Since a deviation to an effort of zero always guarantees each agent a payoff of at least zero, the
agents’ participation constraints can henceforth be ignored.16
The principal maximizes her expected payoff by choosing a contract Φ to implement some
strategy profile σ. Formally, the principal’s problem is given by
max
(σ,Φ)
ΠP (σ,Φ) s.t. (IC-R), (IC-A), (P)
where
ΠP (σ,Φ) = Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei
]
− Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]]
.
A contract Φ∗ is optimal if there exists σ∗ such that (σ∗,Φ∗) solves (P).
15 This formulation does not preclude the possibility that a reviewer randomizes over actions, because the
randomization over probability measures can instead be written as a compound measure that is chosen with
probability one. We impose the following regularity condition on contracts: for each measurable set A ⊆ T ,
µe,θ(A) is a measurable function of (e, θ). This ensures that expected payoffs are well-defined in contracts.
16Formally, the constraints (IC-R) and (IC-A) characterize Perfect Bayesian equilibria of the following game.
Given a delegation set D, the agents first simultaneously choose their efforts e. Nature then determines the
reviewer’s type θ. The reviewer finally observes e and θ and chooses from D. Constraint (IC-R) prescribes
sequential rationality for the reviewer’s (singleton) information sets, while (IC-A) prescribes sequential rationality
(with weakly consistent beliefs) for the information sets in which the agents choose.
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Finally, we introduce a specific class of contracts that will be referred to as contests. We
say that a contract is a contest if it commits to a profile of prizes y = (y1, ..., yn) ∈ T , some of
which could be zero, and specifies how these prizes are allocated to the n agents as a function
of their effort. More formally, let P (y) denote the set of permutations of y.17 Then a contest
Cy with prize profile y is a contract that satisfies µe,θ(P (y)) = 1 for all (e, θ) ∈ E × Θ. Note
that every contest is credible. Once the agents’ efforts are sunk, any allocation of the prizes
generates the same payoff for the principal and the same sum of utilities for the agents. Formally,
∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ,
ΠR(e, µe
′,θ′ , θ) =
n∑
i=1
ei −
n∑
i=1
yi + θ
(
n∑
i=1
u(yi)−
n∑
i=1
c(ei)
)
is independent of (e′, θ′). However, the set of credible contracts is substantially larger than the
set of contests. For instance, it is possible to select from a much larger set of transfer profiles,
not just permutations of given prizes, and still keep both the expected sum of transfers and the
expected sum of the agents’ utilities constant.
4.3 Optimal Contracts
4.3.1 The Optimality of Contests
To illustrate the key incentive problem in our model, suppose first that the preference parameter
θ was known to the principal and the agents. The following example shows that, in this case,
there may exist a credible contract which is not a contest but which implements the first-best
effort levels and extracts the entire surplus.
Example. Consider our previous example for the special case of n = 2. Suppose the reviewer’s
type was common knowledge. First assume θ = 0, so that there is also no misalignment of
preferences between the principal and the reviewer. Consider a contract ΦFB where, if both
agents exert eFB, each of them is paid tFB. If one agent deviates, that agent is paid 0 while
the non-deviating agent is paid 2tFB. In case both agents deviate, they are again each paid
tFB. It is easy to verify that this contract is credible, because the sum of transfers is constant
across (tFB, tFB), (2tFB, 0) and (0, 2tFB), which makes the reviewer indifferent between these
transfer profiles. It is also easy to verify that this contract implements (eFB, eFB), because both
agents receive a payoff of zero in equilibrium and a payoff of at most zero after any unilateral
deviation. Thus the first-best is achievable. Observe that ΦFB is not a contest, because the
three transfer profiles are not permutations of each other. We will show below that the first-best
is not achievable by a contest if the agents are risk-averse. Hence, ΦFB performs strictly better
than any contest in this example. This shows that non-verifiability of effort alone does not make
contests optimal.18
17Profile t is a permutation of y if there exists a bijective mapping s : I → I such that ti = ys(i) ∀i ∈ I.
18This argument is related to MacLeod (2003), who considers an environment with a principal, a single agent,
and non-verifiable performance signals. He shows that, if the principal can commit to burn money, he can credibly
punish a shirking agent. In our example, the transfer to the non-deviating agent plays a role similar to money
burning.
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Now assume that θ > 0 and adjust the contract ΦFB as follows. The payment 2tFB to a
non-deviating agent is replaced by some tnd, while everything else is kept unchanged. If tnd
is chosen such that the reviewer is indifferent between the transfer profiles (tFB, tFB), (tnd, 0),
and (0, tnd), credibility is restored and the first-best can be implemented. For instance, with
α = 1/2, β = 2, and γ = 1 we have eFB ≈ 0.63 and tFB ≈ 0.16. For a reviewer of known type
θ = 3 we would then obtain tnd ≈ 1.15.19 This shows that the misalignment of preferences per
se does also not make contests optimal. 
The contracts described in the example no longer work if θ is the reviewer’s private infor-
mation. Just consider the optimal contract for type θ = 0. Any reviewer with type θ′ > 0
will strictly prefer to allocate (tFB, tFB), no matter what efforts the agents have exerted. This
illustrates the leniency bias and the need for commitment discussed in the Introduction.
Our first main result shows that, despite the fact that the set of possible contracts is very
large, optimal contracts with uncertainty about θ take a very simple form.
Theorem 4.1. The set of optimal contracts contains a contest.
We will establish Theorem 4.1 by proving a series of six lemmas. Since we have shown
that the principal may be able to implement the first-best if she knew the reviewer’s private
type θ, it would seem reasonable to expect that the principal could benefit from screening these
types. Lemmas 4.1 - 4.3 below show that it is not possible for the principal to benefit from
screening. Lemmas 4.4 - 4.5 show that the principal can also not benefit from implementing
mixed or asymmetric effort profiles. Lemma 4.6 shows that using contests is then without loss
of generality. The proofs of all lemmas can be found in Appendix D.1.
Fix an arbitrary contract Φ = (µe,θ)(e,θ)∈E×Θ and denote
St(e, θ) = Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
, Su(e, θ) = Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
and
S(e, θ) = −St(e, θ) + θSu(e, θ).
We can then rewrite the credibility constraint (IC-R) as
−St(e, θ) + θSu(e, θ) ≥ −St(e′, θ′) + θSu(e′, θ′) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ.
Our first lemma provides a characterization of this multidimensional constraint.
Lemma 4.1. A contract Φ is credible if and only if the conditions (i) - (iii) hold:
(i) ∀θ ∈ Θ, S(e, θ) = S(e′, θ) ∀e, e′ ∈ E.
(ii) ∀e ∈ E, Su(e, θ) is non-decreasing in θ.
19The indifference condition is −2tFB + θ2u(tFB) = −tnd + θu(tnd). Given our parameters, it has a second
solution tnd ≈ 3.72, which would work as well. Note that the indifference condition is not guaranteed to have a
solution for all parameter values, so our simple construction of a first-best contract does not work for all values
of θ > 0.
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(iii) ∀e ∈ E, S(e, θ) = S(e, θ) + ∫ θθ Su(e, s)ds ∀θ ∈ Θ.
Conditions (ii) and (iii) are familiar from the mechanism design literature. They have to
hold separately for each fixed effort profile e. Condition (i) concerns the effort dimension and
shows that the payoff of any reviewer has to be constant for any reported e.
Given the characterization provided by Lemma 4.1, the next lemma states an important
implication of the credibility constraint. Not only does S(e, θ) have to be constant across different
profiles e, also its constituent parts St(e, θ) and Su(e, θ) cannot vary with e.
Lemma 4.2. A contract Φ is credible only if there exists a pair of functions x : Θ → R+ and
xˆ : Θ→ R+ such that, ∀e ∈ E,
St(e, θ) = x(θ), Su(e, θ) = xˆ(θ)
for almost all θ ∈ Θ.
We now show that there is no gain for the principal to screen the reviewer’s private type by
using a complex contract where µe,θ varies with θ. Put differently, the principal can without loss
of generality design the delegation set in a way such that all reviewers select the same actions.
Lemma 4.3. For every contract Φ that implements a strategy profile σ, there exists a contract
Φˆ that also implements σ, yields the same expected payoff to the principal, and, ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
satisfies µˆe,θ = µˆe,θ′ ∀e ∈ E.
The proof of the lemma is constructive and shows how the contract Φˆ without screening can
be obtained from an arbitrary contract Φ. Given this result, we from now on focus without loss
of generality on contracts where the agents’ transfers depend on their efforts only, which we write
as Φ = (µe)e∈E . The next lemma shows that the principal does not benefit from implementing
mixed strategies.
Lemma 4.4. For every contract Φ that implements a strategy profile σ, there exists a contract
Φˆ that implements the pure-strategy profile e¯ = (e¯1, ..., e¯n), where e¯i = Eσi [ei] ∀i ∈ I, and yields
the same expected payoff to the principal.
The intuition behind this result is simple: any randomness in transfers that is achieved by
mixed strategies can equivalently be generated by the contract. On the other hand, since c is
convex, the agents benefit from exerting the average effort e¯i instead of σi, while the principal
is indifferent as to whether she obtains the efforts in expectation or deterministically.
The proofs of the above four lemmas do not rely on the symmetry of the agents’ preferences.
In fact, these intermediate results can be straightforwardly extended to the more general setting
where each agent i’s utility function is given by ui(ti) − ci(ei). The next lemma states that, if
we consider the current symmetric setting, then it is without loss to restrict attention to the
implementation of symmetric pure-strategy effort profiles.
Lemma 4.5. For every contract Φ that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯ = (e¯1, ..., e¯n), there
exists a contract Φˆ that implements the symmetric pure-strategy profile eˆ = (eˆ1, ..., eˆn), where
eˆ1 = . . . = eˆn = 1n
∑n
i=1 e¯i, and yields the same expected payoff to the principal.
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The next lemma completes the proof of Theorem 4.1 by demonstrating that the principal
can achieve the same payoff with a contest as with any contract that implements a symmetric
pure-strategy effort profile. Thus, the principal can obtain her maximal payoff with a contest.20
Lemma 4.6. For every contract Φ that implements a symmetric pure-strategy profile eˆ, there
exists a contest Cy that also implements eˆ and yields the same expected payoff to the principal.
To prove this lemma, we construct a contest which implements the effort profile eˆ. This
contest features n − 1 identical prizes and one prize that is smaller. The small prize is used to
punish agents who deviate in either direction from eˆ. In equilibrium, when the effort profile eˆ
is realized, the n prizes are randomly allocated among the agents. As we will show in the next
section, this prize structure is in fact a general feature of optimal contests, while the specific
(non-monotonic) allocation rule is not required to achieve the optimum.
4.3.2 Optimal Contests
From the previous section, we know that the principal can restrict attention to contests when
designing an optimal contract. In this section, we characterize general features of all optimal
contests. When describing a contest Cy, in the following we always assume w.l.o.g. that the
prize profile y is ordered such that y1 ≥ y2 ≥ . . . ≥ yn.
Theorem 4.2. A contest is optimal if and only if the conditions (i) and (ii) hold:
(i) The prizes satisfy yn = 0 and
∑n
k=1 yk = x∗, with x∗ = min{x¯, T¯} and x¯ given by
u′
(
x¯
n− 1
)
= c′
(
c−1
(
n− 1
n
u
(
x¯
n− 1
)))
.
If the agents are risk-averse, then the prize profile is unique and given by
y = (x∗/(n− 1), . . . , x∗/(n− 1), 0).
(ii) The contest implements (e∗, . . . , e∗), where e∗ is given by
e∗ = c−1
(
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
))
.
Condition (i) in the theorem shows that the lowest prize will be zero in any optimal contest.
This is not obvious, since the agents can be risk-averse and in equilibrium all agents face the
risk of receiving the zero prize. The intuition is that in equilibrium an agent receives the zero
prize with probability 1/n, while a shirking agent would receive the zero prize with strictly
larger probability (possibly one). Thus, any increase in yn decreases the difference between the
equilibrium and the deviation payoffs, and therefore decreases the amount of effort that can be
demanded in equilibrium. When the agents are risk-averse, the optimal prize profile will feature
n − 1 identical positive prizes in addition to the zero prize. In that sense, the commitment
20To be exact, Theorem 4.1 follows only after it has been shown that problem (P) has a solution, so that an
optimal contract exists. This will be shown in the proof of Theorem 4.2 in the next section.
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to punishment is as small as possible. Condition (i) also characterizes the optimal total prize
sum x∗, which is given by the point x¯ where marginal cost and benefit of inducing effort are
equalized, or by the exogenous budget T¯ whenever it is sufficiently tight. Condition (ii) in the
theorem shows that every optimal contest extracts the entire surplus from the agents, because
it implements a symmetric pure-strategy effort profile such that each agent’s equilibrium payoff
is zero.
Having characterized the optimal contests, we turn to the question of efficiency loss.
Corollary 4.1. If the agents are risk-neutral, the principal can achieve the first-best. If the
agents are risk-averse, the principal cannot achieve the first-best.
The efficiency loss is driven entirely by risk-aversion of the agents. The loss is a direct
consequence of the commitment to punish, which is both inherent in the contest and the reason
why the contest is optimal. Since the principal has to commit to a punishment, a punishment
must be delivered even in equilibrium. Risk-averse agents have to be compensated for this, which
increases the cost of inducing effort. Hence, the commitment problem prevents the principal
from achieving the first-best. However, the loss will be small if the agents are only mildly
risk-averse, as the following example illustrates.
Example. Consider again our example for n = 2. Applying the results from Theorem 4.2, it
can be shown that e∗ = 2
α−1
β−α eFB and x∗ = 2
β−1
β−α tFB holds in any optimal contest. The ratio of
second-best to first-best profits of the principal is therefore
R = 2e
∗ − x∗
2eFB − 2tFB =
2
β−1
β−α (eFB − tFB)
2(eFB − tFB) = 2
α−1
β−α .
This ratio is increasing in α, with R→ 1 in the limit as α→ 1, so second-best profits approach
first-best profits when the agents’ risk-aversion vanishes. 
The loss will also be small for any given risk-aversion if there are many agents. This follows
immediately from Theorem 4.2, because the probability of not receiving any of the n−1 identical
prizes is 1/n in equilibrium and vanishes as the number of agents grows. We will illustrate this
more formally in Section 4.4.3. In particular, these arguments imply that the absence of a
contingent monetary transfer to the reviewer – the constitutive assumption of the delegation
approach – comes with little loss if risk-aversion is small or if the number of agents is large.
4.3.3 Unique Implementation
We say a contract Φ uniquely implements some pure-strategy effort profile e if (i) it implements
e, and (ii) it does not implement any other (possibly mixed) strategy profile σ 6= e. The
next theorem states that the second-best effort profile e∗ from Theorem 4.2 can be uniquely
implemented by a contest that is similar to the familiar all-pay auctions. We refer to this
contest as an all-pay auction with censoring.
An all-pay auction is one of the canonical contest types (see Konrad, 2009, Ch. 2.1). It is
perfectly discriminating in the sense that the agent with the highest effort wins the highest prize
with probability one, the agent with the second highest effort wins the second prize, and so on.
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Ties are broken randomly. Our all-pay auction with censoring is the same as a standard all-pay
auction (with n − 1 identical prizes) for all effort levels up to the censoring level. Efforts at or
above the censoring level are not differentiated, i.e., an agent who exerts the effort exactly at
the censoring level and an agent who exerts effort above the censoring level are treated the same
and have the same chance of winning each of the prizes. The censoring level can also be thought
of as a maximum admissible bid in an otherwise standard all-pay auction. The following result
shows that censoring generates a unique equilibrium, which is in pure strategies.
Theorem 4.3. The effort profile (e∗, ..., e∗) is uniquely implemented by an all-pay auction with
prize profile y = (x∗/(n− 1), ..., x∗/(n− 1), 0) and censoring level e∗.
To see why all agents exerting e∗ is an equilibrium, observe that upward deviations increase
costs without increasing the probability of winning, while downward deviations guarantee the
zero prize. The intuition for the result that no other pure-strategy equilibria exist is similar to
that for all-pay auctions without censoring. For every positive effort profile e 6= (e∗, ..., e∗), either
an upward deviation discretely increases the probability of winning, or a downward deviation
decreases costs without changing the probability of winning. The crucial step in the proof is
then to show that censoring destroys any potential mixed-strategy equilibrium.21
Theorem 4.3 shows that the optimum can be implemented by a contest with a simple alloca-
tion rule. The allocation rule is also weakly monotonic, in the sense that higher effort translates
into weakly higher expected payments. Furthermore, the implementation is unique, so that the
agents do not face the challenge of coordinating on a given equilibrium.
4.3.4 Implementation in Tullock Contests
The rent-seeking literature commonly studies contests that are imperfectly discriminating, which
means that higher effort translates smoothly into a higher probability of winning (for example,
see again Konrad, 2009). For the symmetric case with n agents but only one prize, such contests
are characterized by a contest success function
pi(e) =
f(ei)∑
j∈I f(ej)
(4.1)
which determines the probability that agent i wins the prize as a function of the effort profile e,
where f is continuous, strictly increasing and satisfies f(0) = 0. If all agents exert zero effort,
each of them wins with equal probability. With more than one prize, as in our optimal contests,
the contest success function can be applied in a nested fashion (see e.g. Clark and Riis, 1996):
the first prize is allocated according to (4.1) among all n agents, the second prize is allocated
according to (4.1) restricted to those n− 1 agents who have not received the first prize, and so
on.
Tullock contests are a special case for f(ei) = eri , where r ≥ 0 is a parameter measuring the
randomness of the allocation rule. In particular, if r = 0 the winners are determined randomly
irrespective of the exerted efforts. On the other hand, as r → ∞ the contest approaches the
21The all-pay auction without censoring does not have an equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore, the max-
min optimal contest in Frankel (2014) would not be optimal in our setting with endogenous efforts, because it is
unable to implement the optimal effort profile.
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perfectly discriminating all-pay auction in which an agent exerting more effort wins a higher
prize for sure.
The rent-seeking literature often treats the contest success function as a black box and
refrains from explaining how technological and institutional circumstances generate its shape.22
Our next result shows that a specific contest success function arises as part of an optimally
designed contract.
Theorem 4.4. The effort profile (e∗, ..., e∗) is implemented by a nested contest with prize profile
y = (x∗/(n− 1), ..., x∗/(n− 1), 0) and the contest success function (4.1) for
f(ei) = c(ei)r
∗(n) with r∗(n) = n− 1
Hn − 1 ,
where Hn =
∑n
k=1 1/k is the n-th harmonic number.
The optimal contest success function incorporates the agents’ cost function and thus depends
on the effort technology. In can be thought of as a generalization of the Tullock contest success
function to settings with non-linear cost. Furthermore, it always reduces to the traditional
Tullock shape f(ei) = eri when the cost function is c(ei) = γe
β
i , as in our running example.
The optimal randomness parameter r∗(n) is strictly increasing in the number of agents, which
means that the optimal contest becomes more discriminating as n grows. For instance, we have
r∗(2) = 2, r∗(3) = 2.4 and r∗(10) ≈ 4.67. It also holds that r∗(n)→∞ in the limit as n→∞,
so the contest approaches the all-pay auction when the number of agents becomes large.
Theorem 4.4 shows that the optimum can be achieved by using an appropriately designed
imperfectly discriminating contest. This contest is strictly monotonic, in the sense that higher
effort always translates into strictly higher expected monetary payments.
4.4 Extensions
4.4.1 Imperfect Effort Observation
The assumption that the reviewer perfectly observes the individual effort of each agent can be
seen as a strong one. In this subsection, we investigate two different observational constraints
that may appear realistic. We will study a setting where only effort differences between the
agents but not the levels are observable, and one where only noisy signals of the efforts are
available. We will show that contests with stochastic allocation rules can help to overcome the
problem of limited observation. We restrict attention to the case of two agents throughout this
subsection.
We first assume that the reviewer does not observe the effort profile (e1, e2) but only the
effort difference ∆e = e1− e2. We then define a contest with additive noise as a contest in which
the optimal prize x∗ is given to agent 1 if and only if ∆e+ ˜ ≥ 0, where ˜ is a random variable
(see, for instance, Lazear and Rosen, 1981). Intuitively, agent 1 receives the prize whenever
the effort difference ∆e is larger than a randomly determined number. Such a contest can be
conducted if only ∆e is observable, but of course also if the entire profile e can be observed. Our
22But for example see Jia et al. (2013) for foundations of various functional forms.
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next result shows that a contest with additive noise implements the optimum for an appropriate
choice of the distribution of ˜.
Proposition 4.1. The effort profile (e∗, e∗) is implemented by a contest with additive noise for
˜ ∼ U [−c(e∗)/c′(e∗), c(e∗)/c′(e∗)].
The randomness in the allocation rule ensures that unilateral deviations from (e∗, e∗) are
not profitable, because the winning probability adapts appropriately. The distribution can
neither be too noisy, which would create incentives to deviate to smaller effort levels, nor to
concentrated, which would create incentives to deviate to larger effort levels. The uniform
distribution described in the proposition is a particularly simple and convenient solution.
We next assume that the reviewer observes only noisy signals of the individual agents’ efforts.
The usual interpretation is that agent i exerts effort ei but the final observable output is a random
variable e˜i that depends on ei. In fact, the principal may care about output rather than effort,
but since her payoffs are unaffected by any noise with zero mean, here we focus on randomness
in the reviewer’s observation of efforts. Since effort is non-negative we assume that noise is
multiplicative, such that
e˜i = eiη˜i
for a non-negative random variable η˜i.23 To ensure closed-form tractability, we assume that the
effort cost function is given by c(ei) = γeβi for some β > 1 and γ > 0. We furthermore assume
that the pair (η˜1, η˜2) follows a bivariate log-normal distribution,
(η˜1, η˜2) ∼ lnN
[(
ν1
ν2
)
,
(
σ21 σ12
σ12 σ22
)]
.
It is possible – but not necessary for our analysis – to impose parameter constraints that guaran-
tee symmetry and/or that the expected value of e˜1 + e˜2 equals e1 + e2. We now define a contest
with multiplicative noise as a contest in which the optimal prize x∗ is given to agent 1 if and
only if η˜e˜1/e˜2 ≥ 1, where η˜ is a non-negative random variable. Intuitively, agent 1 receives the
prize whenever the observed effort ratio e˜1/e˜2 is larger than a randomly determined number.
As before, such a contest could also be conducted if there is actually no noise in the observa-
tion. Our next result shows that a contest with multiplicative noise can indeed implement the
optimum when observation is not too noisy.
Proposition 4.2. If σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12 ≤ 2/(piβ2), then the effort profile (e∗, e∗) is implemented
by a contest with multiplicative noise for η˜ ∼ lnN [νη, σ2η] with
νη = ν2 − ν1 and σ2η =
2
piβ2
− (σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12).
As argued before, an appropriate level of randomness in the allocation is required to imple-
ment the optimum. Noisy observation of efforts already generates some baseline randomness.
If this noise is too strong, then incentives to exert effort cannot be preserved. The condition
23See Jia et al. (2013) for a survey of contests with multiplicative noise.
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σ21 + σ22 − 2σ12 ≤ 2/(piβ2) in the proposition ensures that this is not the case. For instance, if
the random variables η˜i are i.i.d. it simplifies to σ2i ≤ 1/(piβ2). Positive correlation effectively
reduces the observational noise and slackens the condition further. If it is satisfied, then the
randomness due to noisy effort observation can be raised to the appropriate level by an addi-
tional random component in the contract. With η˜ as specified in the proposition, the compound
random variable (η˜2/η˜1)/η˜ follows a log-normal distribution with location parameter ν = 0 and
scale parameter σ2 = 2/(piβ2), and we show in the proof that (e∗, e∗) is an equilibrium for the
resulting stochastic allocation process.24
4.4.2 Cheap Talk
In the main model we assumed that the principal delegates to the reviewer the decision on how
to reward the agents. In this section, we consider a cheap talk model where the reviewer only
reports the unknown state of the world to the principal, who then decides how to reward the
agents. Similar to Kolotilin et al. (2013), we allow the principal to ex ante limit the set from
which she can take her action ex post.
The timing is as follows. First, the principal commits to a set D ⊆ ∆T of possible actions.
Next, the agents choose their efforts simultaneously. The reviewer then observes the efforts and
reports back to the principal. After receiving the report, the principal chooses an action from
D to reward or punish the agents.
Our previous analysis can be modified to capture this cheap talk setting. Given a credi-
ble contract as defined before, we reinterpret µe,θ as the report of a type-θ reviewer who has
observed e, rather than as the action that the reviewer can take himself. This report can be
interchangeably interpreted as a direct communication of (e, θ) or as a recommendation to pay
the agents according to µe,θ. The following additional constraint then ensures that the principal
always has an incentive to follow the reviewer’s recommendation:
piP (e, µe,θ) ≥ piP (e, µe′,θ′) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ, (IC-P)
where piP (e, µe
′,θ′) = Eµe′,θ′ [piP (e, t)]. We are interested in problem (P) with the additional cheap
talk constraint (IC-P). The solution to this problem describes the optimum that the principal
can achieve in the cheap talk setting.25
Given this formulation of the problem, it is obvious that the cheap talk setting is weakly less
permissive than the delegation setting. In the presence of a commitment problem, keeping the
authority to make decisions may harm the principal. The following example illustrates possible
consequences of the additional constraint (IC-P).
24The formulation of the proposition allows for σ2η = 0, by which we mean that η˜ is degenerate and takes the
value eνη with probability one.
25The constraints (IC-R), (IC-A) and (IC-P) again characterize the Perfect Bayesian equilibria of an extensive
form game. Consider the game described in footnote 16 and reinterpret the reviewer’s choice from D as a
recommendation to the principal. Then add a stage where the principal, after observing the recommendation
but not the true state (e, θ), makes the choice from D. Despite the complexity of the principal’s information
sets, many of which are off the equilibrium path, constraint (IC-P) prescribes sequential rationality (given any
weakly consistent beliefs) for all these information sets. The reason is that the principal’s best responses in these
information sets are independent of her beliefs about (e, θ).
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Example. Reconsider the first-best contract ΦFB for n = 2 and a reviewer of known type θ = 3
derived for our parametric example in Section 4.3. This contract rewards the first-best efforts by
the transfer profile (tFB, tFB) and punishes unilateral deviations by one of the profiles (tnd, 0)
or (0, tnd). Since 2tFB ≈ 0.32 < tnd ≈ 1.15, the sum of transfers is not constant across these
profiles. Hence the contract violates (IC-P). With this contract, the principal would exhibit a
leniency bias. Intuitively, to induce the altruistic reviewer to report a deviator truthfully, the
punishment has to be combined with a very large payment tnd to the non-deviating agent. Ex
post, the principal is not willing to carry out this costly punishment. 
The next result shows that, with uncertainty about θ, the principal does not lose by keeping
the authority to allocate rewards to the agents.
Proposition 4.3. Any contest satisfies (IC-P).
The result follows immediately from the observation that, ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ,
piP (e, µe
′,θ′) =
n∑
i=1
ei − Eµe′,θ′
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
=
n∑
i=1
ei −
n∑
i=1
yi
is independent of (e′, θ′) in any contest Cy. Since the principal commits to a transfer sum of
x = ∑ni=1 yi in a contest, once efforts have been exerted she can never increase her payoff by not
implementing the reviewer’s recommendation on how to allocate the prizes to the agents. Since
by Theorem 4.1 the set of optimal contracts always contains a contest, the additional constraint
(IC-P) does not restrict the set of of achievable outcomes for the principal. Furthermore, the
optimal contests derived above for the delegation setting remain optimal in the cheap talk
setting.
4.4.3 Non-Separability and Asymmetry
The assumption that the agents have additively separable and symmetric utility functions serves
as a natural starting point. It was used at several points in the analysis, but it matters mostly for
our characterization of the credibility constraint (IC-R). Separability implies that the agents’
sunk efforts do not influence the reviewer’s optimal decision on how to distribute the prizes.
Symmetry implies that the reviewer exhibits no favoritism. Therefore, a first question that
arises is whether our contests are robust to reviewers who exhibit non-separable preferences or
favoritism. A second question is whether contests are still optimal. We will address each of
these questions in turn. In order to keep comparisons simple, we introduce non-separability
and asymmetry directly in the reviewer’s utility function, but leave the agents’ utility functions
unchanged.
Without separability, different distributions of the prizes will lead to different sums of the
agents’ utilities, which implies that the reviewer will no longer be indifferent between all possible
allocations. For instance, non-separability could easily be captured by modifying the reviewer’s
payoff function to
piR(e, t, θ) = piP (e, t) + θ
n∑
i=1
h(pii(e, t)),
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for a strictly concave function h : R → R. Whenever θ > 0, which we will assume for the
following discussion, this transformation implies a concern for equality of the entire utilities of
the agents (“wide bracketing”) rather than just their utilities from monetary transfers (“narrow
bracketing”). In particular, the reviewer will prefer giving larger prizes to agents who have
exerted higher efforts. For a contest to remain credible, its allocation rule has to be perfectly
discriminating. The all-pay auction discussed in Section 4.3.3 satisfies this property, except
for efforts above the censoring level e∗. A reviewer who brackets widely may still want to
discriminate between agents with efforts above the equilibrium level, thereby destroying the
desirable equilibrium properties of the contract. This problem disappears if the censoring level
is indeed a maximum bid, i.e., an upper bound on the effort that each agent can provide. In
particular, the principal could benefit from setting this bound herself, for instance by imposing
page limits on grant proposals or by enforcing maximal work hours. There is no cost associated
to such measures in our setting, while they bring the benefit of ensuring robustness to non-
separable preferences. The principal can also use tools from information design to achieve
robustness. She could conceal deviations above e∗ from the reviewer (e.g. by forbidding the
manager to call the workers on the weekend) and conduct an otherwise standard all-pay auction.
She could also structure the observation process in a way that adds the right amount of noise
to make a perfectly discriminating contest optimal (see Proposition 4.2). Information design is
also a response to favoritism, which can be captured by agent-specific functions hi in the above
expression. A blind reviewing process would make sure that the reviewer observes the chosen
efforts but not the identity of the agent who chose each effort. Again, garbling the reviewer’s
information in such a way comes at no loss with an optimal contest, but it helps to sustain
credibility despite possible asymmetries in how the reviewer wants to treat the agents.
Rather than using these additional tools to achieve robustness of a contest, one may ask
if the principal can exploit non-separable and/or asymmetric preferences of the reviewer by
writing a contract which is not a contest. The answer to this second question will depend on
the exact nature of the principal’s knowledge. With precise knowledge of preferences, it may
indeed be the case that a standard contest is no longer optimal. For instance, we conjecture
that asymmetries may make generalized contests optimal, in which different prizes are awarded
for the same performance rank depending on the identity of the agent occupying that rank (as
already proposed by Lazear and Rosen, 1981, p. 863). We leave this extension to future research.
However, it is worth pointing out again that a robust contest will often achieve an outcome very
close to the first-best, leaving little additional gain from designing a more complex mechanism.
This is the case if the agents’ risk-aversion is moderate or the number of agents is sufficiently
large, because then the risk imposed by an optimal contest on the agents in equilibrium is not
very harmful. We illustrate this in the following example.
Example. Consider our running example and fix β = 2 and γ = 1. Figure 4.1 depicts the
percentage of first-best payoffs that the principal can achieve with an optimal contest, as a
function of the risk-aversion parameter α and for several values of n. Two observations are
immediate. First, as α → 1 the share of the first-best payoffs that the principal can capture
converges to one. Second, for any given level of risk-aversion, the principal obtains a larger
share with a larger number of agents. This is intuitive, as the risk that an individual agent is
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exposed to decreases in the number of agents. The example also shows that, even for a modest
number of agents, the principal obtains a substantial share of the first-best payoffs by running
an optimal contest. In particular, already for n = 6 the principal captures more than 90% of
the first-best payoffs for any α ∈ (0, 1). 
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Figure 4.1: Share of first-best payoffs with an optimal contest.
4.5 Related Literature
Our contribution is related to three distinct groups of papers. First, the optimal mechanism
in our paper is a contest, so we contribute to the literature examining conditions under which
contests are optimal. Second, we work with a three-tiered hierarchical structure with a lenient
reviewer. There are several papers featuring a similar structure. Third, the principal in our
model delegates the decision on how to reward the agents to the reviewer. Our paper is therefore
related to the literature on optimal delegation. We will discuss the connections and differences
of our paper to each of these strands of literature in turn.
Optimality of contests. In their seminal paper, Lazear and Rosen (1981) show that
contests can implement the socially optimal effort levels when agents are risk-neutral. They
assume perfectly competitive labor markets in which the agents obtain all the surplus. Contests
are then among the optimal mechanisms because they can induce first-best effort. At the same
time, the set of optimal mechanisms also contains a piece-rate contract, among others. For
the case of risk-averse agents, Lazear and Rosen (1981) compare the two specific mechanisms
of piece-rate contracts and contests. They show that either of them sometimes dominates the
other, but they do not establish results on global optimality.
A defining feature of contests is that the payoff of the agents depends on how well they
perform relative to each other. This feature can make contests optimal in the presence of common
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shocks. Both Green and Stokey (1983) and Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) show that contests can
do better than individual contracts when agents are risk-averse and there is a random common
shock to their outputs. If the relationship between effort and output is ambiguous and the agents
are ambiguity-averse, Kellner (2015) shows that contests can be optimal because they filter out
the common ambiguity.
In our paper, contests are optimal because they act as a commitment device. Contests
provide a commitment for lenient reviewers to punish shirking agents.
Lenient reviewer. Several papers have looked at a three-tiered hierarchy with a lenient
reviewer. Prendergast and Topel (1996) and Giebe and Gürtler (2012) consider a situation where
the reviewer is facing a single agent and the principal can write contracts where the reviewer’s
pay is contingent on his behavior. In Prendergast and Topel (1996), both the reviewer and
the principal receive a signal about the worker’s effort. Their main result is that leniency need
not be costly for the firm, because it can charge the reviewer for exercising leniency. In Giebe
and Gürtler (2012), the principal offers a menu of contracts to screen lenient and non-lenient
reviewers. They show that if the non-lenient type is common enough, the optimal solution can
be to pay a flat wage to the reviewer, and rely on the non-lenient type for punishment of agents
who shirk. The main difference between these papers and ours is that we consider multiple
agents and do not allow contracts which condition payment to the reviewer on the reported
evaluation.
Svensson (2003) applies a model with a lenient reviewer to the design of allocation mech-
anisms for foreign aid. The principal wants to use aid to incentivize countries to implement
reforms. In his model, the principal determines the allocation mechanism, but the aid is then
distributed by a country manager whose utility takes into account the well-being of the target
countries. Svensson (2003) proposes a mechanism where each country manager is given a budget
for several similar countries but has discretion in how to allocate the aid across countries. He
shows that under certain conditions this mechanism can incentivize countries to reform. Like in
our paper, Svensson (2003) considers multiple agents and does not allow for conditional mone-
tary payments to the reviewer. The main difference is that we solve for the optimal delegation
mechanism while Svensson (2003) compares two specific mechanisms.
Optimal delegation. Our paper is also related to the optimal delegation literature. In
the usual delegation problem, the agent (the reviewer in our setting) is better informed about
some exogenous state of the world. The principal delegates a unidimensional decision to the
agent, but restricts the set of actions that the agent can choose. The question is how this set
should be designed if the preferences of the principal and the agent are misaligned. The first
to formulate the problem and show the existence of a solution was Holmström (1977, 1984),
who focussed on interval delegation sets. Melumad and Shibano (1991) show that the optimal
delegation set does not necessarily take the form of an interval. Alonso and Matouschek (2008)
and Amador and Bagwell (2013) characterize the optimal delegation sets in progressively more
general environments and find conditions under which the optimal delegation set is indeed an
interval.
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The canonical delegation model has been applied and extended in a number of ways.26 In
the multidimensional delegation model by Frankel (2014), which we have already discussed in
the Introduction, optimal mechanisms exhibit what he calls the “aligned delegation” property,
which means that all agents behave in the same way as the principal would behave. Our optimal
contests also satisfy the aligned delegation property, i.e., the equilibrium behavior of reviewers
is independent of their type. Krähmer and Kováč (2016) assume that the agent has a privately
known type which encodes his ability to interpret the private information he receives later on.
They also find that screening is not beneficial in a large range of cases. Tanner (2014) obtains
a no-screening result in a standard delegation model with uncertain bias of the agent.
Most papers cited above focus on deterministic delegation mechanisms. Kováč and Mylo-
vanov (2009) and Goltsman et al. (2009) allow for stochastic delegation mechanisms and derive
conditions under which the optimal mechanism is deterministic. As in Frankel (2014), we allow
for stochastic mechanisms, and our optimal mechanism is indeed non-deterministic, but in a
special sense – the contest prizes are allocated randomly.
Finally, instead of delegating the decision to the agent, the principal could ask the agent
to report the state of the world but take the action herself. This is the question addressed in
the cheap talk literature in the tradition of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Several papers ask if
the principal is better off delegating the decision or just asking for advice. Bester and Krähmer
(2008) find that, if the agent needs to exert effort after selecting a project, delegation of the
project selection is less likely to be optimal. Kolotilin et al. (2013) consider a model of cheap talk
where the principal can ex ante commit not to take a certain action ex post. Again, they show
that cheap talk with commitment can outperform delegation. On the other hand, Dessein (2002),
Krishna and Morgan (2008), and Ivanov (2010) find that, in general, delegation is better than
cheap talk. However, Fehr et al. (2013) and Bartling et al. (2014) provide experimental evidence
showing that individuals value decision rights intrinsically, which implies that delegation may
not take place even when it is beneficial. These issues does not arise in our model. We can
implement in a cheap talk setting the same outcome as with the optimal delegation mechanism,
provided the principal can commit to constraining her own actions in the same way as she can
constrain the actions of the reviewer.
The main difference between our paper and the delegation literature is that the state of the
world, on which the expert has private information, is exogenous in the delegation literature,
while it is endogenous in our paper. In our model, the reviewer observes the efforts exerted by
the agents. Since the incentives of the agents depend on the behavior of the reviewer, which in
turn depends on the given delegation set, the state of the world is affected by the principal’s
choice of the delegation set. To our knowledge, our paper is the first to consider this class of
delegation problems.
26See Armstrong and Vickers (2010) for an application to merger policy, Pei (2015a) for a model where delegation
is used to conceal the principal’s private type, and Guo (2016) for a model of delegation of experimentation.
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4.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a three-tiered structure consisting of a principal, a reviewer,
and n agents. The principal designs a reward scheme in order to incentivize the agents to exert
effort. However, the principal herself does not observe the efforts, so she delegates the allocation
of rewards to the reviewer. The reviewer has private information about the utility weights he
puts on the payoffs of the principal and of the agents.
Our main result is that a very simple mechanism, a contest, is optimal. A contest is optimal
because it acts as a commitment for the reviewer to punish shirking agents. We also characterize
the set of all optimal contests and show that they have a flat reward structure with n− 1 equal
positive prizes and one zero prize. Finally, we show that the optimum can be achieved with
several common contest success functions, including modified all-pay auctions, nested Tullock
contests, and contests with additive or multiplicative noise.
Given our results, other interesting questions can be examined in the framework of delegated
performance evaluation. Here we will mention three immediate ones. First, while real-world
contests indeed often feature only two prize levels (for instance, the size of research grants is
often fixed, students sometimes receive only pass-fail grades, and tenure is either granted or
declined), there are also contests with multiple prize levels. GE under Jack Welch separated
their employees into three performance levels.27 Grades are often given on a scale from A to
D. An interesting question to ask would be why multiple prize levels are offered. We conjecture
that they are a response to heterogeneity in agents’ ability levels, so that agents of higher ability
compete among themselves for higher prizes.28 Second, in addition to incentivizing agents of
heterogeneous abilities, principals will often be interested in screening the abilities of the agents
in order to be able to assign more responsibilities to more capable agents. The purpose of a
tenure or promotion contest is obviously not only to induce hard work, but also to select the
right agents for a more advanced position. A question that could be examined in this framework
is how screening and provision of incentives interact when both are delegated to potentially
biased reviewers. Finally, the principal also hires the reviewer. At first blush, our results might
seem to suggest that the principal would be better off by trying to recruit a selfish reviewer who
will not take the well-being of the agents into account. However, that would be the case only
if the principal was able to determine the reviewer’s type with absolute certainty. If there is
any remaining uncertainty, our results hold and imply that the principal’s maximal payoff does
not depend on the reviewer’s type. This implies that the principal is free to select the reviewer
based on other criteria. For instance, an altruistic mid-level manager may outperform a selfish
one in uniting his team to face a common challenge.
Our results offer a novel explanation for the widespread use of contests. We also point to new
applications where contest-like mechanisms could be profitably implemented. Settings where an
intermediary allocates monetary rewards are widespread in the economy, and as the example of
27See “’Rank and Yank’ Retains Vocal Fans” (L. Kwoh, The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2012).
28Moldovanu and Sela (2001) find, in a model with incomplete information and risk-neutral agents, that multiple
prizes can be optimal when cost functions are convex. Olszewski and Siegel (2016) develop a novel approach to
contest design, which can be used for very general classes of “large” contests. They characterize the distribution
of prizes which maximizes the effort exerted by agents. Among other results, they find that multiple prizes of
different levels are optimal when agents have convex costs or are risk-averse.
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foreign aid illustrated, they can be found in unexpected places.
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A Appendix: Chapter 1
A.1 Main Proofs and the Running Example
A.1.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
I prove each of the three statements contained in Proposition 1.1 in turn.
Lemma A.1 (Existence). An equilibrium in pure actions always exists.
I provide a constructive proof of Lemma A.1 in three steps. Step 1 constructs the candidate
equilibrium investment plan I∗. Step 2 proves that no firm can increase its expected profits by
making additional investments. Step 3 proves that no firm can increase its expected profits by
reducing investments. Finally, notice that any deviation from the investment plan I∗ can be
written as a collection of investments and divestments and by Steps 2 and 3, each such investment
and divestment decreases expected profits and hence any such collection must decrease expected
profits. Thus, no firm can profitably deviate from the investment plan I∗ and then, by definition,
I∗ is an equilibrium.
Step 1. Constructing the candidate equilibrium.
Given a game, define m such that
m = max
{1,...,N}
n
s.t. R(n,N)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > 0
As by assumption R(1, N)−r(0, N)−C(0) > 0, a solution to this maximization problem always
exists.
Next, calculate each α1, α2, . . . , αm such that the following condition holds:
R(1, N)− r(0, N)− C(α1) =
R(2, N)− r(1, N)− C(α2) =
R(3, N)− r(2, N)− C(α3) =
...
R(m,N)− r(m− 1, N)− C(αm) = 0.
By construction it holds R(m,N)− r(m− 1, N)−C(0) > 0 and by Assumption 1.1 the reward
of innovation are non-increasing, so the inequality holds for all k < m. As costs of innovation
approach infinity as j → 1, values α1, α2, . . . , αm always exist by the Intermediate Value Theo-
rem. Furthermore, as C(j) is increasing and by applying Assumption 1.1 it is easy to see that
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.
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Observe that N ≥ m. For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, let I∗i = [0, αi). For each i ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , N}
let I∗i = ∅. I will demonstrate that I∗ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that I∗ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected profits
by making additional investments.
Proof. First observe that as ∀j ∈ (α1, 1), by construction R(1, N)− r(0, N)−C(j) < 0, no firm
has an incentive to invest beyond the technology frontier. I will consider separately the firms
which in I∗ have some investment and those firms which do not.
First, fix a firm i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and take any feasible investment interval L ⊆ [αi′ , α1). It
must be that min(L) ∈ [αk, αk−1)1 for some k ≤ i′ and k ≥ 2 and sup(L) ∈ (αk′ , αk′−1] for some
k′ ≤ i′ and k′ ≥ 2, with k′ ≤ k.
First consider the case where k′ = k. Then L ⊆ [αk, αk−1). Observe that R(k,N) − r(k −
1, N)−C(αk) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k−1 for all j ∈ [αk, αk−1) by construction. As C(·) is assumed
to be strictly increasing, then R(k,N) − r(k − 1, N) − C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ (min(L), sup(L)).
Hence,
−
∫
L
C(j)dj +
∫
L
R(k,N)dj −
∫
L
r(k − 1, N)dj < 0
and the firm i′ has no incentive to invest in the interval L.
Next consider the case where k′ < k. Then we can write L = [min(L), αk−1)∪ [αk−1, αk−2)∪
· · · ∪ [αk′ , sup(L)). Denote these subintervals as Lk−1, Lk−2, . . . , Lk′−1. Observe that by con-
struction, the following statements hold:
R(k,N)− r(k − 1, N)− C(αk) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 1 for all j ∈ Lk−1
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(αk−1) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 2 for all j ∈ Lk−2
...
R(k′, N)− r(k′ − 1, N)− C(αk′) = 0 and n(j, I∗) = k′ − 1 for all j ∈ Lk′−1
As C(·) is assumed to be strictly increasing, the following statements hold:
R(k,N)− r(k − 1, N)− C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ Lk−1
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ Lk−2
...
R(k′, N)− r(k′ − 1, N)− C(j) < 0 for all j ∈ Lk′−1
But then it holds∫
L
R(n(j, I∗) + 1, N)− r(n(j, I∗), N)− C(j)dj =
=
(∫
Lk−1
R(k,N)− r(k − 1, N)− C(j)dj
)
+
(∫
Lk−2
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j)dj
)
+
· · ·+
(∫
Lk′−1
R(k′, N)− r(k′ − 1, N)− C(j)dj
)
< 0
1If αk = αk−1, let L = {αk} and min(L) = αk.
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and the firm i′ has no incentive to invest in the interval L.
Next, fix a firm i′ ∈ {m + 1, . . . , N} and take any feasible investment interval L ⊆ [0, α1).
Observe that we can write L as a union of two sets, L = L′ ∪ L′′ where L′ ⊆ [0, αm) and
L′′ ⊆ [αm, α1). By the same argument as above, it holds that any investment in the set L′′ cannot
be profitable. Consider now an investment in the set L′. By construction, m is the maximum
number of firms that can profitably invest in the project j = 0. As C(j) is strictly increasing it
is also the maximum number of firms that can invest in any project. By construction, there are
m firms investing in all projects in [0, αm) and as a result the firm i′ cannot profitably invest in
the set L′. Thus, the investment in the set L cannot be profitable.
Step 3. Suppose that I∗ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected profits
by decreasing investments.
Proof. First observe that all firms i > m have zero investments by construction and hence cannot
decrease their investments. Fix a firm i′ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and take any feasible investment interval
L ⊆ [0, αi′). Consider a disinvestment from the set L. It must be that min(L) ∈ [αk, αk−1) for
some k − 1 ≥ i′ with k ≤ m + 1 and αm+1 = 0 and sup(L) ∈ (αk′ , αk′−1] for some k′ − 1 ≥ i′
and k′ ≤ k.
Consider the case where k′ = k. Then L ⊆ [αk, αk−1). Observe that R(k − 1, N) − r(k −
2, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 1 for all j ∈ (αk, αk−1) by construction. Hence,∫
L
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j)dj > 0.
and the firm i′ has no incentive to divest from the interval L.
Next consider the case where k′ < k. Then we can write L = [min(L), αk−1)∪ [αk−1, αk−2)∪
· · · ∪ [αk′ , sup(L)). Denote these subintervals as Lk−1, Lk−2, . . . , Lk′−1. Observe that by con-
struction, the following statements hold:
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 1 for all j ∈ Lk−1
R(k − 2, N)− r(k − 3, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k − 2 for all j ∈ Lk−2
...
R(k′ − 1, N)− r(k′ − 2, N)− C(j) > 0 and n(j, I∗) = k′ − 1 for all j ∈ Lk′−1
But then it holds∫
L′′
R(n(j, I∗), N)− r(n(j, I∗)− 1, N)− C(j)dj =
=
∫
Lk−1
R(k − 1, N)− r(k − 2, N)− C(j)dj +
∫
Lk−2
R(k − 2, N)− r(k − 3, N)−C(j)dj+
+ · · ·+
∫
Lk′−1
R(k′ − 1, N)− r(k′ − 2, N)−C(j)dj > 0
and the firm i′ has no incentive to divest from the interval L.
Thus no firm can increase its expected profits by divesting from any feasible interval L.
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Lemma A.2. If I∗ is an equilibrium and 0 < n(j, I∗) < N for some j ∈ [0, 1), then infinitely
many equilibria exist.
Proof. Let I∗ be an equilibrium and fix some j ∈ [0, 1) such that 0 < n(j, I∗) < N . Then there
exist firms i and i′ such that j ∈ Ii and j 6∈ Ii′ . Then there must exist some  > 0 such that
[j, j + ) ∩ Ii = [j, j + ) and [j, j + ) ∩ Ii′ = ∅.
Consider an investment plan Iˆ such that Iˆi′′ = I∗i′′ , for all i′′ 6= i, i′. For i and i′ let
Iˆi = I∗i \ [j, j+ ) and Iˆi′ = I∗i′ ∪ [j, j+ ). In words, only transfer the ownership of investment in
projects [j, j + ) from firm i to firm i′ and leave everything else unchanged. I will demonstrate
that Iˆ is also an equilibrium and hence, because there is an infinite number of ways to choose ,
there exists an infinity of equilibria.
Suppose that Iˆ is not an equilibrium. Then, there exists a firm that can profitably change
its investment plan. This means that there exists an interval L ⊂ [0, 1) and a firm il such that
firm can increase its expected profits by either investing in the interval L or divesting from
the interval L. Consider first those firms i′′ 6= i, i′. By construction n(j, I∗) = n(j, Iˆ) for all
j ∈ [0, 1). From Equation 1.1, it is clear that strategic effects only influence the expected profit
through n(j, I). Thus, if a firm can profitably deviate from Iˆ it can also profitably deviate from
I∗.
Next, consider firms i and i′. As their investment plans are unchanged in the set [0, j)∪ [j+
, 1) by an argument identical to the one above, if they could profitably deviate in this set from
Iˆ, they could also profitably deviate from I∗. Now consider the set [j, j+ ). Firm i′ can deviate
in this set only by not investing. Suppose that there exists an interval L′ ⊆ [j, j + ), such that
not investing in this set increases the expected profits of firm i′. Then it must be the case that∫
L′
R(n(j, Iˆ), N)− r(n(j, Iˆ)− 1, N)− C(j)dj < 0.
But in this case, firm i could profitably deviate from I∗ by not investing in the interval L′. Next,
firm i can deviate in the set [j, j + ) only by investing. Suppose that there exists an interval
L′ ⊆ [j, j + ), such that investing in this set increases the expected profits of firm i. Then it
must be the case that ∫
L′
R(n(j, Iˆ) + 1, N)− r(n(j, Iˆ), N)− C(j)dj > 0.
But in this case, firm i′ could profitably deviate from I∗ by investing in the interval L′.
Thus, in each case, a profitable deviation from Iˆ implies a profitable deviation from I∗ which
contradicts the initial assumption that I∗ is an equilibrium.
Lemma A.3. If there are multiple equilibria they all result in the same market portfolio of
investment in innovation. That is, if I∗1 and I∗2 are equilibrium investment plans, then n(j, I∗1 ) =
n(j, I∗2 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1). If I∗1 is an equilibrium then any investment plan I∗3 such that n(j, I∗1 ) =
n(j, I∗3 ) for all j ∈ [0, 1) is also an equilibrium.
I prove this Lemma in two steps, each proving one part of the Lemma.
Step 1. If there are multiple equilibria they all result in the same market portfolio of investment
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in innovation. That is, if I∗1 and I∗2 are equilibrium investment plans, then n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I∗2 )
for all j ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, there exists a point j ∈ [0, 1) such that n(j, I∗1 ) 6= n(j, I∗2 ). Suppose,
without loss of generality, that n(j, I∗1 ) > n(j, I∗2 ). Fix a firm i and a point  > 0 such that it holds
[j, j+)∩I∗1,i = [j, j+) and [j, j+)∩I∗2,i = ∅ and n(l, I∗1 ) = const , n(l, I∗2 ) = const,∀l ∈ [j, j+).
Such a firm and a point always exist.
(1) Suppose R(n(j, I∗1 ), N) − r(n(j, I∗1 ) − 1, N) ≥ C(j + ). As C(·) is increasing it holds
R(n(j, I∗1 ), N) − r(n(j, I∗1 ) − 1, N) > C(l) for all l ∈ [j, j + ). By Assumption 1.1 it holds
R(n(j, I∗2 ) + 1, N)− r(n(j, I∗2 ), N) > C(l) for all l ∈ [j, j + ). Then it holds∫ j+
j
R(n(l, I∗2 ) + 1, N)− r(n(l, I∗2 ), N)− C(l)dl > 0.
Then I∗2 cannot be an equilibrium as firm i could increase its expected profits by investing in
the interval [j, j + ).
(2) Suppose R(n(j, I∗1 ), N)− r(n(j, I∗1 )− 1, N) < C(j + ). Then there exists an ′ > 0 such
that R(n(j, I∗1 ), N)− r(n(j, I∗1 )− 1, N) < C(l) for all l ∈ [j + − ′, j + ). Then it holds∫ j+
j+−′
R(n(l, I∗1 ), N)− r(n(l, I∗1 )− 1, N)− C(l)dl < 0.
Then I∗1 cannot be an equilibrium as firm i could increase its expected profits by not investing
in the interval [j + − ′, j + ).
Step 2. If I∗1 is an equilibrium then any investment plan I∗3 such that n(j, I∗1 ) = n(j, I∗3 ) for all
j ∈ [0, 1) is also an equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose not. Then in the investment plan I∗3 exists a firm i and an interval L such that
firm i would be better off by either investing in the interval L or by divesting from interval L.
(1) Suppose that the firm i can profitably invest in the interval L. Then there exists L′ ⊆ L
such that R(n(j, I∗3 ) + 1) − r(n(j, I∗3 ), N) > C(l) for all l ∈ L′. But then there exists a firm i′′
and a set L′′ ⊆ L′ such that L′′ ∩ I∗1,i′′ = ∅. Then I∗1 cannot be an equilibrium as the firm i′′
could profitably deviate by investing in the interval L′′.
(2) Suppose that the firm i can profitably divest from the interval L. Then there exists
L′ ⊆ L such that R(n(j, I∗3 ), N)− r(n(j, I∗3 − 1), N) < C(l) for all l ∈ L′. But then there exists
a firm i′′ and a set L′′ ⊆ L′ such that L′′ ∩ I∗1,i′′ = L′′. Then I∗1 cannot be an equilibrium as the
firm i′′ could profitably deviate by divesting from the interval L′′.
A.1.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
Proof. Observe that by Assumption 1.2, for all n ≥ 1 we have r(n,N) = 0. Let I∗ be the
equilibrium constructed in the proof of Lemma A.1. If n∗(j) as constructed in Proposition 1.2
is equal to n(j, I∗) for all j ∈ [0, 1), then by statement 3 in Proposition 1.1 it characterizes the
equilibrium market portfolio of research projects.
I here show that n∗(j) = n(j, I∗). First, as noted in the proof of Lemma A.1, observe that
α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm. First suppose that j ∈ [α1, 1) Then it must be that j ≥ αk for all
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k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Hence n∗(j) = 0. By construction, n(l, I∗) = 0 for all l ∈ [α1, 1). Next, suppose
that j ∈ [0, α1). Then
n∗(j) = max
1,...,m
k
s.t. j < αk
Let kˆ = n∗(j). It holds that j < αkˆ ≤ αkˆ−1 ≤ · · · ≤ α1. By construction, each firm i such that
i ∈ {1, . . . , kˆ} invests in j. Hence, n(j, I∗) = kˆ.
A.1.3 Proof of Proposition 1.3
I will prove each statement in the proposition in turn. Let the number of firms in the pre-
innovation market increase from N to N ′. Denote the maximum number of firms investing in
two cases as m and m′ and the k-firm frontiers as αk and α′k.
Lemma A.4. In equilibrium, the variety of projects developed and the probability of developing
an innovation weakly increases, that is α1 ≤ α′1.
Proof. By Proposition 1.2 the variety of projects developed in the two equilibria is equal to the
sets [0, α1) and [0, α′1) and the probability of successfully developing an innovation is equal to α1
and α′1. Thus we need to show that α1 ≤ α′1. By Proposition 1.2 we have R(1)−r(0, N) = C(α1)
and R(1) − r(0, N ′) = C(α′1). By assumption 1.3 we have r(n − 1, N ′) ≤ r(n − 1, N) hence
C(α′1) ≥ C(α1). As C(j) is assumed to be increasing this implies α′1 ≥ α1.
Lemma A.5. The maximum number of firms investing also increases, that is m ≤ m′.
Proof. By Proposition 1.2 we have m = max
{1,...,N}
n such that R(n) − r(n − 1, N) − C(0) > 0.
Observe that m ∈ {1, . . . , N} ⊆ {1, . . . , N ′}. If n = 1, by assumption 1.3 we have R(n) −
r(n − 1, N ′) − C(0) ≥ R(n) − r(n − 1, N) − C(0). If n > 1, by assumption 1.2 we have
R(n)− r(n− 1, N ′)−C(0) = R(n)− r(n− 1, N)−C(0). Hence m is chosen from a subset from
which m′ is chosen and it satisfies a stricter condition. Thus m′ cannot be lower than m.
Lemma A.6. Apart from the increase in variety of projects developed and in the maximum
number of firms investing, the equilibrium portfolio remains the same. That is, n(j, I) = n(j, I ′)
for all j ∈ [0, 1) \ {[0, α′m′ ] ∪ [α1, α′1]}.
Proof. Because α′1 ≥ α1, we have n(j, I) = n(j, I ′) = 0 for all j ∈ [α′1, 1). As R(k) does not
depend on N or N ′, by Proposition 1.2 it follows that αk = α′k for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Again by
Proposition 1.2 it follows that n(j, I) = n(j, I ′) for all j ∈ (α′m′ , α1).
A.1.4 Proof of Proposition 1.4
Proof. Suppose the intensity of competition increases from (R, r) to (R′, r′). Denote the respec-
tive equilibrium investment plans as I and I ′. Then the following holds by direct application of
Proposition 1.2:
m′
= m if R
′(m,N)− C(0) > 0
< m otherwise
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α′k < αk ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,m′}
α′1 > α1
and
n(j, I ′) ≤ n(j, I) for all j ∈ [0, α1)
n(j, I ′) > n(j, I) for all j ∈ [α1, α′1)
n(j, I ′) = n(j, I) = 0 for all j ∈ [α′1, 1).
Because α′1 > α1 the variety of research projects undertaken and the probability of dis-
covering an innovation increase. Because α′k < αk ∀k ∈ {2, . . . ,m′} there are some projects
which are developed by fewer firms than with less intense competition. Hence the amount of
duplication of research decreases.
A.1.5 Proof of Proposition 1.5
Proof. The portfolio given in Proposition 1.5 can always be constructed. I show that it is
optimal. Suppose not. Then, there exists a project j ∈ [0, 1) such that investing either more or
less than no(j) marginally increases the expected welfare. There are two cases: (1) there exists
a possibility to profitably increase investment in some project and (2) there exists a possibility
to profitably decrease investment in some project.
(1) Suppose that there exists a possibility to profitably increase investment in some project
j. Then there exists some n such that n0(j) < n ≤ N and
W (n)− nC(j) > W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j).
Then we can write n∑
k=no(j)+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j)
+W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j) > W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j)
n∑
k=no(j)+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j) > 0.
Suppose no(j) = mo. Then, ∀k > no(j) it holds:(
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(0)
)
+
(
C(0)− C(j)
)
≤ 0
the first bracketed expression is by construction not positive whereas the second is not positive
because the function C(·) is increasing. A sum of non-positive elements cannot be positive. A
contradiction.
Suppose now that no(j) < mo. By construction it holds
W (n0(j) + 1)−W (n0(j))− C(αon0(j)+1) = 0
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and for every k > n0(j) by assumption holds
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(αon0(j)+1) ≤ 0
By construction j > αon0(j)+1, so that C(j) > C(αon0(j)+1). Plugging it into the expression above,
it follows
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j) ≤ 0 ∀k > n0(j).
Again, a sum of non-positive elements cannot be positive. A contradiction.
(2) Suppose that there exists a possibility to profitably decrease investment in some project
j. Then there exists some n such that 0 ≤ n < n0(j) and
W (n)− nC(j) > W (n0(j))− n0(j)C(j).
Then we can write
W (n)− nC(j) > W (n)− nC(j) +
 no(j)∑
k=n+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j)

0 >
no(j)∑
k=n+1
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j).
By construction W (no(j)) − W (no(j) − 1) − C(j) > 0 and by assumption it holds for any
k < no(j) that
W (k)−W (k − 1)− C(j) > 0
A sum of positive elements has to be positive. A contradiction.
A.1.6 Proof of Corollary 1.1
Using the notation of Propositions 1.2 and 1.4 the variety of R&D projects in the market portfolio
is [0, α1] and the variety of R&D projects in the optimal portfolio is [0, αo1]. Thus the market
will underinvest in the variety of R&D projects if and only if α1 < αo1. As C(·) is increasing
this is equivalent to C(α1) < C(αo1). By Propositions 1.2 and 1.4 it then holds R(1)− r(0, N) <
W (1) −W (0). Decomposing W (1) into CS(1) + R(1) and W (0) into CS(0) + Nr(0, N) yields
the desired result. Overinvestment and optimal investment cases are proven analogously.
A.1.7 Proof of Proposition 1.6
As assumptions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 hold, by Corollary 1.1 this market will underinvest in the variety
of R&D projects if and only if CS(1)−W (0)+r(0, N) > 0. Denote with q1 the quantity supplied
by a monopolist with the innovation and with q0 the quantity supplied by a single firm if no
innovation is developed. As the innovation is drastic P (q1) < P (Nq0) or equivalently q1 > Nq0.
We can write the consumer surplus as the difference between total utility and the total expense
paid by consumers, so it holds CS(1) =
∫ q1
0 P (s)ds − P (q1)q1. Welfare is total utility less the
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total cost of production, so it holds W (0) =
∫Nq0
0 P (s)ds − Nc¯(q0). Then this market will
underinvest if and only if:
∫ q1
0
P (s)ds− P (q1)q1 −
[∫ Nq0
0
P (s)ds−Nc¯(q0)
]
+ r(0, N) > 0.
Subtracting the integrals and rearranging terms gives:∫ q1
Nq0
P (s)ds− P (q1)q1 +Nc¯(q0) + r(0, N) > 0.
By assumption P ′(·) < 0 so that ∫ q1Nq0 P (s)ds ≥ (q1−Nq0)P (q1). The inequality above will hold
whenever the following inequality holds:
(q1 −Nq0)P (q1)− P (q1)q1 +Nc¯(q0) + r(0, N) > 0.
Rearranging gives:
Nc¯(q0)−Nq0P (q1) + r(0, N) > 0.
By assumption c¯′(·) ≥ 0 so that c¯(q0) =
∫ q0
0 c¯
′(s)ds ≥ (q0 − 0)c¯′(0). The inequality above will
hold whenever the following inequality holds:
Nq0(c¯′(0)− P (q1)) + r(0, N) > 0.
As r(0, N) ≥ 0 by rationality of firms and c¯′(0) > P (q1) by definition of a drastic process
innovation, the above inequality always holds.
A.1.8 Proof of Corollary 1.2
Consider first the case where αok < αk. As C(·) is increasing then it holds C(αok) < C(αk). As
assumptions 1.1, 1.2 and 1.4 hold, then Propositions 1.2 and 1.5 hold. Applying them yields
W (k)−W (k−1) < R(k) and decomposing the expression for W (·) yields kR(k) +CS(k)− (k−
1)R(k − 1)− CS(k − 1) < R(k). Rearranging gives:
δ(k) =
[
(k − 1)(R(k)−R(k − 1))]+ [CS(k)− CS(k − 1)] < 0.
Hence αok < αk if and only if δ(k) < 0. The other cases follow analogously.
A.1.9 Proof of Proposition 1.7
Observe that the proof of Proposition 1.1 does not require Assumption 1.2. Proof of Proposition
1.7 exactly mirrors the proof of Proposition 1.2, except without setting r(n,N) = 0 for all n ≥ 1.
In essence, Proposition 1.2 is a special case of Proposition 1.7.
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A.1.10 Example: Process innovation in a Cournot market
As an illustrative example, consider a simple Cournot model with homogeneous products, linear
costs and linear demand. Suppose that there are three firms facing inverse demand of the form
P (q1, q2, q3) = 1− (q1 + q2 + q3)
where qi is the quantity supplied by the firm i. Denote with c¯ the marginal cost of production
with the old technology and with c the marginal cost of production with the new technology,
where c ≤ c¯ ≤ 1. That is, firms have the possibility to develop a process innovation which
reduces their production cost from c¯ to c. The innovation is drastic if
c¯ ≥ 1 + c2 , (A.1)
where the right hand side of the inequality is the price which would be obtained if there was a
monopolist with marginal cost c in the market. Suppose that the costs of research are given by
C(j) = b
√
j
1− j , j ∈ [0, 1),
where b > 0 is a slope parameter. Observe that this choice of cost function implies C(0) = 0 so
that m = N , that is at least some of the innovation projects are developed by all the firms in
the market.
Using standard methods, the profits in Cournot markets with n firms and marginal costs c
are given by Π(n, c) = (1− c)2/(n+ 1)2. From this equation it is possible to derive the ex post
payoffs:
r(0, 3) =(1− c¯)
2
16 , R(1) =
(1− c)2
4 ,
R(2) =(1− c)
2
9 , R(3) =
(1− c)2
16 .
In order to be able to apply Proposition 1.2, we have to check if Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2
hold. Assumption 1.2 holds whenever Equation (A.1) is satisfied. In addition, Assumption 1.1
holds whenever c ≤ c¯ ≤ 1, which is assumed.2 Hence, Proposition 1.2 can be used to characterize
the equilibrium R&D portfolio.
Applying Proposition 1.2 yields the following k-firm frontiers for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}:
α3 =
R(3)2
b2 +R(3)2 ,
α2 =
R(2)2
b2 +R(2)2 ,
2If Assumption 1.2 is satisfied then the sufficient condition for Assumption 1.1 to hold is (1− c)
2
4 −
(1− c¯)2
16 ≥
(1− c)2
9 . If c¯ = 1, the inequality is satisfied. If c¯ < 1, the expression simplifies to
(1− c
1− c¯
)2
≥ 920 , which is always
satisfied because the left-hand expression is always greater than 1.
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α1 =
(R(1)− r(0, 3))2
b2 + (R(1)− r(0, 3))2 .
All projects in the interval [0, α3) are developed by all three firms whereas the projects in the
interval [α3, α2) are developed by two firms. Projects in the interval [α2, α1) are developed by
just one firm whereas the projects in the interval [α1, 1) are not developed at all. Thus, if the
successful project is from the interval [0, α1), the market will successfully develop the innovation
and all firms which invested in the successful project will compete with the production costs c.
However, if the successful project is from the interval [α1, 1) the market will not develop the
innovation and all firms will compete with the production costs c¯.
Figure 1.1 (in Section 1.4) illustrates the equilibrium market portfolio in the case where
b = 0.05, c¯ = 3/4 and c = 1/2.
Merger of two firms
Suppose now that two of the three firms merge, leaving everything else unchanged. That is,
suppose that the merger affects only the number of firms which are active in the market. Denote
with {r′, R′} payoffs after the merger and with {r,R} payoffs without the merger. Clearly, {r,R}
are the same as before. The new payoff functions are given by:
r′(0, 2) = (1− c¯)
2
9 ,
R′(1) = (1− c)
2
4 ,
R′(2) = (1− c)
2
9 .
It is immediately clear that r′(0, 2) > r(0, 3) whereas R′(1) = R(1) and R′(2) = R(2). The
intuition behind this is that the merger increases profits in the market when all firms are active,
because there are fewer competitors, hence r′(0, 2) > r(0, 3). However, due to the drastic nature
of innovation, post-innovation profits only depend on the number of firms which successfully
innovated, hence R′(1) = R(1) and R′(2) = R(2). As after the merger there are only two firms
in the market, the maximum number of firms investing in any project is at most 2.
Applying Proposition 1.2 yields m′ = 2 < m = 3, α′2 = α2 but α′1 < α1. This is in line with
results derived in Proposition 1.3. Figure 1.2 (in Section 1.5) graphically illustrates the change
in the market portfolio of research projects after the merger.
From Cournot to Bertrand competition
Consider again the scenario with three firms and suppose that the type of competition changes
from Cournot to Bertrand. This change can be interpreted as an increase in the intensity
of competition among the firms. How will the market portfolio of research projects change?
Applying Proposition 1.4, the variety of research projects developed will increase whereas the
duplication of research projects will decrease.
From above we know that with three firms engaged in a Cournot competition, the market
portfolio will be characterized by the maximum number of firms investing m and the firm-
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frontiers α3, α2, and α1. The equilibrium values of the market under Bertrand competition are
denoted with a prime. When there are multiple symmetric firms competing in a homogeneous
goods Bertrand market, in equilibrium.firms set prices equal to marginal cost of production and
earn zero profits. Hence, the payoff functions will be r′(0, 3) = 0 and R′(2) = R′(3) = 0. The
monopolist earns the same profits in both cases, that is R′(1) = R(1) = (1− c)2/4.
As Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 clearly hold, Proposition 1.2 can be applied. It immediately
follows that m′ = 1, hence n(j) < n′(j) for all j < α2. This drastic change in the amount
of duplication is due to the fact that firms make no profits if there is a competitor, so firms
choose to do no duplication at all. Simple calculations show that α′1 > α1. Figure 1.3 (in section
1.5) illustrates the change in the market portfolio of research projects due to the change of
competition from Cournot to Bertrand.
Market and optimal portfolios in a Cournot model
Consider again the Cournot example from the appendix A.1.10. Social welfare generated in this
product market by firms supplying total quantity Q is given by:
WQ =
∫ Q
0
P (s)ds−Qc =
∫ Q
0
(1− s)ds−Qc = Q
(
1− Q2 − c
)
, (A.2)
where c is the constant marginal cost of production. Using standard results, the total quantity
supplied in a Cournot market with n firms is given by
Q(n, c) = n(1− c)
n+ 1 .
Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold and simple calculations show that Assumption 1.4 holds as
well. Hence Propositions 1.5 and 1.6 can be applied. Proposition 1.6 immediately informs us
that there will be underinvestment in the variety of research projects. Figure 1.4 illustrates the
difference between the optimal and the market portfolio in this market.
A.2 Further Extensions
In this Appendix I consider four extensions of the basic model. First two deal with the possibility
that a merger could generate efficiencies which could overturn the result that a merger decreases
the variety of approaches to innovation. In Section A.2.2 I consider a mixed strategy equilibirum
and show that the equilibrium structure and determinants of comparative static results found for
pure strategy equilibria are robust. Finally, in Section A.2.3 I consider the case when the research
budgets are limited or when financing of research is costly. Proofs are presented sequentially in
the end of the Appendix.
A.2.1 Efficiency defense
General cost reduction
Consider the original setting, but suppose that if two firms merge, they become more efficient at
developing innovations. That is, suppose that for the merged firm the fixed cost of developing
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any given approach j is given by C˜(j; ) : [0, 1) → R+ such that C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j) for all j. Like
C, assume that C˜ is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing and that limj→1 C˜(j; ) =∞.
Finally, suppose that in this setting  captures the size of the efficiency gains resulting from
the merger, such that ∂C˜(j; )/∂ < 0. Simple functional forms that satisfy these assumptions
(for the appropriate domain of ) are: (i) additive C˜(j; ) = C(j) −  and (ii) multiplicative
C˜(j; ) = (1 − )C(j). Let the number of symmetric firms with innovation cost functions C(j)
in the pre-merger market be N . Suppose that after the merger, the merged firm has the cost
function C˜(j; ) and that the remaining N − 2 firms are active with cost functions C(j).
In this setting, if the efficiency gain from the merger is sufficiently large, there will be no loss
of diversity in the approaches to innovation as a consequence of the merger.
Proposition A.1 (Merger with general cost reductions).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 hold and that the merger results in efficiency gains
as above. Then:
1. A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
2. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is [0, α˜1), where α˜1
is given by C˜(α˜1; ) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
3. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then the merger
does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if
C(α1)− C˜(α1; ) ≥ r(0, N − 1)− r(0, N). (A.3)
From Proposition 1.3 we know that a merger, via the Arrow effect, reduces the incentives to
invest. This is captured by the right-hand side of the inequality (A.3). However, Proposition
A.1 states that if the efficiency caused by the merger is large enough, which is given by the
left-hand side of the inequality (A.3), it can outweigh the decrease in the incentive to invest.
In this case, the merger does not lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches to innovation.
In the case of additive efficiency gains, that is if C˜(j; ) = C(j)− , the inequality (A.3) would
simplify to  ≥ r(0, N − 1) − r(0, N). In the case of multiplicative efficiency gains, that is if
C˜(j; ) = (1 − )C(j), the inequality (A.3) simplifies to C(α1) ≥ r(0, N − 1) − r(0, N). It is
clear that there always exists  large enough such that these inequalities are satisfied, and that
such a merger would not lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches to innovation.
Approach-specific synergies
In the previous section, I considered a situation in which a merger between any two firms leads
to the same efficiency gains. Now, suppose that each firm has some specific knowledge and
that if the two firms merged, they could combine this specific knowledge in a way that would
enable the merged entity to conduct research over some specific interval of approaches more
efficiently. In this setting, it will not only be the size of the efficiency gains that will be required
for a successful efficiency defense, but also that the efficiency gains occurs over approaches that
would not have been developed in the post-merger market absent the efficiency gains.
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For concreteness, consider this simple extension of the model. Suppose that each firm i ∈
{1, . . . , N} is located on the unit line in an equidistant manner. That is, the location of the
firm is given by i/(N + 1). Firm’s location represents its specific knowledge. On it its own, this
knowledge is worthless. However, suppose that firm i merged with some firm l ∈ {1, . . . , N},
i 6= l. Then the merged entity would receive efficiency gains over an interval midway between
the location of the firms i and l. That is, the merged entity is more efficient over an interval[
i+ l
2(N + 1) − δ,
i+ l
2(N + 1) + δ
)
for some 0 < δ ≤ 1/(N + 1).3 For simplicity, suppose that on the above interval the cost of
developing an approach is zero for the merged entity. That is, a firm which has not merged has
the innovation cost function C(j) and the merged firm (where the merging firms are i and l)
has the innovation cost function
C˜i,l(j) =
0 if j ∈
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
C(j) otherwise
.
In this setting, a merger will not lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches if the
efficiency gain covers large enough interval (δ is large enough) and if the efficiency gain occurs
over projects which would not be developed absent the efficiency gain. The latter depends on
which firms actually merge. Thus, for the same size of the efficiency gain from the merger, some
mergers will lead to a decrease in the variety of approaches whereas others will not.
Proposition A.2 (Merger with approach-specific synergies).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 hold and that the merger results in efficiency gains
as above. Then, if firms i and l merge:
1. A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
2. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is [0, α˜1)∪
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
,
where α˜1 is given by C(α˜1) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
3. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then the merger
does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if∫
x∈[0,α˜1)∪
[
i+l
2(N+1)−δ, i+l2(N+1) +δ
) dx ≥ α1. (A.4)
As the innovation cost function for the merged firm is not strictly increasing, the set of
developed approaches need not be convex any more. However, the intuition is clear — the
efficiency gain must be both large enough and must materialize over the projects which would
not have been developed otherwise for the efficiency defense to be successful.
3The upper bound is a simplification that ensures that efficiency gains are always in the unit interval. It would
be straightforward to remove it, at the cost of more cumbersome notation.
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A.2.2 Mixed strategies
Consider the original setting, but suppose that firms are using mixed strategies. As a simplifying
assumption, I will consider only the following pure strategy space
Im = {0} ∪
{
[0, j) : j ∈ (0, 1)
}
and I will look only at symmetric mixed strategy equilibria (SMSE). Because now the pure
strategy of a firm is restricted to choosing an interval [0, j), it can be identified with the upper
bound of the interval j. Denote with fi(j) the density that the firm i chooses the interval [0, j)
and with Fi(j) the related cumulative distribution function.
Proposition A.3 (Characterization of SMSE). Suppose N = 2 and the Assumptions 1.1 and
1.2 hold. Then the unique SMSE is characterized by the cumulative distribution function:
F (j) =

0 if C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) < 0
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) ∈ [0, 1]
1 if C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) > 1
for j ∈ [0, 1).
Suppose that R(2) − C(0) > 0. In pure actions, by Proposition 1.2 it holds: m = 2,
C(α1) = R(1)− r(0, N) and C(α2) = R(2). Thus, both firms will invest in the interval [0, α1),
only one firm will invest in the interval [α1, α2) and no firm will invest in [α2, 0). Now consider
SMSE. By Proposition A.3, for j ∈ [0, α1) it holds F (j) = 0, thus both firms invest in this
interval with probability 1. For j ∈ (α1, α2) it holds 0 < F (j) < 1, thus firms invest with
some probability less then one. If j ∈ [α2, 0), then F (j) = 1, so that firms do not invest in
this interval. Similar results hold if R(2)− C(0) ≤ 0. Thus, the basic structure of the model is
the same in both pure and mixed strategy equilibria. In particular the k-firm frontiers are the
same. Furthermore, comparative statics results regarding variety of projects undertaken remain
qualitatively the same, as anything that affects the one-firm frontier has qualitatively the same
effect both in pure action and in mixed strategy equilibria. Figure A.1 illustrates the difference
between the (expected) equilibrium market portfolios for the Cournot duopoly example from
the appendix A.1.10. The mixed strategy equilibrium is “smoother" than the pure strategy
equilibrium. The reason for this is that the integer problem is not present in the mixed strategy
setting. In pure strategy equilibrium, some projects have higher expected profits than others
(i.e. project α2 +  is more profitable than α2 −  for some small positive ). In mixed strategy
equilibria, all projects in the interval where the mixing occurs have the same expected profits.
A.2.3 Limited budget and costly financing
This section considers the case where firms face an exogenous constraint on their research bud-
gets. This constraint can take the form of a budget constraint, or it can (equivalently) take
the form of costly financing for research. The main result is that a binding budget constraint
112 Appendix: Chapter 1
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0
1
2
3
Project
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 n
um
be
r
o
f f
irm
s i
nv
es
tin
g
 
 
Portfolio in mixed strategies
Portfolio in pure strategies
Figure A.1: Symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
or a costly source of financing imposes a positive opportunity cost on investments in research
projects, but that the main mechanics of the model remain unchanged.
First, suppose that there are two firms in a market and that each firm has a budget B and
suppose that the budget is binding, in the sense that firms would want to invest more in research
if they had more resources.4 Then the following result is obtained:
Proposition A.4 (Equilibrium in a game with limited budget).
Suppose that Assumptions 1.1 and 1.2 hold, and that there are two firms with a budget B. Then,
a PSE always exists, the induced PSE market portfolio is unique and any investment plan which
induces a portfolio identical to the market PSE portfolio is itself a PSE. Furthermore, there
exists a unique β > 0 such that:
1. the maximum number of firms investing in any project mb is given by
mb = max
{1,2}
n s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N)− C(0) > β.
2. Firm frontiers are determined by
R(1)− r(0, N)− C(αb1) =
R(mb)− r(mb − 1, N)− C(αbm) = β.
3. Let αbm+1 = 0 and αb0 = 1. The total expenditure is
m
∫ αbm
0
C(j)dj + (m− 1)
∫ αbm−1
αbm
C(j)dj = 2B.
4Formally, if m = 2 then 2B < 2
∫ α2
0 C(j)dj +
∫ α1
α2
C(j)dj and if m = 1 then 2B <
∫ α1
0 C(j)dj.
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Then the PSE portfolio nb(j) is given by
nb(j) = k if j ∈ [αbk+1, αbk).
As can be seen from conditions 1. and 2., the basic form of the market equilibrium portfolio
will remain unchanged. The only difference is that the budget constraint will impose positive
opportunity cost β on the choice of research projects, as opposed to the unconstrained equilib-
rium where the opportunity costs was 0. In the scenario where firms can borrow unlimited funds
at some positive price, the equilibrium characterized above still holds, but now β is exogenously
given and as a function of the cost of financing.
A.2.4 Proof of Proposition A.1
I prove each of the three statements contained in Proposition A.1 in turn. The proof is analogous
to the proof of Proposition 1.1.
Lemma A.7 (Existence). A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
I provide a constructive proof of Lemma A.7 in three steps. Step 1 constructs the candidate
equilibrium investment plan I˜. Step 2 proves that no firm can increase its expected profits by
making additional investments. Step 3 proves that no firm can increase its expected profits
by reducing investments. Finally, notice that any deviation from the investment plan I˜ can be
written as a collection of investments and divestments and by Steps 2 and 3, each such investment
and divestment decreases expected profits and hence any such collection must decrease expected
profits. Thus, no firm can profitably deviate from the investment plan I˜ and then, by definition,
I˜ is an equilibrium.
Step 1. Constructing the candidate equilibrium.
Given a game, define m such that
m = max
{1,...,N−1}
n
s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N − 1)− C(0) > 0
As by assumption R(1)−r(0, N−1)−C(0) > 0, a solution to this maximization problem always
exists.
Next, calculate each α˜1, α2, . . . , αm such that the following condition holds:
R(1)− r(0, N − 1)− C˜(α˜1; ) =
R(2)− C(α2) =
R(3)− C(α3) =
...
R(m)− C(αm) = 0.
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By construction it holds R(m) − r(m − 1, N) − C(0) > 0 and by Assumption 1.1 the reward
of innovation are non-increasing, so the inequality holds for all k < m. As C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j), the
inequality also holds for the merged firm. As costs of innovation approach infinity as j → 1,
values α˜1, α2, . . . , αm always exist by the Intermediate Value Theorem. Furthermore, as C(j)
is increasing, C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j), and by applying Assumption 1.1 it is easy to see that α˜1 ≥ α2 ≥
· · · ≥ αm.
Observe that N−1 ≥ m. Label the merged firm with subscript i = 1 and all other firms with
i ∈ {2, . . . , N−1}. For the merged firm, let I˜1 = [0, α˜1). For each i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let I˜i = [0, αi).
For each i ∈ {m+ 1, . . . , N − 1} let I˜i = ∅. I will demonstrate that I˜ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected profits
by making additional investments.
Proof. First observe that for all firms i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} the argument is identical as in the
proof of Proposition 1.1, as the investment decision of the firm only depends on their investment
costs and the number of firms investing in any given project. Thus we only need to show
that the merged firm cannot increase profits by making additional investments. This holds by
construction. The merged firm already invests in the entire interval [0, α˜1). For any j > α˜1 it
holds R(1)− r(0, N − 1)− C˜(j; ) < 0 as C˜(j; ) is strictly increasing in j. Thus, no additional
profitable investments exist for the merged firm.
Step 3. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected profits
by decreasing investments.
Proof. Similar to the argument in the previous step, it is sufficient to show that the merged
firm cannot increase profits by decreasing investments. First, observe that for j ∈ [α2, α˜1) the
investment is profitable as it holds R(1)−r(0, N−1)−C˜(j; ) > 0 for all j in the interval. For all
j in [0, α2) it holds R(n(j, I˜))− C(j) > 0 (otherwise non-merged firms would have an incentive
to divest) and as C˜(j; ) ≤ C(j), it also holds R(n(j, I˜))− C˜(j; ) > 0 for all j ∈ [0, α2). Hence,
the merged firm cannot increase profits by divesting.
Lemma A.8. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is [0, α˜1),
where α˜1 is given by C˜(α˜1; ) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, either there exist an interval l ⊆ [0, α˜1) where no firm invests, or
there exists an interval l′ ⊆ [α˜1, 1) where at least one firm invests, or both. First suppose
that an interval l exists. As C˜(j; ) is strictly increasing, then for all j ∈ l it holds C˜(j; ) <
R(1)−r(0, N−1). Hence the merged firm can profitably invest in the subset of l. Next, suppose
an interval l′ exists. Observe that for any j > α˜1 it holds C(j) ≥ C˜(j; ) > R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
By Assumption 1.1 it then also holds C(j) ≥ C˜(j; ) > R(k) for all k ≥ 2. Thus, no firm can
profitably invest any subset of l′.
Lemma A.9. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then the
merger does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if
C(α1)− C˜(α1; ) ≥ r(0, N − 1)− r(0, N).
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Proof. The merger does not reduce variety if and only if α˜1 ≥ α1. As C˜(j; ) is strictly increasing,
this will hold if and only if C˜(α1; ) ≤ R(1) − r(0, N − 1). By Proposition 1.2, we know that
C(α1) = R(1)− r(0, N). Subtracting the above inequality, the claim follows.
A.2.5 Proof of Proposition A.2
I prove each of the three statements contained in Proposition A.2 in turn. The proof is analogous
to the proof of Proposition 1.1.
Lemma A.10 (Existence). A PSE in the post-merger market always exists.
I provide a constructive proof of Lemma A.10 in three steps, analogous to the proof of Lemma
A.7.
Step 1. Constructing the candidate equilibrium.
Given a game, define m such that
m = max
{1,...,N−1}
n
s.t. R(n)− r(n− 1, N − 1)− C(0) > 0
As by assumption R(1)−r(0, N−1)−C(0) > 0, a solution to this maximization problem always
exists.
Next, calculate each α˜1, α2, . . . , αm such that the following condition holds:
R(1)− r(0, N − 1)− C(α˜1) =
R(2)− C(α2) =
R(3)− C(α3) =
...
R(m)− C(αm) = 0.
By construction it holds R(m)− r(m− 1, N)− C(0) > 0 and by Assumption 1.1 the reward of
innovation are non-increasing, so the inequality holds for all k < m. As costs of innovation ap-
proach infinity as j → 1, values α˜1, α2, . . . , αm always exist by the Intermediate Value Theorem.
Furthermore, by Assumption 1.1, it is easy to see that α˜1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αm.
Observe that N−1 ≥ m. Label the merged firm with subscript i = 1 and all other firms with
i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1}. For the merged firm, let I˜1 = [0, α˜1) ∪
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
. For each
i ∈ {2, . . . ,m}, let I˜i = [0, αi). For each i ∈ {m + 1, . . . , N − 1} let I˜i = ∅. I will demonstrate
that I˜ is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected profits
by making additional investments.
Proof. For firms i ∈ {2, . . . , N − 1} the argument is identical as in the proof of Proposition A.1.
Thus we only need to show that the merged firm cannot increase profits by making additional
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investments. The merged firm already invests in the entire set [0, α˜1)∪
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
.
For any j > α˜1 and j 6∈
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
it holds R(1)− r(0, N − 1)− C˜(j) < 0 as C(j)
is strictly increasing. Thus, no additional profitable investments exist for the merged firm.
Step 3. Suppose that I˜ is constructed as above. Then no firm can increase its expected profits
by decreasing investments.
Proof. Similar to the argument in the previous step, it is sufficient to show that the merged
firm cannot increase profits by decreasing investments. First, observe that for j ∈ [α2, α˜1) the
investment is profitable as it holds R(1)− r(0, N − 1)−C(j) > 0 for all j in the interval. For all
j in [0, α2) it holds R(n(j, I˜))− C(j) > 0 (otherwise non-merged firms would have an incentive
to divest) and as C˜(j) ≤ C(j), it also holds R(n(j, I˜)) − C˜(j) > 0 for all j ∈ [0, α2). For all
j ∈
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
the investment is costless. Hence, the merged firm cannot increase
profits by divesting.
Lemma A.11. In any PSE in the post-merger market the set of developed approaches is [0, α˜1)∪[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
, where α˜1 is given by C(α˜1) = R(1)− r(0, N − 1).
Proof. Suppose not. Then, either there exists an interval l ⊆ [0, α˜1) or an interval l′ ⊆[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
where no firm invests, or there exists an interval l′′ ⊆ [0, 1) \
(
[0, α˜1)∪[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
))
where at least one firm invests. First suppose that an interval l ex-
ists. Because by construction it holds C(j; ) < R(1) − r(0, N − 1) for all j < α˜1, any firm
can profitably invest in the set l. Next, suppose l′ exists. The merged firm can invest in the
set l′ without any cost, hence it can increase its expected profit by investing. Finally, suppose
an interval l′′ exists. Observe that for any j > α˜1 and j 6∈
[
i+l
2(N+1) − δ, i+l2(N+1) + δ
)
it holds
C˜(j) > R(1) − r(0, N − 1). By Assumption 1.1 it then also holds C(j) ≥ C˜(j) > R(k) for all
k ≥ 2. Thus, no firm can profitably invest any subset of l′′.
Lemma A.12. If the technology frontier in the market without a merger is given by α1, then
the merger does not reduce the variety of approaches to innovation if and only if∫
x∈[0,α˜1)∪
[
i+l
2(N+1)−δ, i+l2(N+1) +δ
) dx ≥ α1.
Proof. Without the merger, the set of developed approaches by Proposition 1.2 is [0, α1). The
result follows by Claim 2 of the Proposition.
A.2.6 Proof of Proposition A.3
Suppose, without loss of generality, that the firm 2 invests according to some probability density
function f2, with the cumulative density function F2. Consider any pure action x1 of firm 1.
The profit of the firm 1 can be expressed as:
pi1(x1|F2) =−
∫ x1
0
C(j)dj +
∫ x1
0
[∫ x2
0
R(2)dj +
∫ x1
x2
R(1)dj +
∫ 1
x1
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x2)dx2+
+
∫ 1
x1
[∫ x1
0
R(2)dj +
∫ 1
x2
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x2)dx2.
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Deriving:
dpi1(x1|F2)
dx1
=− C(x1) +
[∫ x1
0
R(2)dj +
∫ x1
x1
R(1)dj +
∫ 1
x1
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x1)−
−
[∫ x1
0
R(2)dj +
∫ 1
x1
r(0, 2)dj
]
f2(x1)+
+
∫ x1
0
[R(1)− r(0, 2)] f2(x2)dx2 +
∫ 1
x1
R(2)f2(x2)dx2
and simplifying:
dpi1(x1|F2)
dx1
= −C(x1) + [R(1)− r(0, 2)]F2(x1) +R(2) (1− F2(x1)) .
Next, use the assumption that the equilibrium is symmetric, that is F1 = F2 = F . In equilibrium
it has to hold dpi1(x1|F )/dx1 = 0 for all x1 in the support of f . This condition is uniquely satisfied
by
F˜ (j) = C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2)
for j in the support of f .
Observe that F˜ is strictly increasing and, for all j such that F˜ (j) < 0 it follows that
dpi1(x1, F )/dx1 > 0, and for all j such that F˜ (j) > 1 it follows that dpi1(x1, F2)/dx1 < 0.
Hence, the unique symmetric equilibrium is given by the profile (F, F ) where
F (j) =

0 if C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) < 0
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) if
C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) ∈ [0, 1]
1 if C(j)−R(2)
R(1)− r(0, 2)−R(2) > 1
for j ∈ [0, 1).
A.2.7 Proof of Proposition A.4
I prove this statement in three steps. First I show that some β satisfying all conditions in the
proposition always exists and is unique. Next, I construct an investment plan inducing the same
portfolio as the one in Proposition A.4. Finally I show that the constructed investment plan is
an equilibrium and that any investment plan inducing the same portfolio is an equilibrium as
well.
Lemma A.13. β always exists and is unique.
Proof. Define functions ψ1(β) : [0, β1]→ R+, ψ2(β) : [0, β2]→ R+ such that
ψ1(β) =
∫ C−1(R(1)−r(0,2)−β)
0
C(j)dj
ψ2(β) =
∫ C−1(R(2)−β)
0
C(j)dj +
∫ C−1(R(1)−r(0,2)−β)
0
C(j)dj
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with β1 = R(1)− r(0, 2)−C(0) and β2 = R(2)−C(0). As C(·) is continuous, strictly increasing
and defined on an interval, its inverse is continuous and strictly increasing as well. Hence both
ψ1(β) and ψ1(β) are continuous and strictly decreasing. Furthermore, by Assumption 1.1 it
holds β1 ≥ β2.
Either (i) ψ1(β2) ≥ 2B or (ii) ψ1(β2) < 2B. If (i) is true, ψ1(β2) ≥ 2B and ψ1(β1) = 0 <
2B. By the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists some β∗ ∈ [β2, β1) such that ψ1(β∗) =
2B and furthermore β∗ is unique because ψ1(β) is strictly decreasing. Observe that β∗ ∈
[R(2) − C(0), β1), hence R(1) − r(0, 2) − C(0) > β∗ and R(2) − C(0) ≤ β∗. Thus, by the
condition 1. of Proposition A.4 we have mb = 1. By the condition 2. the firm frontier is
αb1 = C−1
(
R(1) − r(0, 2) − β∗). Finally, the condition 3. holds because ∫ αb10 C(j)dj = 2B by
construction. Hence, β∗ uniquely satisfies all three conditions of the Proposition A.4.
If (ii) is true, then ψ2(β2) < 2B and ψ2(0) > 2B, by the assumption of the binding
budget constraint. By the Intermediate Value Theorem there exists some β∗ ∈ (0, β2) such
that ψ2(β∗) = 2B and furthermore β∗ is unique because ψ2(β) is strictly decreasing. Observe
that β∗ ∈ (0, β2), hence R(2) − C(0) > β∗. Thus, by the condition 1. of Proposition A.4 we
have mb = 2. By the condition 2. the firm frontiers are αb1 = C−1
(
R(1) − r(0, 2) − β∗) and
αb2 = C−1
(
R(2)− β∗). Finally, the condition 3. holds because ∫ αb20 C(j)dj + ∫ αb10 C(j)dj = 2B by
construction. Hence, β∗ uniquely satisfies all three conditions of the Proposition A.4.
Lemma A.14. An equilibrium inducing portfolio equivalent to the one characterized in Propo-
sition A.4 can always be constructed.
Proof. Either m = 2 or m = 1. If m = 1, then it holds
∫ αb1
0 C(j)dj = 2B. Then there exists a
point x such that 0 < x < αb1 and
∫ x
0 C(j)dj = B and
∫ αb1
x C(j)dj = B. Let one firm invest in
the interval [0, x) and the other firm in the interval [x, αb1). This investment plan generates a
portfolio equivalent to the one characterized.
If m = 2, then it holds 2
∫ αb2
0 C(j)dj +
∫ αb1
αb2
C(j)dj = 2B. Then there exists a point x such
that αb2 ≤ x ≤ αb1 and
∫ x
0 C(j)dj = B and
∫ αb2
0 C(j)dj +
∫ αb1
x C(j)dj = B. Let one firm invest in
the interval [0, x) and the other firm in the set [0, αb2) ∪ [x, αb1). This investment plan generates
a portfolio equivalent to the one characterized.
Lemma A.15. The investment plan constructed in Lemma A.14 is an equilibrium and any
investment plan inducing the same portfolio is an equilibrium as well.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1.1, with the opportunity cost equal
to β as opposed to 0.
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B.1 Basics
In the following, we introduce some notation that we use throughout the Appendix. We also
formulate the restrictions implied by subgame perfection.
B.1.1 Notation
We consistently use subscripts B for buyers, i = 1, 2 for suppliers and T for "total" (buyers plus
suppliers). Superscripts such as fpt for fixed-price tournament, bt for bonus tournament or a for
auction refer to the contest P under consideration. We will drop these superscripts whenever
there is no danger of confusion.
1. pi (qi, qj) ∈ P [Ψ−b,Ψ]2 is a price strategy function.1
2. pii (pi, pj | qi, qj) is the realized revenue that supplier i earns with prices p1 and p2, condi-
tional on qualities q1 and q2, assuming that the buyer chooses the i sequentially rationally,
i.e., the i that maximizes qi − pi in contest P.2
3. Π̂i (vi, vj , pi, pj) is the expectation over pii (pi, pj | qi, qj) when suppliers choose v1, v2, p1 ()
and p2 (), where the expectation is taken over all pairs of quality realizations for given
(v1, v2).
4. ΠPi (vi, vj) = Π̂i (vi, vj , pi, pj), where pi() and pj () are the subgame equilibria for the
contest P as in Lemma 2.2, is the (expected) revenue of supplier i.
5. SPi (vi, vj) = ΠPi (vi, vj) + t− C is the (expected) surplus of supplier i.
6. SPB (vi, vj) = Eσ [max {q (v1, σ) , q (v2, σ)}]− ΠP1 (vi, vj)− ΠP2 (vi, vj)− 2t is the (expected)
surplus of the buyer.
B.1.2 Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
A subgame-perfect equilibrium of the innovation contest given by P consists of supplier strategies
si = (vi, pi) ∈ [0, 1]× P [Ψ−b,Ψ]2 and buyer strategies ν ∈ {v1, v2}(P×[Ψ−b,Ψ])
2
such that:
(DC1) ν1 and v2 are sequentially rational.
(DC2) pii (pi (qi, qj) , pj (qj , qi)| qi, qj) ≥ pii (p′i, pj (qj , qi) |qi, qj) for all p′i ∈ P,(qi, qj) ∈ [Ψ− b,Ψ]2
(sequential rationality of supplier i)
1For sets X and Y , Y X is the set of all mappings from X to Y .
2When q1 − p1 = q2 − p2, we appeal to tie-breaking rule (T1) below.
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(DC3) Π̂i (vi, vj , pi (qi, qj) , pj (qj , qi)) ≥ Π̂i (v′i, vj , p˜i (qi, qj) , pj (qj , qi)) for all v′i ∈ [0, 1] and all
p˜i (qi, qj) ∈ P [Ψ−b,Ψ]×[Ψ−b,Ψ] (best-response condition for supplier i).
B.2 Proofs of Auxiliary Results (Section 2.3.1)
B.2.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Suppose, without loss of generality, that v1 ≤ v2. The total surplus is
ST (v1, v2)− 2C =
∫ 1
0
max{q(v1, σ), q(v2, σ)}dF (σ)− 2C =
Ψ− b

v1∫
0
(v1 − σ) dF (σ) +
(v1+v2)/2∫
v1
(σ − v1) dF (σ) +
v2∫
(v1+v2)/2
(v2 − σ) dF (σ) +
1∫
v2
(σ − v2) dF (σ)

− 2C.
This is a continuous function with a compact domain, hence it attains the maximum. Note that
∂ST (v1, v2)
∂v1
= b (−2F (v1) + F ((v1 + v2) /2)) (B.1)
∂ST (v1, v2)
∂v2
= b (1− 2F (v2) + F ((v1 + v2) /2)) . (B.2)
(B.1) and (B.2) imply that there are no boundary optima. To see this, first note that
∂ST (0,v2)
∂v1
> 0∀v2 > 0 and ∂ST (v1,1)∂v2 < 0∀v1 < 1. Moreover (v1, v2) = (0, 0) and (1, 1) are both
dominated by (1/2, 1/2). Thus, the optimum must satisfy
−2F (v1) + F ((v1 + v2) /2) = 0 (B.3)
1− 2F (v2) + F ((v1 + v2) /2) = 0. (B.4)
Together these conditions imply F (v∗2) = 1/2 + F (v∗1).
For v1 ∈ [0, 1/2], let g (v1) = F−1
(
F (v1) + 12
)
. F−1 is well-defined because of (A1)(iii).
Inserting v2 = g (v1) in (B.3) and (B.4), the first-order conditions hold for (v1, v2) = (v1, g (v1))
if
v1 = F−1
(
F ((v1 + g (v1)) /2)
2
)
. (B.5)
(B.5) has at least one solution v∗1 ∈ (0, 1/2). This holds because both sides of (B.5) are strictly
increasing, and the r.h.s. is positive for v1 = 0 and strictly less than 1/2 for v1 = 1/2. Now
consider (v∗1, v∗2) = (v∗1, g (v∗1)) such that F (v∗1) = 1/4 and F (v∗2) = 3/4. Thus F (v∗2) =
F (v∗1) + 1/2. Moreover, symmetry implies v∗1 + v∗2 = 1 and thus the r.h.s. of (B.5) is F−1
(
1
4
)
,
so that the first-order condition holds for (v∗1, v∗2).
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Finally, consider the Hessian matrix
H =
 ∂2ST∂v21 ∂2ST∂v1∂v2
∂2ST
∂v1∂v2
∂2ST
∂v22

=
[
−2f (v1) + 12f ((v1 + v2) /2) 12f ((v1 + v2) /2)
1
2f ((v1 + v2) /2) −2f (v2) + 12f ((v1 + v2) /2)
]
.
First, H is negative definite at (v∗1, v∗2) if and only if f (1/2) < 2f (v∗1). To see this, note that
f (v∗1) = f (v∗2) and f ((v∗1 + v∗2) /2) = f (1/2). Hence,
−2f (v∗1) +
1
2f ((v
∗
1 + v∗2) /2) = −2f (v∗1) +
1
2f (1/2) < 0⇔ f (1/2) < 4f (v
∗
1) .
In addition,
|H| = 4f (v∗1) f (v∗2)− (f (v∗1) + f (v∗2)) f ((v∗1 + v∗2) /2) = 4f (v∗1)2 − 2f (v∗1) f (1/2) .
This condition holds if and only if f (1/2) < 2f (v∗1), which holds by (A1)(iv).
Second, H is negative definite ∀ (v1, v2) if f (1/2) < 2f (0). To see this, note that f (v) is
minimized at v = 0 and maximized at v = 1/2. Hence, f (1/2) < 2f (0) < 4f (0) implies
−2f (vi) + 12f
(
v1 + v2
2
)
≤ −2f (0) + 12f
(1
2
)
< 0 ∀i ∈ {1, 2} .
and
|H| = f (v1)
(
2f (v2)− f
(
v1 + v2
2
))
+ f (v2)
(
2f (v1)− f
(
v1 + v2
2
))
> 0.
Therefore, f (1/2) < 2f (0), which holds by (A1)(iv), is a sufficient condition for (v∗1, v∗2) to be
the unique global optimum.
B.2.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Step 1: Pricing subgame for q1 = q2.
Consider the equilibrium for the subgame defined by (v1, v2, σ) and the resulting quality
vector (q1, q2). If q1 = q2, the standard Bertrand logic implies that (p (σ) , p (σ)) = (P , P ) is the
unique equilibrium.
Step 2: Pricing subgame for qi > qj
Clearly, if qi > qj . the suggested strategy profile is a subgame equilibrium. To see that i must
bid p (σ) in equilibrium, first suppose pi > p (σ). If pi > pj + q (vi, σ)− q (vj , σ), supplier j wins.
By setting pi = p (σ) ≤ pj + q (vi, σ) − q (vj , σ), supplier i can ensure that he wins, which is a
profitable deviation by (T2). If pi > p (σ) and pi ≤ pj + q (vi, σ)− q (vj , σ), supplier i wins. By
setting pj = P , supplier j can profitably deviate. If pi < p (σ), supplier i can deviate upwards
to p (σ). He then still wins by (T1), and revenues are higher.
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B.2.3 Proof of Lemma 2.3
(i) The result is trivial for v1 = v2. For v1 < v2, we show that supplier 1 can profitably deviate
to some v′1 > v1 if ∆q (v1, v2) + P /∈ P. This immediately follws from the following two steps:
Step 1: If v1 < v2 and ∆q (v1, v2) + P /∈ P, there exists a deviation to v′1 ∈ (v1, v2] such that
the set of states in which supplier 1 wins after the deviation is a strict superset of the set of
states in which the supplier wins before the deviation.
Before the deviation, by Lemma 2.2, if σ ∈ [0, v1], supplier 1 wins and p(σ) < ∆q (v1, v2) + P .
By continuity, ∃ v′1 ∈ (v1, v2] such that p(σ) < ∆q (v′1, v2) + P < ∆q (v1, v2) + P . By deviating
to v′1, supplier 1 wins whenever σ < (v′1 + v2) /2 rather than when σ < (v1 + v2) /2. Step 1 thus
follows.
Step 2: After this deviation, the buyer pays a weakly higher price than before.
For σ ∈ [0, v1], the price is unaffected. For σ ∈ (v1, (v′1 + v2) /2], the price is at least as high as
before the deviation. Thus, v′1 is a profitable deviation by (T2).
(ii) follows directly from Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3 (i).
B.3 Proofs of Main Optimality Results (Section 2.3.2)
B.3.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Let A = ∆q(v1, v2) for some (v1, v2). We will show that, in the bonus tournament with
P = {A, 0} and sufficiently high subsidies, the strategy profiles (v1, v2, p1 () , p2 ()) such that
pi (qi, qj) = A if qi − qj ≥ A and 0 otherwise, form an equilibrium.
Sequential rationality of pi () follows from Lemma 2.2. We now show that (v1, p1 ()) is a best
response of supplier 1 to (v2, p2 ()); the argument for supplier 2 is analogous. For A = 0, only
(v1, v2) = (1/2, 1/2) satisfies the above conditions. Thus, the statement forA = 0 will follow from
Proposition 2.2(ii). If v1 < v2, ∆q (v1, v2) > 0, and the probability that supplier 1 wins with a
positive prize is F (v1). Deviating to v′1 < v1 is not profitable, because the winning probability
falls to F (v̂1), with v̂1 < v1 implicitly defined by q (v′1, v̂1)−q (v2, v̂1) = ∆q (v1, v2) , and the prize
does not rise. It is not profitable to deviate to v′′1 ∈ (v1, v˜), where v˜ = min (2v2 − v1, 1) ≥ 1/2:
For such deviations, ∆q (v′′1 , v2) < ∆q (v˜, v2) ≤ ∆q (v1, v2)∀σ, so that the probability of winning
a positive prize is 0. Finally, if v˜ < 1, deviating to v′′′1 ∈ [v˜, 1] is not profitable, because
v˜ ≥ 1/2 + v2 − v1 implies 1 − v˜ ≤ 1/2 − (v2 − v1) ≤ v2 − (v2 − v1) = v1 and therefore, by
symmetry of the state distribution, 1− F (v′′′1 ) ≤ 1− F (v˜) ≤ F (v1). By analogous arguments,
there are no profitable deviations for supplier 2.
By Lemma 2.1, the social optimal satisfies F (v∗1) = 1/4 and F (v∗2) = 3/4. Clearly, it must
be that 0 < v∗1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ v∗2 < 1, and the social optimum can be implemented.
B.3.2 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The buyer optimally chooses (v1, v2, p1, p2,P, t) ∈ [0, 1]2×P [Ψ−b,Ψ]2 ×I
(
R+
)× [0,+∞) so as to
maximize
ST (v1, v2)− Π̂1 (v1, v2, p1, p2)− Π̂2 (v1, v2, p1, p2)− 2t
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such that, for all i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i, (DC1)-(DC3) hold and
Π̂i (vi, vj , pi, pj) + t− C ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ {1, 2} and i 6= j. (B.6)
(i) The statement follows from two lemmas. Lemma B.1 shows that allocations maximizing
buyer surplus satisfy the conditions of Proposition 2.1 and can thus be implemented by a bonus
tournament. Lemma B.2 shows that implementation requires lower expected transfer than any
alternative; hence buyer surplus is maximal.
Lemma B.1. If
(
vB1 , v
B
2 , p1, p2
)
is an equilibrium of a contest that maximizes buyer surplus,
then 0 < vB1 ≤ 12 ≤ vB2 < 1.
We prove this lemma in two steps.
Step 1: If
(
vB1 , v
B
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2
)
is an equilibrium where w.l.o.g. vB1 ≤ vB2 , then vB1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ vB2 .
Proof : We will show that v1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ v2 must hold in any contest equilibrium. Sup-
pose, to the contrary, that v1 ≤ v2 < 1/2. The case that 1/2 < v1 ≤ v2 follows analogously.
Let p1, p2 be the associated pricing strategies. Then, the expected revenue of supplier 1 is
Π1 (v1, v2) =
∫ v1+v2
2
0 p1 (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ). Consider the deviation v′1 = 2v2 − v1 < 1 with
the same pricing function. Supplier 1 now wins whenever σ > (v2 + v′1) /2. We can write the
expected revenue as Π1 (v′1, v2) =
∫ 2v2
v′1+v2
2
p1 (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) +
∫ 1
2v2 p1 (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ).
Clearly, (v1 + v2) /2 = 2v2− v
′
1+v2
2 . Moreover, there exists a bijective mapping [0, (v1 + v2) /2]→
[(v′1 + v2) /2, 2v2]; σ′ 7→ σ′′ such that q (v1, σ′) − q (v2, σ′) = q (v′1, σ′′) − q (v2, σ′′) and f (σ′) ≤
f (σ′′). Thus
∫ v1+v2
2
0 p1 (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) ≤
∫ 2v2
v′1+v2
2
p1 (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ). As a result,
Π1 (v1, v2) ≤ Π1 (v′1, v2) and v′1 leads to strictly higher probability of winning, hence v′1 is a
profitable deviation.3 Thus, v1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ v2 must hold in any equilibrium; in particular, therefore
vB1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ vB2 .
Step 2: If
(
vB1 , v
B
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2
)
is an equilibrium maximizing buyer surplus, then 0 < vBi < 1 for
i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proof : By Step 1, we know that v1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ v2. Suppose vB1 = 0 and vB2 = 1. We
will distinguish two cases, C = 0 and C > 0. First suppose C = 0. By single-peakedness
(A1), v1 = v2 = 1/2 results in weakly higher total surplus than
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
. As the allocation
(v1, v2) = (1/2, 1/2) can be implemented with an FPT and A = 2C by Proposition 2.2(ii), the
buyer would be strictly better off than in any contest implementing vB1 = 0 and vB2 = 1 where the
suppliers earn positive surplus. Finally, observe that vB1 = 0 and vB2 = 1 cannot be implemented
so that the suppliers earn zero surplus, as the suppliers could increase their probability of
winning by deviating to the interior, which by (T2) would be a profitable deviation. Next
suppose C > 0. There exists some small ε such that ST
(
vB1 = 0, vB2 = 1
)
< ST (ε, 1− ε) and
F (ε)∆q (ε, 1− ε) < C. But then a bonus tournament with subsidy t′ = C − F (ε)∆q (ε, 1− ε),
and P ={∆q (ε, 1− ε) , 0} implements (ε, 1− ε), achieves higher total surplus, and the supplier
surplus not higher than in any contest implementing vB1 = 0 and vB2 = 1. Hence, the buyer
surplus is higher, which is a contradiction.
3Given the tie-breaking rule T2, this is even true for p = 0.
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Next suppose v1 = 0 and v2 < 1 (the case that v1 > 0 and v2 = 1 follows analo-
gously). By Lemma 2.2, the revenue is Π1 (0, v2) =
∫ v2
2
0 p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) for supplier
1 and Π2 (v2, 0) =
∫ v2
v2
2
p¯ (q2 (σ) , q1 (σ)) dF (σ) +
∫ 1
v2
p¯ (q2 (σ) , q1 (σ)) dF (σ) for supplier 2. More-
over, Π1 (0, v2) > 0, because otherwise supplier 1 could increase his probability of winning by de-
viating to the interior, which by (T2) would be a profitable deviation. By single-peakedness (A1)
it holds
∫ v2
2
0 p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) ≤
∫ v2
v2
2
p¯ (q2 (σ) , q1 (σ)) dF (σ). Suppose that this equilibrium
is implemented with transfers t such that t+Π1 (0, v2) ≥ C. This implies t+Π2 (v2, 0) > C. Fur-
ther, using (B.1),dST
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
/dvB1
∣∣∣
vB1 =0
= bF (v2/2) > 0, so that there exists some ε¯ > 0 such
that ST
(
ε, vB2
)
> ST
(
0, vB2
)
for every ε ∈ (0, ε¯). Fix ε such that F (ε)∆q (ε, v2) ≤ Π1 (0, v2)
and F (ε) < 1 − F (v2). Let t′ = t + Π1 (0, v2) − F (ε)∆q (ε, v2). Now consider a bonus tourna-
ment with subsidy t′ and P ={∆q (ε, v2) , 0}. By Proposition 2.1, this bonus tournament will
implement (ε, v2) if the participation constraint is met. This condition holds for both suppliers,
because t′+ (1−F (v2))∆q (ε, v2) > t′+F (ε)∆q (ε, v2) ≥ C. Compared to the original situation
with v1 = 0 and v2 < 1, the rent of supplier 1 is unchanged, but the rent of supplier 2 decreases
since
∫ v2
v2
2
p¯ (q2 (σ) , q1 (σ)) dF (σ) + t > t′ and
∫ 1
v2
p¯ (q2 (σ) , q1 (σ)) dF (σ) > (1−F (v2))∆q (ε, v2).
Since the total surplus increases and the suppliers’ surplus decreases, the buyer’s surplus must
increase. Therefore, the bonus tournament that implements (ε, v2) increases the buyer surplus,
which is a contradiction.
Lemma B.2. If
(
vB1 , v
B
2 , p
B
1 , p
B
2
)
is an equilibrium of a contest maximizing buyer surplus, then
it can be implemented by a contest with P = {A, 0}.
Proof: From Proposition 2.1 and Lemma B.1, we know that the bonus tournament with
A = ∆q
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
implements
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
. It remains to be shown that the buyer cannot implement(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
with lower expected total transfers with any other contest. First, suppose that vB1 +
vB2 = 1. By Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, in any contest that implements
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
the price paid by the
buyer is exactly ∆q(vB1 , vB2 ) +P if σ ∈ [0, vB1 ]∪ [vB2 , 1] and it is at least 0 if σ ∈
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
. Thus,
if ∆q(vB1 , vB2 )F (vB1 ) > C, a bonus tournament implements
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
with the lowest possible
expected total transfers. If ∆q(vB1 , vB2 )F (vB1 ) ≤ C, a bonus tournament with an appropriate t
implements
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
with zero expected supplier surplus. Next, consider an arbitrary contest
implementing
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
with vB1 + vB2 < 1 with subsidy t (the case vB1 + vB2 > 1 is analogous).
The surplus of supplier 1 is then S1 = ∆q(vB1 , vB2 )F (vB1 )+
∫ vB1 +vB2
2
vB1
p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) +
t − C, and for supplier 2 it is S2 = ∆q(vB1 , vB2 )(1 − F (vB2 ))+
∫ v2
vB1 +v
B
2
2
p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) +
t − C. By similar arguments as in Lemma B.1, ∆q(vB1 , vB2 )F (vB1 ) < ∆q(vB1 , vB2 )(1 − F (vB2 ))
and
∫ vB1 +vB2
2
vB1
p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ) ≤
∫ v2
vB1 +v
B
2
2
p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ). Now consider a bonus
tournament with P ={∆q
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
, 0} and t′ = ∫ vB1 +vB22
vB1
p¯ (q1 (σ) , q2 (σ)) dF (σ)+t. The surplus
of supplier 1 now becomes S′1 = S1 by construction. On the other hand, S′2 ≤ S2, but S′2 > S′1.
Thus, the proposed bonus tournament implements
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
with lowest possible net supplier
surplus, which implies that the buyer surplus is maximized.
(ii) Suppose C ≥ F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2). From Proposition 2.1 we know that for the proposed
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P = {A, 0}, (v∗1, v∗2) emerges in equilibrium; and the result also gives the pricing strategies p1
and p2. For t = C − F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2), the buyer surplus in the proposed equilibrium is
ST (v∗1, v∗2)−Π1 (v∗1, v∗2)−Π2 (v∗1, v∗2) + 2t (B.7)
= ST (v∗1, v∗2)− 2F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) + 2 (F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2)− C) = ST (v∗1, v∗2)− 2C
This is the highest surplus that the buyer can achieve without violating the suppliers’ partici-
pation constraints.
(iii) Suppose C < F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) . The proof for this case relies on the fact that im-
plementation with minimal revenues uses bonus tournaments. It shows that
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
must
satisfy vB1 + vB2 = 1. Among all the bonus tournaments implementing (v1, v2) with v1 ≤ v2 and
v1+v2 = 1, the buyer has highest surplus (ignoring participation constraint) at (1/2, 1/2). Using
these facts, the proof shows that the buyer always chooses the minimal value of the subsidy t,
and she just implements enough diversity so that the suppliers (who benefit from some diversity)
break even on expectation.
Step 1: The outcome of an optimal contest can be implemented by P = {A, 0} for some A ≥ 0.
This follows from Part (i).
Step 2: In an optimal contest vB1 + vB2 = 1.
Consider any (v1, v2) such that v1 + v2 < 1. We show that (v1, v2) 6=
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
; the case
v1 + v2 > 1 follows analogously. By Step 1, the optimal outcome can be implemented by some
P = {A, 0} and t ≥ 0. The equilibrium values of pi in this contest are zero whenever σ ∈ (v1, v2).
Hence, the participation constraint for supplier 1 implies that F (v1)A+ t ≥ C; thus v1 +v2 < 1
implies (1− F (v2))A + t > C. Now suppose the buyer implements (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) , where ε
is sufficiently small. We know that (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) can also be implemented with P = {A, 0}.
Thus, we can write the buyer surplus as
SB (ε) = ST (v1 + ε, v2 + ε)− F (v1 + ε)A− (1− F (v2 + ε))A− 2t
for ε ≥ 0. Thus
dSB (ε)
dε
= dST (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) /dε−Af(v1 + ε) +Af(v2 + ε).
Since v1 + v2 < 1, single-peakedness and symmetry (A1) imply f(v1 + ε) < f(v2 + ε). Thus
dSB (ε) /dε > dST (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) /dε. We will show that dST (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) /dε > 0; because
F (v1 + ε)A+ t > C and (for sufficiently small ε) (1− F (v2))A+ t ≥ C, the buyer will thus be
better off implementing (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) than (v1, v2). Maximizing total surplus is equivalent to
minimizing the expected distance
D (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) =
∫ v1+ε
0
(v1 + ε− σ) f(σ)dσ +
∫ v1+v2
2 +ε
v1+ε
(σ − v1 − ε) f(σ)dσ
+
∫ v2+ε
v1+v2
2 +ε
(v2 + ε− σ) f(σ)dσ +
∫ 1
v2+ε
(σ − v2 − ε) f(σ)dσ.
126 Appendix: Chapter 2
From this we obtain
dD (v1 + ε, v2 + ε)
dε
=
∫ v1+ε
0
f(σ)dσ −
∫ v1+v2
2 +ε
v1+ε
f(σ)dσ +
∫ v2+ε
v1+v2
2 +ε
f(σ)dσ −
∫ 1
v2+ε
f(σ)dσ
= 2F (v1 + ε) + 2 (F (v2 + ε))− 2F
(
v1 + v2
2 + ε
)
− 1.
We will show that this expression is negative for v1 +v2 < 1 and sufficiently small ε. To see this,
fix any v2 such that 1/2 ≤ v2 < 1. Note that h (v1, v2) := dD(v1+ε,v2+ε)dε
∣∣∣
ε=0
= 0 for v1 = 1− v2.
Furthermore
∂h
∂v1
= 2f(v1)− f
(
v1 + v2
2
)
> 0,
were the last inequality follows by (A1)(iv). Thus, v1 + v2 < 1 implies 2F (v1) + 2 (F (v2)) −
2F ((v1 + v2) /2) − 1 < 0 and thus dD (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) /dε < 0 for small enough ε. This in turn
implies that ST (v1 + ε, v2 + ε) increases in ε so that buyer surplus also increases in ε.
Step 3: For v1 ∈ [0, 1/2] and for fixed t, buyer surplus SbtB (v1, 1− v1) increases in v1.
For any σ ∈ [0, v1], buyer surplus equals q2 (1− v1, σ), which increases in v1. For any
σ ∈ (v1, 1/2], buyer surplus equals q1 (v1, σ); for a small marginal change, the expected payoff
from states on (v1, 1/2] thus also increases in v1. By similar arguments, buyer surplus increases
for any σ ∈ (1/2, 1− v1] and any σ ∈ (1− v1, 1].
Step 4: Suppose C < F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2). Then, there exists v1 ∈ (v∗1, 1/2] such that: C =
F (v1) ∆q (v1, 1− v1) .
The result follows from F (1/2) ∆q (1/2, 1/2) = 0 because F (v1) ∆q (v1, 1− v1) is a contin-
uous function.
Step 5: Fix v˜1 = max[0,1/2] v1 s.t. C = F (v1) ∆q (v1, 1− v1). Then vB1 ≥ v˜1.
Suppose not. According to Step 1,
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
can be implemented in a bonus tournament with
a subsidy t ≥ 0. By Step 4, v˜1 exists. Suppose vB1 < v˜1. By Step 3, moving from
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
to
(v˜1, 1− v˜1) the buyer could increase her payoff while the participation constraint would remain
satisfied.
Step 6: For v2 = 1− v1 and v1 > v∗1, ST (v1, 1− v1) decreases in v1.
Using the same argument as in Step 2, the derivative of the expected distance is
dD (v1, 1− v1)
dv1
=
∫ v1
0
f (σ) dσ −
∫ 1
2
v1
f (σ) dσ −
∫ 1−v1
1
2
f (σ) dσ +
∫ 1
1−v1
f (σ) dσ = 4F (v1)− 1
This function is monotonic and positive for all v1 > v∗1. Hence the total expected distance
increases in v1, and the total expected surplus decreases.
Step 7: Fix v˜1 as in Step 5. Then vB1 ≤ v˜1.
Suppose not. By Step 1,
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
can be implemented in a bonus tournament with a subsidy
t ≥ 0. Suppose vB1 > v˜1. By Step 6, moving from
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
to (v˜1, 1− v˜1) increases total surplus.
Since (v˜1, 1− v˜1) can be implemented with t′ = 0 because C = F (v˜1) ∆q (v˜1, 1− v˜1), buyer
surplus increases.
Step 8: The optimal
(
vB1 , v
B
2
)
for the buyer (i) satisfies vB1 = v˜1 and vB2 = 1 − vB1 . It can
implemented with (ii) a bonus tournament such that t = 0.
The first part of the statement follows by combining Steps 5 and 7. The second part follows
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from (i) and the fact that the suggested contest implements (v˜1, 1− v˜1) with minimal subsidies
required to satisfy the participation constraint.
B.3.3 Proof of Corollary 2.1
Proof. As F (v∗1) ∆q(v∗i , v∗j ) < C by assumption, both prizes are positive. For firm 1, the ex-
pected profit of following the candidate equilibrium is Π1 (v∗1, v∗2) = F (v∗1)A+(1/2− F (v∗1)) a−
C. Inserting the values of A and a and F (v∗1) = 1/4, Π1 (v∗1, v∗2) = 0. By symmetry, both sup-
pliers break even on expectation. Thus, the suggested allocation maximizes total surplus, with
full rent appropriation by the buyer. It thus suffices to show that {A, a} implements (v∗1, v∗2).
Consider supplier 1. First, any deviation v1 = v∗2 + ε is dominated by v′1 = v∗2 − ε. Next,
a deviation to v′1 < v∗1 cannot increase expected supplier profit, as the probability of winning
decreases and the price charged in any state of the world does not increase. Thus, the only
remaining case is a deviation to v′1 ∈ (v∗1, v∗2]. The expected gross profit can be written as
Π1 (v′1, v∗2) = aF ((v′1 + v∗2) /2). This is clearly increasing in v
′
1 and the profit of supplier 1 is
at most Π1 (v′1, v∗2) = aF (v∗2). The expected profit of following the candidate equilibrium is
Π1 (v∗1, v∗2) = F (v∗1)A + (1/2− F (v∗1)) a. Thus there is no profitable deviation to values just
below v∗2 if and only if F (v∗1)A + (1/2− F (v∗1)) a ≥ aF (v∗2). Inserting the values of A and a
and F (v∗1) = 1/4 and F (v∗2) = 3/4 shows that (v∗1, v∗2) is an equilibrium.
B.4 Proofs on Auctions and Tournaments (Section 2.4)
B.4.1 Proof of Proposition 2.2
(i) By Lemma 2.2, the unique equilibrium of the pricing subgame induced by q1 and q2 is
pi = max {qi − qj , 0} for i, j ∈ {1, 2}; j 6= i. Suppose that an auction does not implement the
social optimum (v∗1, v∗2). Then, for some i, there exists v¯i 6= v∗i such that Πi(v¯i, v∗j ) > Πi(v∗i , v∗j ).
Let Θi (vi, vj) = {σ ∈ [0, 1]| q (vi, σ) ≥ q (vj , σ)} and Θ−i (vi, vj) = [0, 1] \ Θi (vi, vj). Thus
Πi(v¯i, v∗j ) > Πi(v∗i , v∗j ) if and only if∫
Θi(v¯i,v∗j )
(
q (v¯i, σ)− q
(
v∗j , σ
))
dF (σ) >
∫
Θi(v∗i ,v∗j )
(
q (v∗i , σ)− q
(
v∗j , σ
))
dF (σ) ,
or equivalently ∫
Θi(v¯i,v∗j )
(
q (v¯i, σ)− q
(
v∗j , σ
))
dF (σ) +
∫ 1
0
q
(
v∗j , σ
)
dF (σ) >
∫
Θi(v∗i ,v∗j )
(
q (v∗i , σ)− q
(
v∗j , σ
))
dF (σ) +
∫ 1
0
q
(
v∗j , σ
)
dF (σ)
Splitting [0, 1] into Θi
(
v¯i, v
∗
j
)
and Θ−i
(
v¯i, v
∗
j
)
in the first line and into Θi
(
v∗i , v∗j
)
and Θ−i
(
v∗i , v∗j
)
in the second line and simplifying, this is equivalent with∫
Θi(v¯i,v∗j )
q (v¯i, σ) dF (σ) +
∫
Θ−i(v¯i,v∗j )
q
(
v∗j , σ
)
dF (σ) >
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∫
Θi(v∗i ,v∗j )
q (v∗i , σ) dF (σ) +
∫
Θ−i(v∗i ,v∗j )
q
(
v∗j , σ
)
dF (σ) .
and thus ∫ 1
0
max{q(v¯i, σ), q(v∗j , σ)}dF (σ) >
∫ 1
0
max{q(v∗i , σ), q(v∗j , σ)}dF (σ) ,
contradicting optimality of (v∗1, v∗2).
(ii) This follows from the more general statement in Corollary 2.5(ii) below.
(iii) Using Proposition 2.2(ii), any FPT such that the supplier breaks even has a unique
equilibrium with (v1, v2) = (1/2, 1/2). For A = 2C and t = 0, the participation constraint of
the suppliers binds. Hence, buyer surplus is maximized in the class of FPTs. It is
SfptB =
∫ 1/2
0
(
Ψ− b
(1
2 − σ
))
f (σ) dσ +
∫ 1
1/2
(
Ψ− b
(
σ − 12
))
f (σ) dσ − 2C
= Ψ +
∫ 1/2
0
bσf (σ) dσ −
∫ 1
1/2
bσf (σ) dσ − 2C
The surplus of supplier 1 (supplier 2 follows by symmetry) is
Sa1 = F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) +
∫ 1/2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ
= b (v
∗
2 − v∗1)
4 +
∫ 1/2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ.
Thus whenever C < b (v∗2 − v∗1) /4, the participation constraint of the suppliers is satisfied even
with t = 0. By Lemma 2.2, in an auction the winning supplier bids exactly the quality difference.
This implies that the value the buyer receives, in any state of the world, is equal to the quality
of the losing supplier. Then, the buyer surplus in an auction with t = 0 is
SaB =
∫ 1/2
0
(Ψ− b (v∗2 − σ)) f (σ) dσ +
∫ 1
1/2
(Ψ− b (σ − v∗1)) f (σ) dσ
= Ψ +
∫ 1/2
0
bσf (σ) dσ −
∫ 1
1/2
bσf (σ) dσ − bv
∗
2
2 +
bv∗1
2
The buyer prefers FPT to the auction if SfptB −SaB > 0, which holds whenever bv
∗
2
2 −
bv∗1
2 −2C > 0
or equivalently b(v
∗
2−v∗1)
4 > C.
When b(v
∗
2−v∗1)
4 < C, the participation constraints require positive subsidies. In this case, the
buyer implements the social optimum by using an auction with t = C − Πa1 with zero supplier
surplus. Obviously this outperforms the inefficient FPT.
B.4.2 Proof of Corollary 2.3
Denote the minimum allowable price with P . If v1 6= v2 in equilibrium, by Proposition 2.2(ii),
the contest is not an FPT. Suppose that v1 < v2. By Lemmas 2.2 and 2.3, the buyer pays
qi − qj + P to the supplier with qi ≥ qj in equilibrium. Thus, for any σ, the buyer surplus is
B Appendix 129
min{q1, q2} − P . Hence, the surplus of a buyer who induces v1 < v2 with P is
SB (v1, v2 ;P ) =
∫ 1
0
min{qi (vi, σ) , qj (vj , σ)}dF (σ)− P
=
∫ v1+v2
2
0
q2 (v2, σ) dF (σ) +
∫ 1
v1+v2
2
q1 (v1, σ) dF (σ)− P
Thus
dSB
dv1
=
∫ 1
v1+v2
2
∂q1
∂v1
dF (σ) > 0; dSB
dv2
=
∫ v1+v2
2
0
∂q2
∂v2
dF (σ) < 0.
Thus, the buyer surplus is maximal for v1 = v2 and P = 0. Given v1 = v2, the buyer surplus
is maximal for v1 = v2 = 1/2, the unique equilibrium of an FPT with A arbitrarily close to 0.
Given (T2), it is an equilibrium for A = 0.
B.5 Extensions: n > 3 (Section 2.5.1)
B.5.1 Proof of Lemma 2.4
(i) Arguing as for two suppliers, v∗i 6= v∗j for all i 6= j ∈ {1, ..., n}. Thus
ST (v) =
∫ v1+v2
2
0
q1 (v1, σ) dσ +
n−1∑
k=2
∫ vk+vk+1
2
vk−1+vk
2
qk (vk, σ) dσ +
∫ 1
vn−1+vn
2
qn (vn, σ) dσ
The maximum of this function exists and it obviously does not involve corner solutions. Hence,
it is given by the first order conditions
∂ST (v)
∂v1
= −bv1 + bv2 − v12 = 0 (B.8)
∂ST (v)
∂vk
= −bvk − vk−12 + b
vk+1 − vk
2 = 0 (B.9)
for k ∈ {2, ..., n− 1}
∂ST (v)
∂vn
= −bvn − vn−12 + b (1− vn) = 0 (B.10)
(B.9) can be rearranged to give vk−vk−1 = vk+1−vk ≡ ∆v for k = 2, ..., n−1. (B.8) and (B.10)
give v1 = 1 − vn = ∆v/2. Inserting these equations into v1 + (v2 − v1) + ... + (vn − vn−1) +
(1− vn) = 1 gives ∆v = 1n . Thus, v1 = 12n and vk = 12n + k−1n = 2k−12n for k ∈ {2, ..., n}..
(ii) The proof of the result on auctions is analogous to the proof of Proposition 2.2(i) above.
Consider the bonus tournament. If suppliers 1, ..., n choose v∗1, v∗2, ..., v∗n, then suppliers 2, .., n−1
receive no revenues, but they break even because of the subsidy. There are no feasible deviations
for which they can earn a positive price. Consider supplier 1 (supplier n is analogous): His
surplus is 12n
(
b
n
)
+C −C = b2n2 . Deviating to v1 < v∗1 would reduce the probability of winning
the prize, with no compensating benefits. Deviating to vn > v∗n would mean that supplier 1
would only win the low prize 0. This is clearly not profitable.
(iii) Let v = [v1, ..., vn] be the vector of approaches, ordered so that v1 ≤ ... ≤ vn. In Step 1-5,
we show that diversity is less than socially optimal in the FPT. In Step 6, we consider the effect
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of increasing n.
Step 1: In any equilibrium of the FPT, v1 = v2 and vn−1 = vn. This implies that there are at
most n− 2 active approaches.
Suppose v1 < v2. Then the revenue of supplier 1 is Av1+v22 . For v′1 = v1 + ε, ε > 0, such
that v′1 < v2, the revenue is A
v′1+v2
2 > A
v1+v2
2 . A similar argument holds for vn−1 < vn.
We prove the second claim (that there is an inefficiently low amount of diversity) in several
steps. For any supplier i, let P iσ<vi (P
i
σ>vi) be the probability that supplier i wins and, in
addition, σ < vi (σ > vi). Let P i = P iσ<vi + P
i
σ>vi be the total probability that supplier i wins.
Step 2: If for suppliers i and j there exist k 6= i and l 6= j such that vi = vk and vj = vl, then
P iσ<vi = P
i
σ>vi = P
j
σ<vj = P
j
σ>vj in any equilibrium.
Suppose first that P iσ<vi 6= P iσ>vi for some supplier i using the same approach as another
one. Suppose that P iσ<vi > P
i
σ>vi (the opposite case is analogous). Then, a deviation to vi−ε for
some sufficiently small ε > 0 leads to a winning probability of 2P iσ<vi > P
i
σ<vi +P
i
σ>vi ,
4 which is
a profitable deviation. Next, suppose that P iσ>vi < P
j
σ<vj (the opposite case is analogous). Then,
a deviation of supplier i to vj − ε for sufficiently small ε > 0 leads to a winning probability of
2P jσ<vj > P iσ<vi + P
i
σ>vi ,
5 which is a profitable deviation.
Step 3: In any equilibrium of an FPT with n suppliers, P := P 1 = P 2 = Pn−1 = Pn ≥ 12(n−2) .
By Step 2, all extreme approaches are duplicate. The three equalities thus follow from Step
1. Suppose that the inequality does not hold. Then P 1 + P 2 + Pn−1 + Pn < 2n−2 which in
turn implies that ∑n−2j=3P j ≥ n−4n−2 . But then there exist at least one k ∈ {3, ..., n− 2} such that
P k ≥ 1n−2 . By deviating to vk, each supplier 1, 2, n− 1 or n would win with a probability of at
least 12(n−2) , which would be a profitable deviation.
Step 4: Any equilibrium of an FPT with n suppliers satisfies maxi vTi −mini vTi ≤ n−3n−2 .
Suppose not. As 2(n−2)−12(n−2) − 12(n−2) = n−3n−2 , there exists an equilibrium of an FPT such that
either maxi vTi >
2(n−2)−1
2(n−2) or mini v
T
i <
1
2(n−2) or both. If maxi v
T
i >
2(n−2)−1
2(n−2) , then Steps 1 and
2 imply Pn < 12(n−2) , which is impossible by Step 3. If mini v
T
i <
2−1
2(n−2) , then P
1 < 12(n−2) by
Steps 1 and 2, which is again impossible by Step 3.
Step 5: The diversity in an FPT is lower than socially optimal.
By (i), the socially optimal diversity is n−1n . By Step 4, the diversity in an FPT is at most
n−3
n−2 <
n−1
n .
Step 6: The difference between the FPT and the social optimum converges to zero as the number
of suppliers increases.
By Step 3, we know that each supplier 1, 2, n − 1, n wins with probability P . Then in any
equilibrium of an FPT, there exists a supplier j such that P j ≤ 1−4Pn−4 . A deviation to v1 − ε
would result in a probability of winning approximately P . Then, a necessary condition for an
equilibrium is that P ≤ 1−4Pn−4 , which implies that P ≤ 1/n and consequently v1 ≤ 1/n and
vn ≥ (n− 1) /n. Then, maxi vTi − mini vTi ≥ n−2n in any equilibrium of an FPT. By (i), the
socially optimal diversity is (n− 1) /n, so the difference between the socially optimal diversity
and diversity in any equilibrium of an FPT is at most n−1n − n−2n = 1/n. Thus, the difference
converges to zero as n increases.
4The winning probability is approximately 2P iσ<vi if vi = min{v1, ..., vn}.
5The winning probability is approximately 2P iσ<vj if vj = min{v1, ..., vn}.
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B.5.2 Sufficient Conditions for FPT equilibria
We now provide sufficient conditions for equilibria in the FPT. These conditions hold in the
equilibria described in Figure 2.3.
Lemma B.3. An outcome with k active approaches (r1, ..., rk) can be supported in an equilibrium
if the following conditions both hold:
(a) k ∈ {k, ..., k¯}, where k¯ = n− 2 and k = n/2 if n is even and k = (n+ 1) /2 if n is odd;
(b) (r1, ..., rk) = (1/2k, 3/2k, 5/2k, ..., (2k − 1) /2k).
Two suppliers choose the extreme approaches r1 and rk; each of the intermediate approaches
r2, ..., rk−1 is chosen by one or two suppliers.
Proof. Step 1: Suppose n is even and k = n/2. Then any choice of r1, ..., rk as stated in part
(b) of the lemma can be supported as an equilibrium.
In the suggested equilibria, the active approaches are equidistant. Also, r1 = 1/n and rn/2 =
1−1/n. For any 1 < m < n/2, rm− rm−1 = 2/n, any of the active approaches offers the highest
quality with probability 1/k = 2/n. Now suppose each approach r1, ..., rk is chosen by exactly
two suppliers. Then each supplier has a revenue of Πi = A/n. Deviating to any other active
approach leads to payoff of 2A/3n; hence it is not profitable. A deviation to [0, r1) or (rn/2, 1]
results in a winning probability strictly lower than 1/n, so this is not a profitable deviation
either. Finally, consider a deviation to v ∈ (rm−1, rm), m ∈ {2, ..., n/2}. The deviating supplier
wins if and only if σ is in the set [ v+rm−12 ,
v+rm
2 ], so that the winning probability is 1/n and this
is also not a profitable deviation.
Step 2: Now suppose n is even or odd and k > n/2. Then any choice of r1, ..., rk as stated in
part (b) of the lemma is an equilibrium.
Arguing as in Step 1, any of the active approaches offers the highest quality with probability
1/k. Suppose two suppliers choose r1 and rk, respectively. Moreover, suppose that each of the
approaches r2, ..., rk−1 is chosen by one or two suppliers. Thus, if there are two suppliers using
an approach, each of them wins with probability 1/2k, and if there is only one supplier using this
approach, he wins with probability 1/k. Consider a supplier who wins with probability 1/2k. By
the same argument as in Step 1, if he deviates to [0, r1) or (rk, 1], he wins with probability strictly
lower than 1/2k. Deviating to any approach in some interval (rl, rl+1); l ∈ {1, ..., k − 1}, he wins
with probability of at most 1/2k; hence such a deviation is not profitable either. If he deviates
to any active approach, he wins with a probability of at most 1/2k. Thus, such suppliers do
not have profitable deviations. Finally consider a deviation by a supplier who is the only one to
choose some rm, where 1 < m < k. Any deviation to [0, rm−1] or [rm+1, 1] leads to strictly lower
revenues, by the same argument as above. For any approach v ∈ (rm−1, rm+1), he wins whenever
σ ∈ [ v+rm−12 , v+rm+12 ], so that the winning probability is v+rm+12 − v+rm−12 = rm+1−rm−12 = 1/k.
Hence, this is not a profitable deviation either.
B.5.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
(i) Arguing as in Lemma 2.3, the bonus prize of b/n is necessary for implementation of the social
optimum with a bonus tournament. Thus, the total expected transfer from the buyer to the
suppliers is b/n2 + nC. In an auction, the conditional transfers to suppliers 1 and n differ from
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those for the remaining suppliers. The revenue of supplier 1 is
Π1 =
b
2n2 +
∫ 2/2n
1/2n
(
Ψ− b
(
σ − 12n
)
−
(
Ψ− b
( 3
2n − σ
)))
dσ = 3b4n2
For supplier 2 it is
Π2 = 2
∫ 3/2n
2/2n
(
Ψ− b
( 3
2n − σ
)
−
(
Ψ− b
(
σ − 12n
)))
dσ = 2b4n2
By symmetry, Π1 = Πn and Π2 = Πj for all j ∈ {2, ...n− 1}. As Π1 > Π2, the participation
constraint of suppliers j ∈ {2, ...n− 1} will be binding. Suppose first C > Π2. Then, the buyer
optimally sets t = C − Π2 in the auction. The total transfers of the buyer to the suppliers are
thus ΣΠi +nt = 2 (Π1 −Π2) +nC = b2n2 +nC. In this case, the total transfers of the buyer are
strictly greater in the bonus tournament than in the auction. Since both contests implement
the social optimum, the buyer is better off in an auction.
Next, suppose C ≤ Π2. Then, the buyer optimally sets t = 0. The total transfers of the buyer
to the suppliers are therefore ΣΠi = 2 3b4n2 + (n− 2) 2b4n2 = b2n2 (1 + n). The buyer prefers the
bonus tournament iff b
n2 + nC <
b
2n2 (1 + n) or, equivalently, C <
b
2
(
n−1
n3
)
.
(ii) According to the proof of Lemma 2.4(iii), an FPT can implement at most n − 2 different
approaches. By Lemma B.3, an FPT implementing n − 2 approaches exists. The FPT im-
plementing maximum diversity (hence maximizing total surplus) thus implements k = n − 2
with A = 0 and t = C. The participation constraint of all suppliers binds, so this is the best
outcome for the buyer. In the FPT, the buyer has expected costs from suboptimal quality of
b
4k . Moreover, she pays subsidies nC. In the bonus tournament, the buyer has expected costs
from suboptimal quality of b4n , pays revenues
b
n2 and subsidies nC; together
b
n2 +
b
4n + nC =
b
4
n+4
n2 + nC. Thus, the buyer is better of in the bonus tournament if
b
4
n+4
n2 ≤ b4k or k ≤ n
2
n+4 .
The maximum value of k in any tournament equilibrium is n− 2. For k = n− 2 and n > 4, this
condition holds strictly; for k = n− 2 and n = 4 it holds with equality.
B.5.4 Proof of Corollary 2.4
According to Lemma 2.4(i), the social optimum is given by the choices v∗k = (2k − 1) /2n (k ∈
{1, ..., n}). The average quality in the social optimum is thus Ψ−b/4n. Therefore the total surplus
is Ψ− b/4n− nC. The maximum of this expression in R+ is n = √b/2√C. By concavity of the
objective function, the optimal choice of n ∈ N is thus given by n− (C) or n+(C). According to
Lemma 2.4(ii), the social optimum for any given number of suppliers can be implemented with
an auction.
B.6 Other Extensions (Section 2.5.2)
B.6.1 Proof of Corollary 2.5
Proof. (i) The proof of the result on auctions is the same as the proof of Proposition 2.2(i)
above. By the generalized Proposition 2.1, the social optimum can be implemented with a bonus
tournament if 0 < v∗1 ≤ 1/2 ≤ v∗2 < 1. Thus, we only need to show that the social optimum
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always satisfies these conditions. Therefore, first consider any v1 = 0 (v2 = 1 is analogous).
Clearly, ∂ST (v1,v2)∂v1
∣∣∣
v1=0
> 0. Hence, in the social optimum v∗1 > 0. Next, consider (v1, v2) such
that v1 ≤ v2 < 1/2 (the case 1/2 < v1 ≤ v2 is analogous). Supplier 2 offers higher quality than
supplier 1 in the interval
[v1+v2
2 , 1
]
. We can write the total surplus from this interval as
ST (v1, v2)|σ≥ v1+v22 =
Ψ
(
1− F
(
v1 + v2
2
))
−
∫ v2
v1+v2
2
δ(|v2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ −
∫ 1/2
v2
δ(|v2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ
−
∫ 1−v2
1/2
δ(|v2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ −
∫ 1− v1+v22
1−v2
δ(|v2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ −
∫ 1
1− v1+v22
δ(|v2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ
Consider a deviation to v′2 = 1−v2. Symmetry of f (σ) implies that
∫ 1− v1+v22
v1+v2
2
δ(|v2−σ|)f (σ) dσ =∫ 1− v1+v22
v1+v2
2
δ(|v′2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ. As the highest available quality determines the total surplus, it
follows ST (v1, v2)| v1+v2
2 ≤σ≤1−
v1+v2
2
≤ ST (v1, v′2)| v1+v2
2 ≤σ≤1−
v1+v2
2
. Observe that
∫ 1
1− v1+v22
δ(|v2−
σ|)f (σ) dσ < ∫ 11− v1+v22 δ(|v′2 − σ|)f (σ) dσ, because δ is increasing. Thus ST (v1, v2)|σ≥ v1+v22 <
ST (v1, v′2)|σ≥ v1+v22 . For σ <
v1+v2
2 , the highest quality always comes from v1. Thus we have
ST (v1, v2)|σ< v1+v22 = ST (v1, v
′
2)|σ< v1+v22 and obtain ST (v1, v2) < ST (v1, v
′
2). Thus, there can be
no social optimum with v∗1 ≤ v∗2 < 1/2.
(ii) The unique equilibrium in an FPT is such that v1 = v2 and F (vi) = 1/2 for i = 1, 2.
First, we show that the suggested (v1, v2) emerges as an equilibrium. Denote the prize with A.
Let vj be such that F (vj) = 1/2. Since f is everywhere positive, such a vj is unique. Now if
supplier i ∈ {1, 2} plays vi = vj , his revenue is Πi (vi, vj) = A/2. For any vi < vj the revenue
is Πi (vi, vj) = AF ((vi + vj) /2) < A/2. Similarly, for any vi > vj the revenue is Πi (vi, vj) =
A (1− F ((vi + vj) /2)) < A/2. Thus, vi = vj is an equilibrium. Second, v′i = v′j is an equilibrium
only if F (v′j) = 1/2. Suppose not. Then, a supplier i can profitably deviate to vi such that
F (vi) = 1/2, since his revenue will be Πi (vi, vj) > A/2. Third, vi 6= vj is never an equilibrium.
Suppose it was. Let v1 < v2. Then, the revenue of supplier 1 is Π1 (v1|v2) = AF ((v1 + v2) /2),
while deviating to (v1 + v2) /2 leads to a revenue of AF ((v1 + 3v2) /4) > AF ((v1 + v2) /2).
B.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4
(i) By Corollary 2.5(ii), the FPT uniquely implements v1 = v2 = 1/2 and F (vi) = 1/2
for i = 1, 2. Then there exists ε > 0, such that F (1/2− ε) ∆q (1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε) = (1 −
F (1/2− ε))∆q (1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε) < C. Then, by the generalized version of Proposition 2.1,
a bonus tournament with prices P = {∆q (1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε) , 0} and transfers t = C − F (1/2−
ε)∆q (1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε) implements (v1, v2) = (1/2− ε, 1/2 + ε). This yields strictly greater to-
tal surplus, with weakly lower supplier surplus than any FPT. Hence, buyer surplus is strictly
greater in such a bonus tournament than in any FPT.
(iia) By Corollary 2.5(i), both the auction and the bonus tournament implement the social
optimum with t = 0. When σ ∈ [0, v∗1]∪{(v∗1 + v∗2) /2}∪[v∗2, 1], the price paid is equal in both the
auction and the bonus tournament. Everywhere else the price paid is in the bonus tournament
is zero, while in the auction it is strictly positive. Hence, the buyer is strictly better off in the
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bonus tournament than in the auction.
(iib) If v∗1 + v∗2 = 1, then F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) = (1− F (v∗2)) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2). Moreover, we ob-
tain
∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ =
∫ v∗2
v∗1+v
∗
2
2
(q (v∗2, σ)− q (v∗1, σ)) f (σ) dσ. By (iia), we
can focus on the case that F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) < C. If, in addition, C < F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) +∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ, the auction implements the social optimum with positive
supplier surplus. The bonus tournament implements the social optimum (with appropriate
choice of t) in such a way that the suppliers make zero surplus. Hence, the buyer is strictly bet-
ter off in a bonus tournament. If C ≥ F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) +
∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ,
both contests implement the social optimum with zero supplier surplus and the buyer is indif-
ferent.
(iic) Suppose that neither (a) nor (b) hold and suppose (w.l.o.g.) that v∗1 + v∗2 < 1. We can
write the revenues for each buyer as
Πa1 = F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) +
∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ
Πa2 = (1− F (v∗2)) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) +
∫ v∗2
v∗1+v
∗
2
2
(q (v∗2, σ)− q (v∗1, σ)) f (σ) dσ
From v∗1 + v∗2 < 1, it follows that F (v∗1) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) < (1− F (v∗2)) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2). Furthermore,
symmetry and single-peakedness of f (σ) implies that
∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ <
∫ v∗2
v∗1+v
∗
2
2
(q (v∗2, σ)− q (v∗1, σ)) f (σ) dσ.
Let t′ ≥ 0 be the lowest subsidy needed to satisfy participation constraints in an auction; t′
guarantees that supplier 1 breaks even. Then, the bonus tournament with P = {∆q(v∗1, v∗2), 0}
and t = t′ +
∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ implements the social optimum. Again, the
participation constraint of supplier 1 binds, while supplier 2 obtains positive surplus. However,
the surplus of supplier 2 is lower in the bonus tournament than in the auction since
∫ v∗1+v∗2
2
v∗1
(q (v∗1, σ)− q (v∗2, σ)) f (σ) dσ <
∫ v∗2
v∗1+v
∗
2
2
(q (v∗2, σ)− q (v∗1, σ)) f (σ) dσ
implies that
t+ (1− F (v∗2)) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) < t′+
∫ v∗2
v∗1+v
∗
2
2
(q (v∗2, σ)− q (v∗1, σ)) f (σ) dσ+ (1− F (v∗2)) ∆q (v∗1, v∗2) .
Hence, the buyer is better off in the bonus tournament than in the auction.
B.6.3 Proof of Lemma 2.5
This section provides the proof of Lemma 2.5 from Section 2.5.2.3. Suppose that there are n
suppliers and that assumption (A1)” holds. Consider an FPT with two prizes A1 > A2 > 0,
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where the supplier with the highest quality receives A1 and the supplier with the second-highest
quality receives A2.6 For notational convenience, suppose that v1 ≤ v2 ≤ · · · ≤ vn. We first
provide an intermediate result.
Lemma B.4. If v1, v2, . . . , vn is an equilibrium of an FPT with two prizes, then v1 = v2 = v3
and vn−2 = vn−1 = vn.
Proof. We will prove that v1 = v2 = v3. The other claim follows by an analogous argument.
Step 1: v1 = v2. Suppose not. Then v1 < v2. Thus, the revenue of supplier 1 is
Π1 (v1, v−1) =
v1 + v2
2 A1 +
v3 − v2
2 A2.
Therefore, a deviation to any v′1 ∈ (v1, v2) increases the probability of winning the first prize,
while not affecting the probability of winning the second prize. Hence, it is profitable.
Step 2: v1 = v2 < v3 = v4 cannot be an equilibrium. Denote with P i,1σ<vi the probability that
supplier i wins the first prize when σ < vi. Analogously define the probabilities of winning
when the state is greater than the chosen approach and the probabilities of winning the second
prize. By random tie breaking we have P 1,1σ<v1 = P
2,1
σ<v2 = P
1,2
σ<v1 = P
2,2
σ<v2 and P
1,1
σ>v1 = P
2,1
σ>v2 =
P 1,2σ>v1 = P
2,2
σ>v2 . We will show that P
1,1
σ<v1 = P
1,1
σ>v1 . Suppose that this was not true. First,
suppose P 1,1σ<v1 > P
1,1
σ>v1 . Then, there exist ε, ε′, ε′′ > 0 arbitrarily small such that a deviation
v′1 = v1 − ε leads to revenues
Π1
(
v′1, v−1
)
= 2
(
P 1,1σ<v1 − ε′
)
A1 + 2
(
P 1,1σ>v1 − ε′′
)
A2.
For sufficiently small ε this constitutes a profitable deviation. The case P 1,1σ<v1 < P
1,1
σ>v1 follows
by an analogous argument, but the incentives to deviate are even stronger.
Now suppose that P 1,1σ<v1 = P
1,1
σ>v1 and v1 = v2 < v3 = v4. We will show that this cannot be an
equilibrium. In the proposed equilibrium P 1,1σ<v1 = v1/2 and P
1,1
σ<v1 +P
1,1
σ>v1 = P
1,2
σ<v1 +P
1,2
σ>v1 = v1.
Hence, the expected revenue is
Π1 (v1, v−1) = v1A1 + v1A2.
For any deviation v′1 ∈ (v2, v3) the probability of winning the first prize is
v′1 + v3
2 −
v′1 + v2
2 =
v3 − v2
2 = v1
where the last equality follows from P 1,1σ<v1 = P
1,1
σ>v1 . Using v3 = v4, the probability of winning
the second prize is
v2 + v′1
2 > v1
thus it follows that Π1 (v′1, v−1) > Π1 (v1, v−1).
Step 3: v1 = v2 < v3 < v4 cannot be an equilibrium. The revenue of supplier 1 is
Π1 (v1, v−1) =
v1
2 A1 +
v3 − v1
4 A1 +
v3 + v1
4 A2 +
v4 − v3
4 A2. (B.11)
6Ties are broken randomly, with equal chance of winning for each firm with the respective quality.
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Consider a deviation to v′1 ∈ (v1, v3). The revenue is
Π1
(
v′1, v−1
)
= v3 − v12 A1 +
v′1 + v1
2 A2 +
v4 − v3
2 A2.
If Π1 (v′1, v−1) > Π1 (v1, v−1), then this is a profitable deviation. If Π1 (v′1, v−1) ≤ Π1 (v1|v−1) is
equivalent with
v1
2 A1 −
v3 − v1
4 A1 +
v3 − v1
4 A2 −
v′1
2 A2 −
v4 − v3
4 A2 ≥ 0 (B.12)
But consider in that case a deviation to v′′1 = v1 − ε for small positive ε. The expected revenue
is
Π1
(
v′′1 , v−1
)
= v
′′
1 + v1
2 A1 +
v3 − v1
2 A2
and limε→0 Π1 (v′′1 , v−1) = v1A1 + v3−v12 A2. Together with (B.11), this implies
lim
ε→0 Π1
(
v′′1 , v−1
)−Π1 (v1, v−1) = v12 A1 + v3 − v14 A2 − v3 − v14 A1 − v12 A2 − v4 − v34 A2.
Since v′1 > v1, (B.12) implies limε→0 Π1 (v′′1 , v−1)− Π1 (v1, v−1) > 0. Hence, there always exists
ε > 0 small enough such that Π1 (v′′1 , v−1)−Π1 (v1, v−1) > 0.
The lemma implies that the maximal number of active approaches in an FPT with two prizes
is n−4. By Lemma B.3 an FPT with a single prize implements an equilibrium with n−2 active
approaches. By Lemma 2.4(ii), it is possible to implement the socially optimal allocation with
n− 2 approaches in an FPT with a single prize. Implementing this equilibrium in a single-prize
FPT, where the prize size is the sum of the two prizes in an FPT with two prizes, strictly
increases the total payoff. On the other hand, the payoff of the suppliers remains the same, so
the expected buyer payoff strictly increases.
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C.1 Proof of Proposition 3.1
The proposition is established in two steps. First, we provide conditions for the first-best solution
to be such that all N sellers conduct research in every period until a breakthrough is achieved
after which search is stopped completely. Second, we show that if Assumption 3.1 holds, then
the conditions identified in the first step hold as well.
Let n(θ, t) be a function which specifies the number of sellers which in the first-best do
research given period t and the current highest quality is θ. Gal et al. (1981) and Morgan
(1983) have shown that n(θ, t) is decreasing in θ and increasing in t. Denote with nθ(θk, t) =
n(θk+1, t) − n(θk, t) and nt(θk, t) = n(θk, t + 1) − n(θk, t) the change in the optimal number of
sellers due to an increase in θ or t respectively.
Step 1: We begin by showing that n(θb−1, 1) = N is a sufficient condition for n(θ, t) = N for
all θ < θb and all t ≥ 1. Recall that nt(θ, t) ≥ 0. Thus, we have n(θb−1, t) = N for all t ≥ 1.
Further, recall that nθ(θ, t) ≤ 0. Consequently, n(θb−1, 1) = N implies n(θs, 1) = N for all
s ∈ {1, . . . , b− 1}. Analogously, n(θb−1, T ) = N implies n(θs, T ) = N for all s ∈ {1, . . . , b− 1}.
Taking this together we have n(θ, t) = N for all θ < θb and all t ≥ 1.
We next show that n(θb, T ) = 0 is a sufficient condition for n(θ, t) = 0 for all θ ≥ θb and all
t ≥ 1. It follows from nt(θ, t) ≥ 0 that n(θb, t) = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Further, because nθ(θ, t) ≤ 0
we must have n(θ, t) = 0 for all θ ≥ θb and all t ≥ 1.
Step 2: Next, we show that Assumption 3.1 implies that the conditions identified in Step 1
hold. Note that n(θb, T ) = 0 is equivalent to
F (θb)θb +
K∑
j=b+1
(
F (θj)− F (θj−1)
)
θj − θb < C.
The left-hand side of the inequality is the expected benefit of conducting research with one seller
in the last period given that the an innovation of quality θb is already available. The right-hand
side is the cost of doing research with a single seller. We can rearrange the inequality to obtain
(
F (θb)− 1
)
θb +
(
1− F (θb)
)
θb +
K∑
j=b+1
(
F (θj)− F (θj−1)
) (
θj − θb
)
< C
K∑
j=b+1
(
F (θj)− F (θj−1)
) (
θj − θb
)
< C
This inequality is satisfied for any F if (
θK − θb
)
≤ C
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which holds by Assumption 3.1(i).
We will now show that if Assumption 3.1(ii) holds, then n(θb−1, 1) ≥ N . Note that to
demonstrate that n(θb−1, 1) ≥ N it is enough to show that having N sellers conduct research
is better than N − 1. First, we cannot have more than N sellers, and second, Morgan (1983,
Proposition 2) shows that the expected benefit of conducting research within a period is concave
in the number of sellers. Thus, if it is better to have N than N − 1 sellers, it is also better
than having N − s for s ≥ 1 sellers. Let V (θ, t) denote the value of having quality θ in period
t given an optimal continuation in subsequent periods. Then, we can write the expected payoff
of having N sellers conduct research in period 1 given that we have quality θb−1 as
FN (θb−1)V (θb−1, 2) + θb(1− FN (θb−1)) +M(N)−NC
where M(N) = ∑Kj=b+1 (FN (θj)− FN (θj−1)) (θj − θb). The expected payoff of having N − 1
sellers conduct research is
FN−1(θb−1)V (θb−1, 2) + θb(1− FN−1(θb−1)) +M(N − 1)− (N − 1)C.
Thus, havingN firms is better if the difference between the two inequalities is weakly positive,
which reads
(1− F (θb−1))FN−1(θb−1)
[
θb − V (θb−1, 2)
]
+ (M(N)−M(N − 1))− C ≥ 0.
Consider now the value θb such that the inequality holds with equality, i.e., such that we are
indifferent between N and N − 1 sellers. This implies that we would rather have N than
N − s sellers for s ≥ 2 by the within-period concavity in the number of sellers. Moreover, since
nt(θ, t) ≥ 0 the θb which induces indifference in period 1 is such that for any period t ≥ 2 having
N firms is weakly better than having N − 1 firms, too. Therefore, the optimal continuation is
to always employ N firms. Hence,
V (θb−1, 2) =FN(T−1)(θb−1)θb−1 + (1− FN(T−1)(θb−1))
(
θb(1− FN (θb−1)) +M(N)
)
−NC
T−1∑
j=1
FNj(θb−1)j,
because either we continue to have a quality of θb−1 until the end, or at some point we have a
breakthrough.
Therefore,
θb ≥ θ¯ = 1
1− (1− FN(T−1)(θb−1))(1− FN (θb−1)) ×
(
C − (M(N)−M(N − 1))
(1− F (θb−1))FN−1(θb−1)
− FN(T−1)(θb−1)θb−1 + (1− FN(T−1)(θb−1))M(N)−NC
T−1∑
j=1
FNj(θb−1)j
)
is a sufficient condition on θb.
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C.2 Proof of Proposition 3.2
The result follows as a special case (such that Nt = Nt+1 for all t) of Propositon 3.5.
C.3 Proof of Proposition 3.3
The result follows because the first-best is a global stopping rule with a fixed number of sellers
(Proposition 3.1) and a dynamic fixed prize tournament can implement any global stopping rule
with a fixed number of sellers (Proposition 3.2).
C.4 Proof of Proposition 3.4
Fix the number of sellers to N . Then any round of research yields a draw from the distribution
FN = G. Hence, we can reformulate the problem to one of either one seller with distribution G
doing research to no research taking place at all. Then, the proof in Gal et al. (1981, p. 605)
with setting K = 1 goes through directly proving the result.
C.5 Proof of Proposition 3.5
The tournament 〈E,p,N〉 induces a game of incomplete information with the set of players
being the buyer and the set of sellers N which is given by all the sellers that are active in the
tournament at some point. Abusing notation, let |N | = N . In what follows we prove that there
exists a sequential equilibrium in this game in which the sellers will conduct research in every
period until they reach an innovation of quality at least θg, which they submit to the buyer, who
will then stop the tournament. Thus, the equilibrium induces a global stopping rule. We begin
by formally describing the game of incomplete information and characterize the equilibrium
candidate. We then prove that this equilibrium candidate is indeed a sequential equilibrium
using the one-shot deviation principle by Hendon et al. (1996).
The Game
The tournament 〈E,p,N〉 induces the following extensive form game of incomplete information:
G = 〈I,H, α, F, (Ii)i∈I , (ui)i∈I〉. The set of players is I = {B,S1, . . . , SN}. The set H is the set
of histories, where the set of terminal histories is denoted Z and the actions available after the
non-terminal history h is denoted A(h) = {a : (h, a) ∈ H}. Note that sellers who have been
eliminated cannot report an innovation anymore and that sellers who have not yet been added
to the tournament cannot do research. The function α assigns to each non-terminal history a
member of I, i.e., α is the player function. The set of initial histories is the finite set of the
states of the world ΘNT . The true initial history is θ ∈ Θ, where each element θit ∈ Θ (where
i ∈ 1, . . . , N and t ∈ 1, . . . , T ) is drawn i.i.d. from the probability distribution F . A seller i who
conducts research in period t receives quality equal to θit. For each player i ∈ I a partition Ii
of {h ∈ H : α(h) = i} with the property that A(h) = A(h′), whenever h and h′ are in the same
member of the partition. The function ui : Z → R maps for each player i the payoff at each of
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the terminal nodes. For the sellers the payoffs are determined by the research costs they have
incurred, the entry fee they pay (or receive) if they enter the contest, and the prize they receive.
The buyer’s payoff is determined by the quality of the innovation she gets, the entry fees of the
participants, and the prize she pays to the winning seller. In what follows we will use the terms
doing research and investing (in research) interchangeably.
Timing
Period 0:
- All N invited sellers decide whether to enter or not. If they enter they pay the entry fee
Et according to what period they are supposed to start.
Period t < T :
- Stage 1: Each seller simultaneously decides whether to perform research at cost C. Sellers
do not observe the actions taken by their competitors.
- Stage 2: Each seller i who conducted research receives quality equal to θit. All other sellers
receive quality 0.
- Stage 3: Having privately observed the value of their innovation, sellers simultaneously
decide whether to privately submit their best innovation.
- Stage 4: The buyer observes the set of submissions. If there have been no submissions,
the buyer cannot end the tournament. If there have been submissions, the buyer decides
whether to declare a winner or not. If a winner is declared the tournament stops, the
buyer obtains the winning innovation and the seller who submitted the winning innovation
receives the prize pt. If the tournament continues and the set of sellers has to be reduced to
Nt+1, the buyer selects Nt+1 sellers depending on their submission (if necessary randomly)
to continue. If the tournament continues and the set of sellers has to be increased to Nt+1,
Nt+1 −Nt sellers who paid Et+1 entry fee join in the next period.
Period T :
- Stages 1-3: As above.
- Stage 4: The tournament stops and the buyer has to declare a winner whose submissions
the buyer then obtains in exchange for the prize pT . If no seller submitted, the prize is
randomly allocated.
Equilibrium Candidate
Denote with θi|h the highest quality available to player i at history h. For sellers, this is the
highest quality they have so far discovered. For buyers, this is the highest quality currently
submitted. The equilibrium candidate (σ, µ) is defined as follows:
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Sellers If A(h) = {Invest, Not Invest} = {I,NI} then
σi(h) =
I if θ
i|h < θˆ(h)
NI else
, (C.1)
where θˆ : H → Θ. If A(h) = {Submit, Not Submit} = {S,NS} then
σi(h) =
S if θ
i|h ≥ θg
NS else
. (C.2)
As we already noted, a seller who has not been added to the tournament cannot invest
and a seller who has been eliminated cannot submit any innovation.
Equilibrium beliefs of seller i are as follows. Denote a history in the period t′ as ht′ . Let
the last period when the buyer i has not observed a deviation by the seller be te|h′t. This
means that in period te, seller i did not submit and that in all periods te + 1, . . . , t′ − 1
the seller i submitted a quality over θg but the buyer did not end the tournament. The
beliefs that the element of state of the world θ˜ in some period t and for a player j, where
the true state of the world is θjt are given by the following cases.
• Own elements of the state of the world (i = j):
µijt(θk|ht′) =

1 if t ≤ t′, ait|ht′ = I and θk = θjt
0 if t ≤ t′, ait|ht′ = I and θk 6= θjt
F (θk)− F (θk−1) else
. (C.3)
• Others’ elements of the state of the world (i 6= j):
µijt(θk|ht′) =

F (θk)−F (θk−1)
F (θg−1) if t ≤ te|ht′ and θk < θg
0 if t ≤ te|ht′ and θk ≥ θg
F (θk)− F (θk−1) else
. (C.4)
For own elements, the seller learns exact state if he invests, if he does not, or if the chance
to invest has not occurred yet, he holds initial beliefs. For the others’ elements, once a
period starts after a no deviation from the buyer, the seller concludes that everybody has
invested up to that point and that nobody has a quality higher than θg. This implies that
each individual θjt is drawn from the truncated distribution. If the seller observes that the
buyer deviated, he learns nothing about the realization of the state in that period, hence
he should hold the initial beliefs. For all the states which have not been revealed yet, the
seller holds initial beliefs.
Buyer Consider any information set at which the buyer is moving, i.e., there has been at least
one submission. The buyer stops the game if and only if there has been a submission of
quality at least θg. The buyer’s beliefs need to be specified only when there has been at
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least one submission, as the buyer doesn’t move if there hasn’t been any. If there has
been a submission, the beliefs are as follows. For any seller who has not submitted an
innovation, the buyer believes that research has been conducted in every period, yet the
draws were always below θg. For a firm which submitted an innovation, the buyer believes
that research has been conducted in every period and that the submission is the currently
highest quality.
There is no profitable one-shot deviation for the buyer
First, observe that the buyer cannot stop the tournament in any period if no firm submits an
innovation. Thus we only need to consider cases where at least one firm has submitted an
innovation. Further, whenever the buyer declares a winner, she will always choose the highest
submission. Moreover, in period T the tournament ends in any case and consequently the buyer
simply declares the highest quality innovation the winner.
Period T− 1
Let the expected highest quality after one additional round of research by M firms, given that
the current highest quality is θk ∈ Θ, be given by a function R : Θ× N→ [θ1, θK ]. That is
R
(
θk,M
)
= F (θk)Mθk +
K∑
j=k+1
(
F (θj)M − F (θj−1)M
)
θj .
Suppose the sellers play the candidate equilibrium strategy. Consider the incentives of the buyer
in the period T − 1, when the highest quality is θk < θg. Stopping the tournament results in
the payoff θk − pT−1 while continuing the tournament yields her R
(
θk, NT
)
− pT . The buyer
continues the tournament if and only if
R
(
θk, NT
)
− θk > pT − pT−1.
Next, we show that the LHS of the above inequality is strictly decreasing in θk.
R
(
θk+1, NT
)
− θk−1 −
(
R
(
θk, NT
)
− θk
)
= F (θk+1)NT θk+1 +
K∑
j=k+2
(
F (θj)NT − F (θj−1)N
)
θj − θk+1
− F (θk)NT θk −
K∑
j=k+1
(
F (θj)NT − F (θj−1)NT
)
θj + θk
= F (θk+1)NT θk+1 − θk+1 − F (θk)NT θk −
(
F (θk+1)NT − F (θk)NT
)
θk+1 + θk
= (θk+1 − θk)(F (θk)NT − 1) < 0.
The LHS is strictly decreasing in θk and since R (θg, NT )− θg = pT − pT−1 by construction, the
buyer has no incentive to stop the tournament if θk < θg. If θk > θg and all firms do research
in the period T it still holds R
(
θk, NT
)
− θk < pT − pT−1, hence the buyer does not want to
continue the tournament and, therefore, the buyer stops the tournament in the period T − 1 if
and only if the highest quality is θk ≥ θg.
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If a round of elimination is ahead and there have been more than Nt+1 submissions, the
buyer obviously chooses the best of them to continue. If not, the buyer chooses randomly. If
the buyer has to increase the number of sellers, she chooses Nt+1 − Nt sellers from the set of
previously inactive sellers who paid Et+1 entry fee, all which only have worthless innovations to
begin with.
Period t ≤ T− 2
Step 1. Denote with Vt(µ, pi|θk) the value to the buyer of having the highest quality θk in period
t given that she follows the equilibrium candidate. Then, it follows that Vt(µ, pi|θg) = θg − pt.
In this step, we will show that also
Vt(µ, pi|θg) = F (θg)Nt+1Vt+1(µ, pi|θg) +
K∑
j=g+1
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)Vt+1(µ, pi|θj)
for any t. It suffices to show that
θg − pt = F (θg)Nt+1Vt+1(µ, pi|θg) +
K∑
j=g+1
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)Vt+1(µ, pi|θj).
Obviously, for any θj ≥ θg it holds Vt+1(µ, pi|θj) = θj − pt+1. Substituting
θg − pt = F (θg)Nt+1(θg − pt+1) +
K∑
j=g+1
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)(θj − pt+1)
pt+1 − pt = F (θg)Nt+1θg +
K∑
j=g+1
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)θj − θg
which holds by definition for any t.
Step 2. In this step we show that for any pair θk, θk+1 such that θk+1 ≤ θg it holds that
Vt(µ, pi|θk+1)− Vt(µ, pi|θk) = F (θk)Nt+1(Vt+1(µ, pi|θk+1)− Vt+1(µ, pi|θk)).
We have
Vt(µ, pi|θk) = F (θk)Nt+1Vt+1(µ, pi|θk) +
K∑
j=k+1
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)Vt+1(µ, pi|θj)
By Step 1, an equivalent expression holds for Vt(µ, pi|θk+1). Expanding Vt(µ, pi|θk+1)−Vt(µ, pi|θk)
we get:
Vt(µ, pi|θk+1)− Vt(µ, pi|θk)
= F (θk+1)Nt+1Vt+1(µ, pi|θk+1) +
K∑
j=k+2
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)Vt+1(µ, pi|θj)
− F (θk)Nt+1Vt+1(µ, pi|θk)−
K∑
j=k+1
(F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1)Vt+1(µ, pi|θj)
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= F (θk)Nt+1(Vt+1(µ, pi|θk+1)− Vt+1(µ, pi|θk))
Step 3. In this step we show that for any t ≤ T −2 and any θk < θg, the buyer does not stop the
tournament, i.e., there is no profitable one-shot deviation. Stopping the tournament in period t
yields the payoff of θk − pt. Thus, it suffices to show that Vt(µ, pi|θk) > θk − pt for any θk < θg.
Observe that Vt(µ, pi|θg)− θg + pt = 0. We will show that Vt(µ, pi|θk)− θk is strictly decreasing
in θk for any θk < θg. The result then follows. This is equivalent to
Vt(µ, pi|θk+1)− θk+1 − (Vt(µ, pi|θk)− θk) < 0,
where θk+1 ≤ θg. By Step 2 we can write
F (θk)Nt+1(Vt+1(µ, pi|θk+1)− Vt+1(µ, pi|θk))− (θk+1 − θk) < 0
Observe that VT (θk+1)− VT (θk) = θk+1 − θk. Iterating Step 2 we get
F (θk)Nt+1(Vt+1(θk+1)− Vt+1(θk)) < (θk+1 − θk)
and thus a one-shot deviation is not profitable.
Step 4. In this step we show that the buyer stops the tournament whenever θk > θg, i.e. we
show that there is no profitable one-shot deviation in this case either. Consider a quality of
θk ≥ θg in period t and suppose the buyer does not stop the tournament. She will for sure stop
the tournament in period t + 1, however, as we consider only a one-shot deviation. The buyer
stops the tournament if
θk − pt > F (θk)Nt+1θk +
K∑
j=k+1
(
F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1
)
θj − pt+1
or, equivalently, if
pt+1 − pt > F (θk)Nt+1θk +
K∑
j=k+1
(
F (θj)Nt+1 − F (θj−1)Nt+1
)
θj − θk.
From our period T analysis we know that the RHS is strictly decreasing in θk, and by
construction it is equal to the LHS for θk = θg. Hence whenever θk > θg, the inequality holds
and the buyer stops the tournament.
Step 5. If a round of elimination is ahead and there have been more than Nt+1 submissions,
the buyer obviously chooses the best of them to continue. If not, the buyer chooses randomly.
If the buyer has to increase the number of sellers, she chooses Nt+1 −Nt sellers from the set of
previously inactive sellers who paid Et+1 entry fee, all which only have worthless innovations to
begin with.
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There is no profitable one-shot deviation at the research stage for the seller
Let pi′ the a strategy profile that coincides with the equilibrium candidate pi with the exception
of the seller i’s action in the investment stage in period t. Thus, it is a one-shot deviation.
Recall that
pt = p1 +
t∑
i=2
∆(θg, Ni),
where
∆(θg, n) = F (θg)n θg +
K∑
j=g+1
(
F (θj)n − F (θj−1)n
)
θj − θg,
In what follows, we show two things. First, for a sufficiently high p1 there exists a θ ∈ Θ with
θg ≤ θ < θK such that investing is optimal for all θk ≤ θ. Second, for each p1 there exists a
θ ∈ Θ with θg ≤ θ < θK such that not investing is optimal for all θk > θ. Notice that in any
period t the seller could win an amount zt ∈ Zt = {0, pt, pt/2, . . . , pt/Nt}. Here, winning zero
amounts to the tournament ending in that period. Thus, the probability that the tournament
continues is given by 1− ∑
z∈Zt
Pµ,pit (z|θk)
 =: W (µ, pi|t, θk).
Further, let Pµ,pit (z|θk) denote the probability of winning some z ∈ Zt. We can then define the
seller’s expected winnings in period t as
Z(µ, pi|θk, t) = ptPµ,pi(pt|θk),
where
Pµ,pi(pt|θk) =
Nt−1∑
n=0
Pµ,pit (pt/(n+ 1)|θk)
n+ 1
denotes the probability of winning in period t conditional on reaching period t with quality θk.
Notice that we have
Pµ,pi(pt|θi) = Pµ,pi(pt|θj), ∀θi, θj < θg; t < T.
Further, for all θk < θg and t < s < T (i.e., any subsequent period after the deviation except the
last one) we have Pµ,pi(ps|θk) = Pµ,pi′(ps|θk). In period t, when the deviation takes place, we have
Pµ,pi(pt|θk) > Pµ,pi′(pt|θk) = 0 for any θk < θg and in the final period we have Pµ,pi(pT |θk) ≥
Pµ,pi′(pT |θk) for any θk < θg. Further, notice that the investment costs incurred up to any
period s ≥ t is greater under pi than under pi′ by exactly C, the investment cost from period
t. Note that the probability of winning in period t < T does not depend on the quality at the
beginning of the period (since we consider one-shot deviations all qualities will be below the
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threshold), because all that matters is whether a quality above the threshold is drawn in period
t. Thus, we can drop the quality and write Pµ,pi(pt|θk) = Pµ,pi(pt), but we need to keep in mind
that this is only without loss for t < T , as the current quality matters for winning in the last
period, too.
Moreover, Ii(µ, pi|θk, t) ∈ {0, 1} denotes the seller’s investment decision. With this in hand
we can define the expected utility of the assessment (µ, pi) in period t when having a highest
quality θk by
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t) = Z(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ii(µ, pi|θk, t)C +W (µ, pi|t, θk)U˜i(µ, pi|t+ 1),
where
U˜i(µ, pi|t+ 1)
= Ii(µ, pi|θk, t)
F (θk)Ui(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1) + g−1∑
x=k+1
(F (θx)− F (θx−1))Ui(µ, pi|θx, t+ 1)

+ (1− Ii(µ, pi|θk, t))Ui(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1).
Note that the history is not an argument of the expected utility Ui(µ, pi|θk, t). The reason is
that any investment cost incurred up to period t are sunk and do not matter for the decision in
period t and only the highest quality is relevant, but not how (i.e., at what point in the past) the
seller got it. Moreover, the continuation utility U˜i(µ, pi|t+ 1) is different depending on whether
or not the seller invests in period t. In case of investment the seller could start period t with a
highest quality ranging from θk to θg−1, but not above, as for any quality above θg she would
have submitted it in ended the tournament.
Part 1: Investment is optimal up to some θ
We begin by showing that for a sufficiently high p1 there exists a θ ∈ Θ with θg ≤ θ < θK such
that investing is optimal for all θk ≤ θ. Thus, we need to show that
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, t) ≥ 0 (C.5)
for all θk ≤ θ for sufficiently high p1. We will do so by showing that inequality (C.5) is satisfied
for any θk < θK for sufficiently high p1. We can rewrite the LHS of inequality (C.5) to
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, t) =
− C + pt(Pµ,pi(pt)− Pµ,pi′(pt))
+W (µ, pi|t, θk)
F (θk)Ui(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1) + g−1∑
x=k+1
(F (θx)− F (θx−1))Ui(µ, pi|θx, t+ 1)

−W (µ, pi′|t, θk)Ui(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1).
Note the following about the term Ui(µ, pi|θk, t + 1) at the very end. This is the continuation
value of the one-shot deviation pi′. Yet, the argument in the function is the equilibrium candidate
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pi. The reason for this is that in period t + 1 the only thing that matters is the strategy (and
belief) for periods after and including t + 1 (and there pi and pi′ coincide) and all that matters
from past periods is the highest quality. We need to consider two cases. First the case when the
currently highest quality is below θg, and second the case when the currently highest quality is
at least θg.
Case 1 Suppose θk < θg. Begin by considering period T . The LHS of inequality (C.5) then
simplifies to
Ui(µ, pi|θk, T )− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, T ) =
− C + pT (Pµ,pi(pT |θk)− Pµ,pi′(pT |θk))
because the tournament ends for sure. Notice that Pµ,pi(pT |θk)−Pµ,pi′(pT |θk) > 0. To see
this, note that we are comparing the probabilities of winning the tournament (in a tie or
outright) for the case of no research in the last period with the case of another round of
research in the last period. Clearly, if the seller invests there is a strictly higher chance of
winning. Thus, inequality (C.5) is satisfied for sufficiently large p1.
Now consider any period t < T . We can write the expected utility of the equilibrium
strategy as
ptPµ,pi(pt)− C +
(
T∑
s=t+1
(−C + psPµ,pi(ps))
s−1∏
i=t
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)
)
and the utility of the one-shot deviation as
T∑
s=t+1
(
−C + psPµ,pi′(ps)
)
F−1(θg−1)
s−1∏
i=t
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t),
where Qµ,pi(t) is the probability that the seller will still be in the tournament given that it
continues. This captures the risk of being eliminated. We have Qµ,pi′(t) ≤ Qµ,pi(t) because
not investing yields a lower expected innovation and therefore a higher chance of being
eliminated.
Recall that we can write prizes as pt = p1 +
∑T
i=2 ∆(θg, Ni). Making use of this we can
write the expected utility of the equilibrium strategy as
ptPµ,pi(pt)− C +
(
T∑
s=t+1
(−C + psPµ,pi(ps))
s−1∏
i=t
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)
)
= p1Pµ,pi(pt) + p1
(
T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi(ps)
s−1∏
i=t
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)
)
+K
where K contains all the terms that are not a function of p1.
We can proceed accordingly for the expected utility of the one-shot deviation. Then
the difference between the equilibrium candidate and the one-shot deviation corresponds
exactly to the LHS of inequality (C.5). Dropping all the terms that do not depend on p1
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this difference then reads
p1
Pµ,pi(pt) +
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi(ps)FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)

− p1
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi′(ps)FNt−1(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)

Recall that Pµ,pi(ps) = Pµ,pi′(ps) for all t < s < T and Pµ,pi(pT ) ≥ Pµ,pi′(pT ) and that
Qµ,pi
′(t) ≤ Qµ,pi(t). Thus, for the inequality to be satisfied we need
Pµ,pi(pt) +
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi(ps)FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi(t)

−
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi′(ps)FNt−1(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)

≥ Pµ,pi(pt) +
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi′(ps)FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)

−
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi′(ps)FNt−1(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)

= Pµ,pi(pt) + FNt(θg−1)
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi′(ps)Qµ,pi′(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)

− FNt−1(θg−1)
 T∑
s=t+1
Pµ,pi′(ps)Qµ,pi′(t)
s−1∏
i=t+1
FNt(θg−1)Qµ,pi′(t)

= Pµ,pi(pt)− FNt−1(θg−1)(1− F (θg−1))R
≥ 0
to be positive. Note that that R ≤ 1 as R is the total probability of winning the tournament
(either tied or outright). Thus, what remains to be shown in order for the inequality (C.5)
to be satisfied is that
Pµ,pi(pt) + FNt−1(θg−1)(F (θg−1)− 1) ≥ 0.
We can write
Pµ,pi(pt) =
K∑
k=g
(F (θk)− F (θk−1))
Nt−1∑
n=0
(
N − 1
n
)
FNt−1−n(θk−1)
(
F (θk)− F (θk−1)
)n
n+ 1 .
The lowest quality with which the seller can win in period t < T is θg, which she gets with
a probability F (θg)− F (θg−1). In addition, to win outright, all others must draw at most
C Appendix 149
θg−1. The probability of winning when tying with one is
(
Nt − 1
1
)
FNt−2(θk−1)
(
F (θk)− F (θk−1)
)
2
as Nt−2 sellers must draw at most θg−1 and exactly one must draw θg, too, and there are
Nt − 1 different ways of getting there and then there is a 1/2 chance of winning the tie.
Proving that inequality (C.5) is satisfied then boils down to proving
FNt−1(θg−1)(F (θg−1)− 1)
+
K∑
k=g
(F (θk)− F (θk−1))
N−1∑
n=0
(
N − 1
n
)
FN−1−n(θk−1)
(
F (θk)− F (θk−1))n
n+ 1 ≥ 0.
To see that this is indeed the case some steps are needed.
FNt−1(θg−1)(F (θg−1)− 1)
+
K∑
k=g
(F (θk)− F (θk−1))
Nt−1∑
n=0
(
Nt − 1
n
)
FNt−1−n(θk−1)
(
F (θk)− F (θk−1))n
n+ 1
≥ FNt−1(θg−1)(F (θg−1)− 1) +
K∑
k=g
(F (θk)− F (θk−1))FNt−1(θk−1)
≥ FNt−1(θg−1)(F (θg−1)− 1) + FNt−1(θg−1)
K∑
k=g
(F (θk)− F (θk−1))
= FNt−1(θg−1)(F (θg−1)− 1) + FNt−1(θg−1)(1− F (θg−1))
= 0.
The first inequality follows by considering only the first element of the binomial sum (that is, only
the outright wins).
Case 2 Suppose θg ≤ θk < θK . In this case, the game will end with certainty in this period
and the LHS of inequality (C.5) reads
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, t) =
− C + (p1 +
T∑
i=2
∆(θg, Ni))(Pµ,pi(pt)− Pµ,pi′(pt)).
Thus, for a sufficiently high p1, not investing is not a profitable deviation.
Part 2: Investment is not optimal above some θ
We will now show that for each p1 there exists a θ ∈ Θ with θg ≤ θ < θK such that not investing
is optimal for all θk > θ. It is obvious that for a quality of θK it is never optimal to invest, as
research is costly. So there will always exist a quality level above which not investing is optimal.
What we remains to be shown is that if there is a θ < θK such that not investing is optimal at
θ, then for all θk ≥ θ not investing is optimal, too. We do this by showing that whenever it is
optimal not to invest for θk, then it is also optimal not to invest for θk+1. The proof is then
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completed by induction.
Consider some θk ≥ θ ≥ θg. Abusing notation, let Z(µ, pi|θk, t) denote the expected winnings
after the investment stage. Thus, we can write the expected utility of having highest quality θk
and investing in that period as
F (θk)Z(µ, pi|θk, t) +
K∑
m=k+1
(F (θm)− F (θm−1))Z(µ, pi|θm, t)− C
while the expected utility of having highest quality θk and not investing in that period is
Z(µ, pi|θk, t). By assumption we have
Z(µ, pi|θk, t)−
F (θk)Z(µ, pi|θk, t) + K∑
m=k+1
(F (θm)− F (θm−1))Z(µ, pi|θm, t)− C
 ≥ 0.
We now show that this implies
Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t)−
F (θk+1)Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t) + K∑
m=k+2
(F (θm)− F (θm−1))Z(µ, pi|θm, t)− C

≥ 0.
We have
Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t)−
(
F (θk+1)Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t) +
K∑
m=k+2
(F (θm)− F (θm−1))Z(µ, pi|θm, t)− C
)
− Z(µ, pi|θk, t) +
(
F (θk)Z(µ, pi|θk, t) +
K∑
m=k+1
(F (θm)− F (θm−1))Z(µ, pi|θm, t)− C
)
= Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t)− Z(µ, pi|θk, t)− F (θk+1)Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t)
+ F (θk)Z(µ, pi|θk, t) + (F (θk+1)− F (θk))Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t)
= (1− F (θk))(Z(µ, pi|θk+1, t)− Z(µ, pi|θk, t))
≥ 0
and therefore not investing is optimal for θk+1 given that not investing was optimal at θk.
There is no profitable one-shot deviation at the submission stage for the seller
Let pi′ denote the one-shot deviation of seller i in period t at the submission stage. Observe
that submitting an innovation that has quality below θg is never profitable, unless a round of
elimination is ahead. Then, any seller should submit their highest innovation as this increases
the chance of being allowed to continue. If no round of elimination is ahead, submitting below
θg is not profitable. Thus we only need to consider the decision of a seller who has an innovation
of quality θk ≥ θg. Let Si(µ, pi|θk, t) ∈ {0, 1} denote seller i’s submission decision in period t
with highest quality θk. Given that we consider the submission stage with θk ≥ θg we can write
utility as follows
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t) = Si(µ, pi|θk, t)Z(µ, pi|θk, t) +
(
1− Si(µ, pi|θk, t)
)
Qµ,pi(t)U˜i(µ, pi|t+ 1),
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where
Z(µ, pi|θk, t) = pt
N−1∑
n=0
Pµ,pit (pt/(n+ 1)|θk)
n+ 1 ,
and
U˜i(µ, pi|t+ 1) = Ii(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1)
(
(F (θk)Ui(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1)+
K∑
x=k+1
(F (θx)− F (θx−1))Ui(µ, pi|θx, t+ 1)− C
)
+ (1− Ii(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1))Ui(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1).
The term Pµ,pit (z|θk) captures the probability of winning prize t in period t when the seller’s
highest quality is θk after the investment stage in t. Thus, Z(µ, pi|θk, t) captures the expected
winning after the investment stage. Moreover, the cost of investment in period t is already
sunk at the submission stage and does not show up. The term U˜i(µ, pi|t+ 1) corresponds to the
continuation value the seller receives when she does not submit. Recall that submitting will end
the game for sure, as the buyer is playing according to the equilibriums strategy and the seller
has a quality θk ≥ θg. Even if the seller does not submit, the game may still end if another
seller submitted a sufficiently high quality or because the seller is eliminated. Thus we weight
the continuation value by that probability that the contest indeed continues to the next period
and denote this Qµ,pi(t). The continuation value itself differs depending on whether the seller
will invest in period t or not.
Submitting is profitable if
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, t) ≥ 0. (C.6)
Step 1. Suppose θk is sufficiently high so that the seller would not invest in the following period.
We can then rewrite the left-hand side of equation (C.6) to
Ui(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, t)
= Z(µ, pi|θk, t)−Qµ,pi′(t)Z(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1)
= p1
N−1∑
n=0
[
Pµ,pit (pt/(n+ 1)|θk)−Qµ,pi
′(t)Pµ,pi
′
t+1 (pt+1/(n+ 1)|θk)
]
n+ 1 +R1 −R2,
where the terms R1 and R2 do not depend on p1. Further, the term in the brackets in the sum is
strictly positive. Hence, increasing p1 increases the difference Ui(µ, pi|θk, t)− Ui(µ, pi′|θk, t) and
thus, for sufficiently large p1, the inequality is satisfied.
Step 2. Suppose θk is sufficiently low so that the seller would still invest in the following period.
If the seller submits, she will get any prize zt ∈ Zt = {0, pt, pt/2, . . . , pt/Nt} and the game will
end for sure, as she is submitting a quality θk ≥ θg. Suppose the state of the world is such
that she would receive a price zt ∈ Zt \ {pt}, i.e., she will not win outright. Not submitting
would mean that the contest ends and she receives no prize, as there is (at least) one other seller
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with a quality θ ≥ θk ≥ θg. Since we have zt ≥ 0 for all zt ∈ Zt \ {pt}, submitting is yields a
weakly higher payoff in those states of the world than not submitting. Suppose next that the
state of the world is such that the highest valuation among the other sellers is θ and we have
θg ≤ θ < θk. Thus, the seller would win outright if she submits and if she does not submit she
receives nothing and the tournament ends. Thus, submitting yields a strictly higher payoff than
not submitting. Finally, suppose the state of the world is such that the highest quality among
the other seller is θ and we have θ < θg. Thus, submitting would yield a prize of pt while not
submitting would yield an expected winning of
Qµ,pi
′(t)Z(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1)
if she does not invest in the subsequent period or
Qµ,pi
′(t)
F (θk)Z(µ, pi|θk, t+ 1) + K∑
x=k+1
(F (θx)− F (θx−1))Z(µ, pi|θx, t+ 1)

if she submits. Given that she chooses optimally between submitting and not submitting, sub-
mitting would yield Z∗, which denotes the maximum of the two above expressions. Essentially,
in this state of the world the seller is trading-off winning the higher prize pt+1 in the next period
with a probability below 1 against winning pt for sure. Thus, for a sufficiently high prize p1 she
will always choose to submit.
C.6 Proof of Proposition 3.6
The proof proceeds in two steps. In the Step 1 we show that extending T is always beneficial for
the buyer in case of a dynamic prize tournament. In Step 2 we show by example that extending
T may be harmful for the buyer in case of a fixed prize dynamic tournament.
Step 1: The expected costs in a dynamic prize tournament, implementing a global stopping
rule θg in a T -period tournament are given by
EKg(θg, N, T ) =
(
T−1∑
t=1
tF (t−1)N (θg−1)(1− FN (θg−1)) + TF (T−1)N (θg−1)
)
NC.
Thus, the marginal cost of extending the tournament to T + 1 periods is
EKg(θg, N, T + 1)− EKg(θg, N, T ) =
=
(
T∑
t=1
tF (t−1)N (θg−1)(1− FN (θg−1)) + (T + 1)F TN (θg−1)
)
NC
−
(
T−1∑
t=1
tF (t−1)N (θg−1)(1− FN (θg−1)) + TF (T−1)N (θg−1)
)
NC
=
(
−TF (T−1)N (θg−1)(FN (θg−1)) + (T + 1)F TN (θg−1)
)
NC
=F TN (θg−1)NC
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and expected quality by EQg(θg, N, T ) = ∑Kk=1 θkhg(θk|θg, N, T ). where
hg(θk|θg, N, T ) =
F
NT (θk)− FNT (θk−1) k < g,∑T
t=1 F
N(t−1)(θg−1)
(
FN (θk)− FN (θk−1)
)
k ≥ g.
Then, the marginal benefit of extending the tournament to T + 1 periods is
EQg(θg, N, T + 1)− EQg(θg, N, T ) =
=
K∑
k=1
θkhg(θk|θg, N, T + 1)−
K∑
k=1
θkhg(θk|θg, N, T )
=
K∑
k=1
θk(hg(θk|θg, N, T + 1)− hg(θk|θg, N, T ))
=
g−1∑
k=1
θk
(
FNT (θk)(FN (θk)− 1)− FNT (θk−1)(FN (θk−1)− 1)
)
+
K∑
k=g
θkFNT (θg−1)
(
FN (θk)− FN (θk−1)
)
(C.7)
The seller benefits from extending the tournament if
F TN (θg−1)NC ≤ (EQg(θg, N, T + 1)− EQg(θg, N, T )) .
From the optimality of θg we know that
NC ≤
K∑
j=g+1
θj
(
FN (θj)− FN (θj−1)
)
− θg
(
1− FN (θg)
)
Thus, to show that the seller benefits from extending the tournament, it is sufficient to show
that
F TN (θg−1)
( K∑
j=g+1
θj(FN (θj)−FN (θj−1))− θg
(
1− FN (θg)
))
≤ (EQg(θg, N, T + 1)− EQg(θg, N, T )) . (C.8)
Combining (C.7) and (C.8) and simplifying, we get that the sufficient condition is
F TN (θg−1)θg(1− FN (θg−1)) ≥
g−1∑
k=1
θk(FNT (θk)(1− FN (θk))− FNT (θk−1)(1− FN (θk−1)))
Recall that F (θ0) = 0 and note that we can write this sum as
g−1∑
k=1
θk(FNT (θk)(1− FN (θk))− FNT (θk−1)(1− FN (θk−1)))
=θ1FNT (θ1)(1− FN (θ1))− θ2FNT (θ1)(1− FN (θ1))
+ θ2FNT (θ2)(1− FN (θ2))− θ3FNT (θ2)(1− FN (θ2))
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...
+ θg−2FNT (θg−2)(1− FN (θg−2))− θg−1FNT (θg−2)(1− FN (θg−2))
+ θg−1FNT (θg−1)(1− FN (θg−1))
=−
g−2∑
k=1
(θk+1 − θk)FNT (θk)(1− FN (θk)) + θg−1FNT (θg−1)(1− FN (θg−1))
This allows us to rewrite the sufficient condition to
(θg − θg−1)F TN (θg−1)(1− FN (θg−1)) ≥ −
g−2∑
k=1
(θk+1 − θk)FNT (θk)(1− FN (θk))
which always holds because θk+1 > θk.
Step 2: To construct an example of a harmful extension of T in case of a fixed prize tournament
we consider a setting with N = 2, Θ = {0, 1} and extend T = 2 to T +1 = 3. Let the probability
of drawing θ1 = 1 be given by pi. We will choose parameters such that the optimal individual
threshold is θi = 1. The expected costs in the case of T = 2 are given by
EK(2, 2) = 2(piC + 2(1− pi)C)
and the expected quality
EQ(2, 2) = 1− (1− pi)4.
In the case of T = 3 we have
EK(2, 3) = 2(piC + 2(1− pi)piC + 3(1− pi)2C)
and the expected quality
EQ(2, 3) = 1− (1− pi)6.
Hence, the change in expected surplus for the buyer is given by
EQ(2, 2)− EK(2, 2)− EQ(2, 3) + EK(2, 3) = (1− pi)2
(
2C − (2− pi)pi(1− pi)2
)
which is negative for C = 1/10 and pi = 2/5. Since
EQ(2, 2)− EK(2, 2) = 1625 −
8
25 > 0
the individual threshold is θi = 1 is indeed optimal.
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D.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
D.1.1 Proof of Lemma 4.1
If-statement. We first show that (IC-R) is implied by (i) - (iii). Note that (IC-R) can be
rewritten as
S(e, θ)− S(e′, θ′) ≥ (θ − θ′)Su(e′, θ′) ∀(e, θ), (e′, θ′) ∈ E ×Θ.
Using (i) and (iii), this is equivalent to the requirement that, ∀e′ ∈ E and ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
∫ θ
θ′
(
Su(e′, s)− Su(e′, θ′)
)
ds ≥ 0,
and this inequality indeed holds since Su(e′, θ) is non-decreasing in θ by (ii).
Only-if-statement. We now proceed to prove that (IC-R) implies (i) - (iii). Note that for
the special case θ′ = θ, (IC-R) is reduced to the requirement that S(e, θ) ≥ S(e′, θ) ∀e, e′ ∈ E.
Interchanging e and e′, we immediately obtain (i). Next, consider the special case where e′ = e.
For this case, (IC-R) requires that, ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ,
S(e, θ) ≥ −St(e, θ′) + θSu(e, θ′) (ICθ,θ′)
and
S(e, θ′) ≥ −St(e, θ) + θ′Su(e, θ). (ICθ′,θ)
Summing up (ICθ,θ′) and (ICθ′,θ) we obtain
(θ − θ′) (Su(e, θ)− Su(e, θ′)) ≥ 0 ∀θ, θ′ ∈ Θ.
Thus, Su(e, θ) must be non-decreasing in θ, which is condition (ii). The envelope formula in
(iii) follows directly from Theorem 2 of Milgrom and Segal (2002), where absolute continuity of
S(e, θ) holds because the set of transfer profiles is bounded. 
D.1.2 Proof of Lemma 4.2
By Lemma 4.1, credibility implies that, ∀e, e′ ∈ E and ∀θ ∈ Θ,
δ(e, e′, θ) = S(e, θ)− S(e′, θ) =
∫ θ
θ
(
Su(e, s)− Su(e′, s)
)
ds = 0.
155
156 Appendix: Chapter 4
This implies that, for any fixed e, e′ ∈ E, Su(e, θ) = Su(e′, θ) for almost every θ ∈ Θ. It then also
immediately follows that St(e, θ) = St(e′, θ) for almost every θ ∈ Θ. Now choose an arbitrary
e′ ∈ E and define the functions x and xˆ by
x(θ) = St(e′, θ), xˆ(θ) = Su(e′, θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ.
It follows that, for any e ∈ E, St(e, θ) = x(θ) and Su(e, θ) = xˆ(θ) for almost all θ ∈ Θ. 
D.1.3 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Suppose Φ = (µe,θ)(e,θ)∈E×Θ implements σ. In particular, Φ is credible, so by Lemma 4.2 there
exists a pair of function x and xˆ such that, ∀e ∈ E,
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x(θ), Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ(θ),
for almost every θ ∈ Θ. Since Φ implements σ, we also have ∀i ∈ I and ∀σ′i ∈ ∆R+,
Eσ
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]
− c(ei)
]
≥ E(σ′i,σ−i)
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]
− c(ei)
]
.
The expected payoff of the principal with (σ,Φ) is given by
ΠP (σ,Φ) = Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei − Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]]
= Eσ
[
n∑
i=1
ei
]
− Eτ [x(θ)] .
For every e ∈ E, define a probability measure µe ∈ ∆T such that
µe(A) = Eτ
[
µe,θ(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T .1 Now construct an alternative contract Φˆ by setting µˆe,θ = µe
for all (e, θ) ∈ E×Θ. This contract satisfies the property of θ-independence stated in the lemma.
Since, ∀(e, θ) ∈ E ×Θ,
Sˆt(e, θ) = Eµˆe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eτ [x(θ)] ,
Sˆu(e, θ) = Eµˆe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eτ
[
Eµe,θ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]]
= Eτ [xˆ(θ)] ,
by Lemma 1 it is straightforward to check that Φˆ is credible. Furthermore, note that
Πi(σ′, Φˆ) = Eσ′
[
Eτ
[
Eµˆe,θ [u(ti)]
]
− c(ei)
]
= Eσ′ [Eτ [Eµe [u(ti)]]− c(ei)]
= Eσ′
[
Eτ
[
Eµe,θ [u(ti)]
]
− c(ei)
]
= Πi(σ′,Φ)
1The assumption discussed in footnote 15 ensures that the expectation (as well as the ones in the proof of the
next lemma) is well-defined. It is also easy to show that µe is indeed a probability measure.
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for all σ′ and i ∈ I, which implies that Φˆ implements σ because Φ implements σ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff is
Eσ [
∑n
i=1 ei]− Eτ [x(θ)] with both (σ,Φ) and (σ, Φˆ). 
D.1.4 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Suppose Φ = (µe)e∈E implements σ. We first construct a probability measure η ∈ ∆T by
η(A) = Eσ [µe(A)]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T . Furthermore, for each i ∈ I we construct a probability
measure η(i) ∈ ∆T by setting
η(i)(A) = Eσ
[
µ(0,e−i)(A)
]
for all measurable subsets A ⊆ T . We now construct an alternative contract Φˆ = (µˆe)e∈E as
follows. For e = e¯, we let µˆe = η. For any e = (ei, e¯−i) with ei 6= e¯i, we let µˆe = η(i). For all
remaining e, we let µˆe = µe.
We first show that Φˆ is credible. Since Φ is credible and its transfers are independent of θ,
by Lemma 4.2 there exist x, xˆ ∈ R+ such that Eµe [∑ni=1 ti] = x and Eµe [∑ni=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all
e ∈ E. First consider µˆe for e = e¯. We obtain
Eµˆe¯
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eη
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eσ
[
Eµe
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eσ[x] = x
and, by the analogous argument, Eµˆe¯ [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ. Now consider µˆe for e = (ei, e¯−i) with
ei 6= e¯i. We obtain
E
µˆ(ei,e¯−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eη(i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eσ
[
E
µ(0,e−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]]
= Eσ[x] = x
and, by the analogous argument, E
µˆ(ei,e¯−i) [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ. Since Φˆ and Φ are identical for all
other e, we can conclude that Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E. It is then
straightforward to check that Φˆ is credible by using Lemma 4.1.
We next show that, in Φˆ, for each agent i ∈ I it is a best response to play e¯i when the
remaining agents are playing e¯−i, which implies that Φˆ implements e¯. This claim holds because,
∀i ∈ I and ∀e′i 6= e¯i,
Πi(e¯, Φˆ) = Eη[u(ti)]− c(e¯i)
= Eσ[Eµe [u(ti)]]− c (Eσ[ei])
≥ Eσ[Eµe [u(ti)]]− Eσ[c(ei)] (D.1)
≥ Eσ
[
E
µ(0,e−i) [u(ti)]
]
≥ Eσ
[
E
µ(0,e−i) [u(ti)]
]
− c(e′i)
= Eη(i) [u(ti)]− c(e′i) = Πi((e′i, e¯−i), Φˆ),
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where the first inequality follows the convexity of c and the second inequality follows from the
fact that Φ implements σ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff is∑n
i=1 e¯i − x with both (σ,Φ) and (e¯, Φˆ). 
D.1.5 Proof of Lemma 4.5
Suppose Φ = (µe)e∈E implements e¯. We now construct an alternative contract Φˆ = (µˆe)e∈E as
follows. For e = eˆ, we define µˆe by generating a profile of prizes t = (t1, ..., tn) according to µe¯
and then allocating these prizes randomly and uniformly among the agents. For any e = (ei, eˆ−i)
with ei 6= eˆi, we let µˆe by given as follows. A number j is drawn uniformly from I and then
a profile of prizes t = (t1, ..., tn) is generated according to µ(0,e¯−j). The deviating agent i gets
the prize tj and the remaining n − 1 prizes are allocated randomly and uniformly among the
non-deviating agents. Note that, by construction, this punishment rule for unilateral deviations
does not depend on the identity of the agent being punished. For all remaining e, we let µˆe = µe.
We first show that Φˆ is credible. By Lemma 4.2, credibility and θ-independence of Φ imply
that there exists x, xˆ ∈ R+ such that Eµe [∑ni=1 ti] = x and Eµe [∑ni=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E.
Now first consider µˆe for e = eˆ. We obtain
Eµˆeˆ
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= Eµe¯
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= x,
Eµˆeˆ
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= Eµe¯
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= xˆ.
Now consider µˆe for any e = (ei, eˆ−i) with ei 6= eˆi. We obtain
E
µˆ(ei,eˆ−i)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
E
µ(0,e¯−j)
[
n∑
i=1
ti
]
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
x = x,
E
µˆ(ei,eˆ−i)
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
=
n∑
j=1
1
n
E
µ(0,e¯−j)
[
n∑
i=1
u(ti)
]
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
xˆ = xˆ.
Since Φˆ and Φ are identical for all other e, we can conclude that Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and
Eµˆe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E. It is then straightforward to check that Φˆ is credible by
using Lemma 4.1.
We next show that, in Φˆ, for each agent i ∈ I it is a best response to play eˆi when the
remaining agents are playing eˆ−i, which implies that Φˆ implements eˆ. To prove this claim, note
that
Eµe¯ [u(ti)]− c(e¯i) ≥ Eµ(0,e¯−i) [u(ti)]
holds for all i ∈ I because Φ implements e¯. Summing over all i ∈ I and dividing by n yields
Eµe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
c(e¯k) ≥ 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
µ(0,e¯−k) [u(tk)] .
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We now obtain, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei 6= eˆi,
Πi(eˆ, Φˆ) = Eµˆeˆ [u(ti)]− c (eˆi)
= Eµe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− c(eˆi)
≥ Eµe¯
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− 1
n
n∑
k=1
c(e¯k)
≥ 1
n
n∑
k=1
E
µ(0,e¯−k) [u(tk)]− c(ei)
= E
µˆ(ei,eˆ−i) [u(ti)]− c(ei) = Πi((ei, eˆ−i), Φˆ),
where the first inequality follows from convexity of c. Hence the claim follows.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff is∑n
i=1 e¯i − x with both (e¯,Φ) and (eˆ, Φˆ). 
D.1.6 Proof of Lemma 4.6
Suppose Φ = (µe)e∈E implements the symmetric profile eˆ. From the proof of Lemma 4.5 we
know that it is without loss of generality to assume that Φ has the following form. If e = eˆ, a
profile of prizes t = (t1, ..., tn) is generated according to some probability measure pi and these
prizes are randomly and uniformly allocated to the agents. If e = (ei, eˆ−i) with ei 6= eˆi for
some i ∈ I, a profile of prizes td = (td1, ..., tdn) is generated according to some (i-independent)
probability measure ρ and agent i gets tdn, while the remaining n − 1 prizes are randomly and
uniformly allocated among the other agents. For all other effort profiles e, the transfer rule can
be chosen as for eˆ. Thus, we have
Eµeˆ [u(ti)] = Epi
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
, E
µ(ei,eˆ−i) [u(ti)] = Eρ[u(t
d
n)].
Furthermore, by Lemma 4.2, credibility and θ-independence of Φ imply that there exist x, xˆ ∈ R+
such that Eµe [
∑n
i=1 ti] = x and Eµe [
∑n
i=1 u(ti)] = xˆ for all e ∈ E.
Now construct a contest Cy with prize profile y as follows. Define td as the certainty equiv-
alent of a deviating agent’s random transfers in contract Φ, i.e., u(td) = Eρ[u(tdn)]. Note that
td ≤ Eρ[tdn] by concavity of u. Then define the prize profile
y =
(
x− td
n− 1 , . . . ,
x− td
n− 1 , t
d
)
.
The allocation rule of Cy is a follows. If e = eˆ, the prizes are randomly and uniformly allocated
among all agents. If e = (ei, eˆ−i) with ei 6= eˆi for some i ∈ I, the deviating agent i obtains td
and all other agents obtain (x− td)/(n− 1). For all other effort profiles e, the prizes are again
randomly and uniformly allocated among all agents.
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Since Cy is a contest, it is credible. Furthermore, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei 6= eˆi,
Πi(eˆ, Cy) =
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
x− td
n− 1
)
+ 1
n
u(td)− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
Eρ[
∑n
k=1 t
d
k)]− Eρ[tdn)]
n− 1
)
+ 1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
=
(
n− 1
n
)
u
(
Eρ
[
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1 t
d
k
])
+ 1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
Eρ
[
u
(
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1 t
d
k
)]
+ 1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
≥
(
n− 1
n
)
Eρ
[
n−1∑
k=1
1
n− 1u
(
tdk
)]
+ 1
n
Eρ[u(tdn)]− c(eˆi)
= Eρ
[
1
n
n−1∑
k=1
u
(
tdk
)]
+ Eρ
[ 1
n
u
(
tdn
)]
− c(eˆi)
= Eρ
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u
(
tdk
)]
− c(eˆi)
= Epi
[
1
n
n∑
k=1
u(tk)
]
− c(eˆi)
≥ Eρ
[
u(tdn)
]
− c(ei)
= u(td)− c(ei) = Πi((ei, eˆ−i), Cy),
where the first inequality follows from td ≤ Eρ[tdn], the second and third inequalities follow from
concavity of u, and the last inequality follows from the fact that Φ implements eˆ. We can thus
conclude that Cy also implements eˆ.
Finally, from the above arguments we also obtain that the principal’s expected payoff is∑n
i=1 eˆi − x with both (eˆ,Φ) and (eˆ, Cy). 
D.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
Only-if-statement. Suppose (σ∗, C∗y ) solves (P). We first claim that σ∗ must be a pure-strategy
effort profile. By contradiction, suppose there exists j ∈ I such that σ∗j is not a Dirac measure.
We can now proceed exactly as in the proof of Lemma 4.4 to construct a contract Φˆ (in fact, a
contest) that implements a pure-strategy profile e¯. The only difference to the proof of Lemma
4.4 is that we let e¯j = Eσ∗j [ej ] +  for some  > 0 (but still e¯i = Eσ∗i [ei] for all i 6= j). Credibility
of Φˆ and the fact that e¯i is a best response to e¯−i for all i 6= j follow exactly as in the proof of
Lemma 4.4. The fact that e¯j is a best response to e¯−j for sufficiently small  > 0 follows because
the first inequality in (D.1) is strict for j when  = 0, because c is strictly convex and σ∗j is not
a Dirac measure. Since the principal’s payoff with (e¯, Φˆ) is increased by , (σ∗, C∗y ) cannot have
been a solution to (P).
Now suppose (e¯, C∗y ) solves (P), where e¯ may still be asymmetric. Denote x =
∑n
k=1 yk.
We next show that whenever yn > 0, there exists another contest Cy˜ with
∑n
k=1 y˜k = x that
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implements an effort profile e˜ with ∑ni=1 e˜i > ∑ni=1 e¯i, and hence (e¯, C∗y ) cannot have been a
solution to (P). Denote by pki (e) the probability that agent i receives prize yk in C∗y when the
effort profile is e. Note that
Πi(e¯, C∗y ) =
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)− c(e¯i) ≥
n∑
k=1
pki (0, e¯−i)u(yk) ≥ u(yn),
because C∗y implements e¯. Now consider an agent j ∈ I for which pnj (e¯) < 1. Construct a contest
Cy˜ with a profile of prizes y˜ given by y˜1 = y1 +δ, y˜n = yn−δ, and y˜k = yk for all k 6= 1, n, where
δ ∈ (0, yn]. Note that ∑nk=1 y˜k = x. Let effort profile e˜ be such that e˜j = e¯j +  and e˜i = e¯i for
all i 6= j, where  > 0. Note that ∑ni=1 e˜i > ∑ni=1 e¯i. The rule of contest Cy˜ is the following. If
the effort profile is e˜, then the prizes y˜ are allocated such that each agent i receives prize y˜k with
probability p˜ki (e˜) = pki (e¯). If some agent i unilaterally deviates from e˜, then agent i receives
the prize y˜n, while the prizes y˜1, . . . , y˜n−1 are allocated randomly and uniformly among the
remaining agents. Otherwise, the allocation of prizes can be chosen arbitrarily. For sufficiently
small  > 0 we then have, ∀i ∈ I and ∀ei ∈ R+,
Πi(e˜, Cy˜) =
n∑
k=1
p˜ki (e˜)u(y˜k)− c(e˜i)
= Πi(e¯, C∗y ) + p1i (e¯)(u(y1 + δ)− u(y1))
+ pni (e¯)(u(yn − δ)− u(yn)) + c(e¯i)− c(e˜i)
≥ u(yn) + p1i (e¯)(u(y1 + δ)− u(y1))
+ pni (e¯)(u(yn − δ)− u(yn)) + c(e¯i)− c(e˜i)
≥ u(yn − δ) = u(y˜n) ≥ Πi((ei, e˜−i), Cy˜),
where the second inequality holds because
u(yn) + pni (e¯)(u(yn − δ)− u(yn)) ≥ u(yn − δ)
for all i ∈ I, with strict inequality for j. Hence Cy˜ implements e˜.
When studying the set of all contest solutions to (P), we thus need to consider only pure-
strategy effort profiles e¯ and contests Cy with yn = 0. Fix a sum of prizes x ∈ [0, T¯ ]. Let ex be
the (unique) effort level that solves
n− 1
n
u
(
x
n− 1
)
− c(ex) = 0.
Note that, by the assumptions on u and c, the solution ex is differentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly concave in x. We now claim that nex is an upper bound on the sum of efforts
implementable with a contest Cy that has
∑n
k=1 yk = x and yn = 0, and it can be reached only
by implementing the symmetric effort profile (ex, ..., ex). Suppose first that Cy implements an
effort profile e¯ with ∑ni=1 e¯i ≥ nex but e¯ 6= (ex, . . . , ex). Note that
Πi(e¯, Cy) =
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)− c(e¯i) ≥ u(yn)− c(0) = 0,
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because Cy implements e¯. Summing these inequalities over all agents we obtain
n∑
i=1
n∑
k=1
pki (e¯)u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) =
n−1∑
k=1
u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) ≥ 0.
However, due to weak concavity of u and strict convexity of c we also have
n−1∑
k=1
u(yk)−
n∑
i=1
c(e¯i) < (n− 1)u
(
x
n− 1
)
− nc(ex) = 0,
a contradiction. Observe next that (ex, . . . , ex) can indeed be implemented. For instance, let
y = (x/(n − 1), . . . , x/(n − 1), 0) and choose the rules of Cy as follows. If the effort profile is
(ex, . . . , ex), then the prizes are allocated randomly and uniformly across the agents. If some
agent i unilaterally deviates from (ex, . . . , ex), then agent i receives the prize 0, while each other
agent receives x/(n− 1). Otherwise, the allocation of prizes can be chosen arbitrarily. It follows
immediately from the definition of ex that this contest indeed implements (ex, . . . , ex).
Given any sum of prizes x, the highest payoff that the principal can achieve is thus given
by ΠP (x) = nex − x, and the problem is reduced to a choice of x ∈ [0, T¯ ]. Since ΠP is
continuous in x, it follows that a solution exists. Furthermore, since ΠP is differentiable and
strictly concave, the first-order condition ∂ΠP /∂x = 0 that is stated in part (i) of the theorem
uniquely characterizes a value x¯ > 0 (given the assumptions on u and c), and the optimal value
of x is given by x∗ = min{x¯, T¯}. The resulting implemented optimal effort level is then given
by e∗ = ex∗ .
We complete the proof of the only-if-statement by showing that any optimal contest has
the profile of prizes y = (x∗/(n − 1), . . . , x∗/(n − 1), 0) whenever u is strictly concave. By
contradiction, let Cy be a contest that implements (e∗, ..., e∗) with
∑n
k=1 yk = x∗ and yn =
0 but y1 6= yn−1. Proceeding as before, summing the inequalities Πi((e∗, . . . , e∗), Cy) ≥ 0
over all agents yields ∑n−1k=1 u(yk) − nc(e∗) ≥ 0. Strict concavity of u, however, implies that∑n−1
k=1 u(yk)− nc(e∗) < (n− 1)u(x∗/(n− 1))− nc(e∗) = 0, a contradiction.
If-statement. We showed above that the upper bound on the principal’s payoff is given by
ne∗ − x∗. Thus, any contest which implements (e∗, ..., e∗) with the prize sum x∗ attains the
upper bound. 
D.3 Proof of Corollary 4.1
Each optimal contest induces individual efforts of e∗ and pays a sum of x∗, as characterized in
Theorem 4.2. Now consider the principal’s first-best problem. If the agents’ efforts were directly
observable and verifiable, then the principal could ask for individual efforts of e and would have
to compensate the agents with a transfer sum x such that u(x/n) − c(e) = 0. Put differently,
for a given transfer sum x the maximal achievable individual effort is
ex = c−1
(
u
(
x
n
))
,
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and the first-best problem is to maximize nex − x by choice of x ∈ [0, T¯ ]. With the same
arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, this yields xFB = min{x˜, T¯}, where x˜ is given by
u′
(
x˜
n
)
= c′
(
c−1
(
u
(
x˜
n
)))
.
The resulting optimal effort level is
eFB = c−1
(
u
(
xFB
n
))
.
Now suppose that the agents are risk-neutral, i.e., the function u is linear. The conditions
characterizing (e∗, x∗) in Theorem 4.2 then coincide with those characterizing (eFB, xFB) above,
which implies (e∗, x∗) = (eFB, xFB). Then suppose that the agents are risk-averse, i.e., the
function u is strictly concave. If x∗ 6= xFB there is nothing to prove. Hence assume x∗ = xFB.
Inspection of the conditions that define e∗ and eFB then immediately reveals that e∗ < eFB. 
D.4 Proof of Theorem 4.3
The proof proceeds in two steps. Step 1 shows that (e∗, . . . , e∗) is an equilibrium of the contest
C∗y described in the theorem. Step 2 shows that no other equilibria exist. The structure of
the arguments in Step 2 is reminiscent of equilibrium characterization proofs in all-pay auctions
without censoring (see Baye et al., 1996).
Step 1. Consider deviations e′i of agent i from (e∗, . . . , e∗). If e′i > e∗, we obtain
Πi((e∗, . . . , e∗), C∗y ) =
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
>
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e′i)
= Πi((e∗, . . . , e′i, . . . , e∗), C∗y ).
If e′i < e∗, we obtain
Πi((e∗, . . . , e∗), C∗y ) =
n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗)
= 0 ≥ −c(e′i) = Πi((e∗, . . . , e′i, . . . , e∗), C∗y ).
Thus, the contest C∗y implements the effort profile (e∗, ..., e∗).
Step 2. By contradiction, suppose C∗y also implements some other profile σ 6= (e∗, . . . , e∗).
Denote the support of σi by Li, so ei ∈ Li if and only if every open neighbourhood N of ei
satisfies σi(N) > 0. We first show that it must be that Li ⊆ [0, e∗] for all i ∈ I. Suppose not,
so there exists an agent i and an effort level ei > e∗ such that σi((ei − , ei + )) > 0 ∀ > 0.
Fix ¯ > 0 such that ei − ¯ > e∗. Note that the expected payoff of agent i playing e′i ≥ e∗ with
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probability one, while the other agents play σ−i, is
Πi(e′i, σ−i) =
1−∏
j 6=i
σj([e∗,∞)) +
∏
j 6=i
σj([e∗,∞))n− 1
n
u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e′i).
where we omit the dependence on C∗y to simplify notation. Since c is strictly increasing, we have
Πi(e∗, σ−i) > Πi(e′i, σ−i) for all e′i > e∗. Hence Πi(e∗, σ−i) > Πi(e¯i, σ−i) for all e¯i ∈ (ei− ¯, ei+ ¯).
Since σi((ei − ¯, ei + ¯)) > 0, agent i could strictly increase his expected payoff by shifting the
mass from this interval to e∗. Thus, σ is not an equilibrium. From now on, we only consider the
cases where Li ⊆ [0, e∗] ∀i ∈ I. Let ei = minLi. Since the proposed profile σ is different from
(e∗, ..., e∗), it must be that e = mini∈I ei < e∗.
First, suppose that e > 0. Furthermore suppose that σj({e}) > 0 for exactly one agent j ∈ I,
or that σi({e}) = 0 for all i ∈ I. In the latter case let j be such that ej = e. Then there exists
some ¯ > 0 such that
Πj(e+ , σ−j) ≤
1−∏
i 6=j
σi((e+ ,∞))
u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e+ ) < 0
for all  < ¯. Intuitively, the probability that agent j wins a positive prize approaches zero as
 approaches zero (by right continuity of σi((e+ ,∞)) in  and σi((e,∞)) = 1), while the cost
of effort at e is strictly positive. Hence agent j could strictly increase his expected payoff by
shifting the mass σj([e, e + ¯)) > 0 from [e, e + ¯) to 0. Next suppose that σi({e}) > 0 for at
least two agents i = j, k. Then there exists a small  > 0 such that
Πj(e, σ−j) ≤
1− (1− 12σk({e})
) ∏
i 6=j,k
σi((e,∞))
u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e)
<
1−∏
i 6=j
σi((e,∞))
u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e+ )
≤ Πj(e+ , σ−j).
The intuition is that a small upward deviation from e increases the probability of winning
discretely, while marginally increasing the effort costs. Hence agent j could strictly increase his
expected payoff by shifting the mass σj({e}) > 0 from e to e+ . We conclude that there does
not exist an equilibrium σ 6= (e∗, ..., e∗) with e > 0.
Second, suppose that e = 0. Consider first the case where σi({0}) = 0 for all i ∈ I, that is,
no agent places an atom on 0. If there is an agent j such that ek > 0 for all k 6= j, then there
exists some ¯ > 0 such that Πj(, σ−j) = −c() for all  < ¯. Agent j could then strictly increase
his expected payoff by shifting the mass σj((0, ¯)) > 0 from (0, ¯) to 0. Thus, there have to be
at least two agents j and k with ej = ek = 0. But in this case, observe that
Πj(, σ−j) ≤
1−∏
i 6=j
σi((,∞))
u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c()

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and
lim
→0
1−∏
i 6=j
σi((,∞))
u( x∗
n− 1
)
− c()
 = 0.
Thus for every Π¯ > 0 there exists ¯ > 0 such that Πj(, σ−j) < Π¯ for all  < ¯. Intuitively,
both the probability of winning and the costs approach zero as  → 0. However, it must be
that Πj(e∗, σ−j) > 0 since Πj(e∗, . . . , e∗) = 0 and the probability that j wins a positive prize is
strictly greater if the other agents play σ−j , because at least agent k exerts efforts lower than
e∗ with strictly positive probability. Hence agent j could strictly increase his expected payoff
by shifting the mass σj((0, ¯)) > 0 from (0, ¯) to e∗, for some sufficiently small ¯ > 0. The only
remaining case is σj({0}) > 0 for at least one agent j ∈ I. Observe that there can only be one
such agent, since otherwise a small upward deviation from 0 would lead to a discrete increase
in the probability of winning a positive prize, analogous to the argument above. Then it must
be that Πj(σj , σ−j) = 0 since Πj(0, σ−j) = 0. This can only be the maximum payoff of agent
j if all other agents exert deterministic efforts equal to e∗, since otherwise Πj(e∗, σ−j) > 0. In
this case, agent j is indifferent between playing 0 or e∗, and all other effort levels yield strictly
lower payoffs. This implies σj({0}) + σj({e∗}) = 1. Now consider an agent k 6= j. Observe that
a deviation by agent k to some  with 0 <  < e∗ leads to payoffs
Πk(, σ−k) = σj({0})u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c().
Thus a sufficiently small  > 0 will be a profitable deviation whenever
σj({0})u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
> σj({0})u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
+ (1− σj({0}))n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
− c(e∗).
This can be reformulated to
0 > −σj({0})n− 1
n
u
(
x∗
n− 1
)
,
which always holds because σj({0}) > 0. 
D.5 Proof of Theorem 4.4
Consider a nested contest with prize profile y = (x∗/(n − 1), ..., x∗/(n − 1), 0) and the general
success function (4.1). We will show that, for an appropriate choice of f , the effort profile
(e∗, . . . , e∗) is an equilibrium. The proof proceeds in three steps. In Step 1, we derive the
agents’ payoff function in the nested contest. Step 2 introduces the specific value r∗(n) stated in
the theorem. In Step 3, we then complete the proof that the resulting contest indeed implements
the desired effort profile.
Step 1. Let p(ei) denote the probability that agent i wins none of the n− 1 positive prizes,
given that all other agents exert effort e∗. Furthermore, let u∗ be the utility derived from a
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positive prize. Then, the expected payoff of agent i, when all other agents exert e∗, is given by
Πi(ei) = [1− p(ei)]u∗ − c(ei)
=
[
1− (n− 1)!f(e
∗)n−1∏n−1
k=1 [f(ei) + (n− k)f(e∗))]
]
u∗ − c(ei)
=
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)f(e∗)
[f(ei) + (n− k)f(e∗))]
]
u∗ − c(ei)
=
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)f(e∗)
[f(ei) + (n− k)f(e∗))]
](
n
n− 1
)
c(e∗)− c(ei).
Now suppose f(ei) = c(ei)r for some r ≥ 0. It is easy to see that Πi(0) = Πi(e∗) = 0 for
any r. We will show in the next two steps that Πi(ei) ≤ 0 for all ei when r = r∗(n) =
(n − 1)/(Hn − 1), where Hn = ∑nk=1 1/k is the n-th harmonic number. This implies that
(e∗, . . . , e∗) is an equilibrium.
Step 2. Consider any ei > 0 (we already know the value of Πi for ei = 0). To determine the
sign of Πi(ei), we can equivalently examine the sign of
Πi(ei)
[
n− 1
nc(e∗)
]
=
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)c(e∗)r
[c(ei)r + (n− k)c(e∗)r)]
]
−
(
n− 1
n
)
c(ei)
c(e∗) .
Make the change of variables y∗ = c(e∗)r and y = c(ei)r to obtain
F (y|r) =
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)y∗
[y + (n− k)y∗]
]
− n− 1
n
(
y
y∗
)1
r .
After the additional variable substitution x = y∗/y we obtain
F (x|r) =
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)x
[1 + (n− k)x]
]
− n− 1
n
(1
x
)1
r .
Showing that F (x|r) ≤ 0 for all x > 0, x 6= 1, is then sufficient to ensure that the contest with
parameter r implements the optimum.
Fix any x and let us look for r(x) such that F (x|r(x)) = 0. Since F is strictly increasing in
r whenever x ∈ (0, 1), we obtain that F (x|r) ≤ 0 for any fixed x ∈ (0, 1) whenever r ≤ r(x), so
r(x) gives an upper bound on the possible values of r. Similarly, since F is strictly decreasing in
r whenever x ∈ (1,∞), we obtain that F (x|r) ≤ 0 for any fixed x ∈ (1,∞) whenever r ≥ r(x),
so r(x) gives a lower bound on the possible values of r. Thus it is sufficient to find a value r∗
such that r(x) ≥ r∗ for all x ∈ (0, 1) and r(x) ≤ r∗ for all x ∈ (1,∞).
Rewriting the equation F (x|r(x)) = 0, we have
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)x
[1 + (n− k)x]
]
= n− 1
n
(1
x
) 1
r(x)
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log
[
1−
n−1∏
k=1
(n− k)x
[1 + (n− k)x]
]
= log
(
n− 1
n
)
− 1
r(x) log(x)
1
r(x) log(x) = log
(
n− 1
n
)
− log
[
1− (n− 1)!x
n−1∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
]
1
r(x) log(x) = log
[
n− 1
n
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
]
r(x) = log(x)
log
[
n− 1
n
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
]
.
Denote
g(x) = n− 1
n
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
so that
r(x) = log(x)log(g(x)) .
Note that g(x) > 0 for any x > 0. We will first show that limx↗1 r(x) = limx↘1 r(x) = r∗(n) =
(n − 1)/(Hn − 1). Note that for x = 1 both the denominator and the numerator of r(x) equal
zero. Hence we use l’Hôpital’s rule. Observe that
(log(g(x)))′ = g
′(x)
g(x)
=
(
∂
∂x
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
)(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
−
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
) ∂
∂x
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
=
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
) ∂
∂x
(
(n− 1)!xn−1)(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
−
(
(n− 1)!xn−1) ( ∂
∂x
∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
=
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
)
(n− 1) ((n− 1)!xn−2)(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
−
(
(n− 1)!xn−1) (∑n−1k=1(n− k)∏j 6=k [1 + (n− j)x])(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]− (n− 1)!xn−1
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)x]
.
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We evaluate this at x = 1, that is,
(log(g(x)))′
∣∣
x=1 =
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]
)
(n− 1)(n− 1)!(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]− (n− 1)!
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]
−
(n− 1)!
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)]
)
(∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]− (n− 1)!
)∏n−1
k=1 [1 + (n− k)]
= n!(n− 1)(n− 1)!(n!− (n− 1)!)n!
−
(n− 1)!
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)]
)
(n!− (n− 1)!)n!
= 1−
(∑n−1
k=1(n− k)
∏
j 6=k [1 + (n− j)]
)
(n− 1)n!
= 1−
n!
(∑n−1
k=1
n− k
n− k + 1
)
(n− 1)n!
=
n− 1−
(∑n−1
k=1
n− k
n− k + 1
)
n− 1
=
1 +∑n−1k=1 n− k + 1n− k + 1 −∑n−1k=1 n− kn− k + 1 − 1
n− 1
=
1 +∑n−1k=1 1n− k + 1 − 1
n− 1
= Hn − 1
n− 1 .
Thus we have
lim
x↗1
r(x) = lim
x↘1
r(x) = 1/x(log(g(x)))′
∣∣∣∣
x=1
= n− 1
Hn − 1 .
To complete the proof of the theorem, it is now sufficient to show that r(x) is weakly monoton-
ically decreasing on (0, 1) and on (1,∞). We will do this in the next step.
Step 3. To show monotonicity of r(x), we will apply a suitable version of the l’Hôpital
montone rule. Proposition 1.1 in Pinelis (2002) (together with Corollary 1.2 and Remark 1.3)
implies that r(x) = log(x)/ log(g(x)) is weakly decreasing on (0, 1) and (1,∞) if
(log(x))′
(log(g(x)))′ =
g(x)
xg′(x)
is weakly decreasing.2 We will thus show that
(
g(x)
xg′(x)
)′
= [g
′(x)x− g(x)]g′(x)− xg(x)g′′(x)
(xg′(x))2 ≤ 0.
2Proposition 1.1 is applicable because log(x) and log(g(x)) are differentiable on the respective intervals and
limx→1 log(x) = limx→1 log(g(x)) = 0 holds. The remaining prerequisite (log(g(x)))′ = g′(x)/g(x) > 0 also holds,
because g(x) > 0 and g′(x) > 0 according to Lemma D.1 below.
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For this, it is sufficient to show the following three conditions:
(a) g′(x) > 0,
(b) g′′(x) ≥ 0,
(c) g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0.
We will verify these conditions in the following three lemmas. To do this, consider the function
g. We can write
n−1∏
k=1
[1 + (n− k)x] = (n− 1)!xn−1 + an−2xn−2 + an−3xn−3 + · · ·+ a1x+ 1
= (n− 1)!xn−1 + γ(x),
where a1, . . . , an−2 are strictly positive coefficients (that depend on n), so that γ is a polynomial
of degree n− 2 which is strictly positive for all x > 0.3 We can then rewrite
g(x) = n− 1
n
(n− 1)!xn−1 + γ(x)
γ(x) .
Lemma D.1. Condition g′(x) > 0 is satisfied.
Proof. Observe that
g′(x) = n− 1
n
(n− 1)(n− 1)!xn−2γ(x)− (n− 1)!xn−1γ′(x)
γ(x)2
= n− 1
n
(n− 1)!xn−2[(n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x)]
γ(x)2 ,
and, since
(n− 1)γ(x) = (n− 1)an−2xn−2 + (n− 1)an−3xn−3 + . . .+ (n− 1)a1x+ n− 1 and
xγ′(x) = (n− 2)an−2xn−2 + (n− 3)an−3xn−3 + . . .+ a1x,
it follows that (n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x) > 0, which implies that g′(x) > 0. 
Lemma D.2. Condition g′′(x) ≥ 0 is satisfied.
Proof. Observe that
g′′(x) = (n− 1)(n− 1)!
n
[
(n− 1)xn−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)
γ(x)2
]′
,
so that g′′(x) ≥ 0 is equivalent to
3To avoid confusion, the formula should be read as γ(x) = 1 for n = 2 and as γ(x) = a1x for n = 3.
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0 ≤
[
(n− 1)xn−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)
γ(x)2
]′
= [(n− 2)(n− 1)x
n−3γ(x) + (n− 1)xn−2γ′(x)− (n− 1)xn−2γ′(x)− xn−1γ′′(x)]γ(x)2
γ(x)4
− [(n− 1)x
n−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)]2γ(x)γ′(x)
γ(x)4
= [(n− 2)(n− 1)x
n−3γ(x)− xn−1γ′′(x)]γ(x)2
γ(x)4
− [(n− 1)x
n−2γ(x)− xn−1γ′(x)]2γ(x)γ′(x)
γ(x)4
= γ(x)x
n−3
γ(x)4
[
(n− 2)(n− 1)γ(x)2 − x2γ′′(x)γ(x)− 2(n− 1)xγ(x)γ′(x) + 2x2γ′(x)2
]
.
The expression in the square bracket is a polynomial of degree (2n− 4). We will show that all
coefficients of this polynomial are positive, which implies that the polynomial, and hence also
g′′(x), is non-negative.
Using the auxiliary definitions a0 = 1 and aκ = 0 for κ < 0, the coefficient multiplying x2n−j
in this polynomial, for any 4 ≤ j ≤ 2n, is given by
j−2∑
k=2
(n− 2)(n− 1)an−kan−j+k −
j−2∑
k=2
(n− k)(n− k − 1)an−kan−j+k
−
j−2∑
k=2
2(n− 1)(n− k)an−kan−j+k +
j−2∑
k=2
2(n− k)(n− j + k)an−kan−j+k
=
j−2∑
k=2
(n2 − 3n+ 2)an−kan−j+k −
j−2∑
k=2
(n2 − 2nk − n+ k2 + k)an−kan−j+k
−
j−2∑
k=2
2(n2 − nk − n+ k)an−kan−j+k +
j−2∑
k=2
2(n2 − nj + jk − k2)an−kan−j+k
=
j−2∑
k=2
(2 + 4nk − 3k2 − 3k − 2nj + 2jk)an−kan−j+k.
Let ϕ(n, j, k) = 2+4nk−3k2−3k−2nj+2jk. We will show that∑j−2k=2 ϕ(n, j, k)an−kan−j+k ≥ 0.
For n = 2 and n = 3, this condition can easily be verified directly. Hence we suppose that n > 3
from now on.
Observe that for any k there is k′ = j − k such that an−kan−j+k = an−k′an−j+k′ . Hence we
first consider the case where j is odd, so that we can write
j−2∑
k=2
ϕ(n, j, k)an−kan−j+k =
j−1
2∑
k=2
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)]an−kan−j+k.
Since ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k) is an integer, we can think of this expression as a long sum
where each of the terms an−kan−j+k appears exactly |ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)| times, added or
subtracted depending on the sign of ϕ(n, j, k)+ϕ(n, j, j−k). Now note that∑(j−1)/2k=2 [ϕ(n, j, k)+
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ϕ(n, j, j − k)] = 0 holds. This follows because we can write
j−1
2∑
k=2
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)]
=
j−2∑
k=2
ϕ(n, j, k)
=
j−2∑
k=2
(2− 2nj) + (4n− 3 + 2j)
j−2∑
k=2
k − 3
j−2∑
k=2
k2
= (j − 3)(2− 2nj) + (4n− 3 + 2j)j(j − 3)2 − 3
(j − 3)(2j2 − 3j + 4)
6
= (j − 3)
(
2− 2nj + 2nj − 3j2 + j
2 − j2 + 3j2 − 2
)
= 0.
Thus, for each instance where a term an−k′an−j+k′ is subtracted in the long sum, we can find
a term an−k′′an−j+k′′ which is added. We claim that the respective terms which are added are
weakly larger than the terms which are subtracted. This claim follows once we show that both
ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k) and an−kan−j+k are weakly increasing in k within the range of the
sum. In that case, the terms which are subtracted are those for small k and the terms which
are added are those for large k, and the latter are weakly larger. The same argument in fact
applies when j is even, so that we can write
j−2∑
k=2
ϕ(n, j, k)an−kan−j+k
=
j−2
2∑
k=2
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)]an−kan−j+k + ϕ(n, j, j/2)a2n−j/2.
Importantly, for the last term we have
ϕ(n, j, j/2) = 2− 2nj − 3
(
j
2
)2
+ j2(4n− 3 + 2j)
= 2− j2 34 − j
3
2 + j
2
= 2 + j
(
j
4 −
3
2
)
> 0,
so that the last and largest term a2n−j/2 = an−j/2an−j/2 is indeed also added.
We first show that ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k) is weakly increasing in k in the relevant range.
We have
ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)
= (2− 2nj − 3k2 + k(4n− 3 + 2j)) + (2− 2nj − 3(j − k)2 + (j − k)(4n− 3 + 2j))
= 4− 4nj − 3(2k2 + j2 − 2jk) + j(4n− 3 + 2j).
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Treating k as a real variable, we obtain
∂
∂k
[ϕ(n, j, k) + ϕ(n, j, j − k)] = −3(4k − 2j)
= −6(2k − j) > 0
for all k < j/2, so the claim follows.
We now show that an−kan−j+k is weakly increasing in k in the relevant range. Formally, we
show that an−kan−j+k ≤ an−k−1an−j+k+1 for any k < j/2. Observe that we can write
a1 =
n−1∑
k1=1
(n− k1),
a2 =
n−2∑
k2=1
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− k2)(n− k1),
...
aj =
n−j∑
kj=1
n−j+1∑
kj−1=kj+1
· · ·
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− kj)(n− kj−1) . . . (n− k1).
Intuitively, each summand in the definition of aj is the product of j different elements chosen
from the set {(n − 1), (n − 2), . . . , 1}, and the nested summation goes over all the different
possibilities in which these j elements can be chosen. Using simplified notation for the nested
summation, we can thus write (where α, β, λ, and η take the role of the indices of summation,
like k in the expression above):
an−k =
∑
(n− αn−k)(n− αn−k−1) . . . (n− α1),
an−j+k =
∑
(n− βn−j+k)(n− βn−j+k−1) . . . (n− β1),
an−k−1 =
∑
(n− λn−k−1)(n− λn−k−2) . . . (n− λ1),
an−j+k+1 =
∑
(n− ηn−j+k+1)(n− ηn−j+k) . . . (n− η1).
Rewriting the inequality an−kan−j+k ≤ an−k−1an−j+k+1 using this notation, we obtain∑
(n− αn−k)(n− αn−k−1) . . . (n− α1)(n− βn−j+k)(n− βn−j+k−1) . . . (n− β1)
≤
∑
(n− λn−k−1)(n− λn−k−2) . . . (n− λ1)(n− ηn−j+k+1)(n− ηn−j+k) . . . (n− η1).
Observe that each summand of the LHS sum is the product of (n − k) + (n − j + k) = 2n − j
elements, all of them chosen from the set {(n−1), (n−2), . . . , 1}. The first n−k elements are all
different from each other, and the last n− j+k elements are all different from each other. Thus,
since n−k > n−j+k when k < j/2, in each summand at most n−j+k elements can appear twice.
Furthermore, the LHS sum goes over all the different combinations that satisfy this property.
Similarly, each summand of the RHS sum is the product of (n−k−1) + (n− j+k+ 1) = 2n− j
elements, all of them chosen from the same set {(n − 1), (n − 2), . . . , 1}. The first n − k − 1
elements are all different from each other, and the last n−j+k+1 elements are all different from
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each other. Thus, (weakly) more than n− j+k elements can appear twice in these summands.4
Since the RHS sum goes over all the different combinations that satisfy this property, for each
summand on the LHS there exists an equal summand on the RHS. This shows that the inequality
indeed holds. 
Lemma D.3. Condition g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0 is satisfied.
Proof. We have
g′(x)x− g(x) = n− 1
n
[
(n− 1)!xn−1[(n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x)]
γ(x)2 −
(n− 1)!xn−1 + γ(x)
γ(x)
]
,
and therefore g′(x)x− g(x) ≤ 0 if and only if
0 ≥ (n− 1)!xn−1[(n− 1)γ(x)− xγ′(x)]− (n− 1)!xn−1γ(x)− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)!xn−1(n− 2)γ(x)− (n− 1)!xnγ′(x)− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)![(n− 2)an−2x2n−3 + (n− 2)an−3x2n−4 + · · ·+ (n− 2)a1xn + (n− 2)xn−1
− (n− 2)an−2x2n−3 − (n− 3)an−3x2n−4 − · · · − a1xn]− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)![an−3x2n−4 + 2an−4x2n−5 + · · ·+ (n− 3)a1xn + (n− 2)xn−1]− γ(x)2
= (n− 1)![an−3x2n−4 + 2an−4x2n−5 + · · ·+ (n− 3)a1xn + (n− 2)xn−1]
−
n+1∑
j=4
j−2∑
k=2
an−kan−j+kx2n−j − ρ,
where ρ ≥ 0 is some positive remainder of γ(x)2. To show g′(x)x − g(x) ≤ 0, it is therefore
sufficient to ignore ρ and show that the overall coefficient on x2n−j in the last expression is not
positive. That is, it is sufficient to show that, for all j ∈ {4, . . . , n+ 1},
(n− 1)!(j − 3)an−j+1 −
j−2∑
k=2
an−kan−j+k ≤ 0.
Observe that the sum has exactly (j − 3) elements. Then, it is sufficient to show that, for all
k ∈ {2, . . . , j − 2},
(n− 1)!an−j+1 ≤ an−kan−j+k. (D.2)
To demonstrate condition (D.2), we will first write the values of the coefficients aj in a
different way. Instead of summing over all possibilities in which j different elements from the
set {(n− 1), (n− 2), . . . , 1} can be chosen, we can sum over the n− j − 1 elements not chosen,
and divide the factorial (n− 1)! by the product of these elements. This yields
an−2 =
n−1∑
k1=1
(n− 1)!
n− k1 ,
an−3 =
n−2∑
k2=1
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− k2)(n− k1) ,
4The inequality n−k− 1 ≥ n− j+k+ 1 can be rearranged to k ≤ j/2− 1, which follows from k < j/2, except
if j is odd and k = (j − 1)/2. Thus, typically, up to n − j + k + 1 elements can appear twice. If j is odd and
k = (j − 1)/2, up to n− k − 1 elements can appear twice, which is identical to n− j + k in that case.
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...
an−j =
n−j+1∑
kj−1=1
n−j+2∑
kj−2=kj−1+1
· · ·
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− kj−1)(n− kj−2) . . . (n− k1) ,
...
a1 =
2∑
kn−2=1
3∑
kn−3=kn−2+1
· · ·
n−1∑
k1=k2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− kn−2)(n− kn−3) . . . (n− k1) .
Rewriting condition (D.2), we then have
n−j+2∑
λj−2=1
n−j+3∑
λj−3=λj−2+1
· · ·
n−1∑
λ1=λ2+1
((n− 1)!)2
(n− λj−2)(n− λj−3) . . . (n− λ1)
≤
n−k+1∑
αk−1=1
n−k+2∑
αk−2=αk−1+1
· · ·
n−1∑
α1=α2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− αk−1)(n− αk−2) . . . (n− α1)

×
n−j+k+1∑
βj−k−1=1
n−j+k+2∑
βj−k−2=βj−k−1+1
· · ·
n−1∑
β1=β2+1
(n− 1)!
(n− βj−k−1)(n− βj−k−2) . . . (n− β1)
 .
Observe that for each summand on the LHS, the denominator is a product of j − 2 different
elements from the set {(n− 1), (n− 2), . . . , 1}. In fact, the LHS sum goes over all the different
possibilities in which these j − 2 elements can be chosen. On the RHS, after multiplication, the
denominator of each summand is a product of (k − 1) + (j − k − 1) = j − 2 elements from the
same set, where replication of some elements may be possible (but is not necessary). Since the
RHS sum goes over all these different possibilities, for each summand on the LHS there exists
an equal summand on the RHS. This shows that the inequality holds.  
D.6 Proof of Proposition 4.1
Observe first that c(e∗)/c′(e∗) < e∗ holds due to strict convexity of c and c(0) = 0. We can
therefore write the probability that agent 1 wins the prize in the described contest, holding the
effort e2 = e∗ fixed, as a piecewise function
p(e1) =

1 if e1 > e∗ + c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) ,
1
2 +
1
2
c′(e∗)
c(e∗) (e1 − e∗) if e∗ − c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) ≤ e1 ≤ e∗ + c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) ,
0 if e1 < e∗ − c(e
∗)
c′(e∗) .
Then, the expected payoff of agent 1 is given by
Π1(e1) = p(e1)u∗ − c(e1) = p(e1)2c(e∗)− c(e1).
It follows that Π1(e∗) = 0. We now consider the three types of deviations from e∗.
Case 1: e1 < e∗ − c(e∗)/c′(e∗). It follows immediately that Π1(e1) ≤ 0 in this range, which
implies that these deviations are not profitable.
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Case 2: e∗ − c(e∗)/c′(e∗) ≤ e1 ≤ e∗ + c(e∗)/c′(e∗). Observe that Π′1(e1) = c′(e∗) − c′(e1) in
this range. Hence the first-order condition yields the unique solution e1 = e∗. Since Π′′1(e1) =
−c′′(e1) < 0, this is indeed the maximum over this range.
Case 3: e1 > e∗+c(e∗)/c′(e∗). We have Π1(e1) < Π1(e∗+c(e∗)/c′(e∗)) for this range. Hence,
by the arguments for the previous case, these deviations are not profitable either.
We conclude that e1 = e∗ is a best response to e2 = e∗. The argument for agent 2 is
symmetric, which implies that the contest implements (e∗, e∗). 
D.7 Proof of Proposition 4.2
Suppose that the condition σ21 +σ22−2σ12 ≤ 2/(piβ2) is satisfied. Consider a contest as described
in the proposition. We proceed in two steps. Step 1 derives an expression for agent i’s expected
payoff as a function of the effort profile e. Step 2 shows that ei = e∗ is a best response when
agent j 6= i chooses ej = e∗.
Step 1. Given an effort profile e, the probability that agent 1 wins the prize is
p(e) = Pr
[
η˜e˜1
e˜2
≥ 1
]
= Pr
[
η˜η˜1e1
η˜2e2
≥ 1
]
= Pr
[
η˜2
η˜η˜1
≤ e1
e2
]
.
Since the variables η˜1, η˜2 and η˜ are log-normally distributed, it follows that the compound
variable η˜2/(η˜η˜1) is also log-normal, with location parameter ν = ν2 − ν1 − νη = 0 and scale
parameter σ2 = σ21 + σ22 − σ12 + σ2η = 2/(piβ2). The cdf of the log-normal distribution is given
by F (x) = Φ ((log x− ν)/σ), where Φ is the cdf of the standard normal distribution. Thus we
can write
p(e) = Φ
(
log(e1/e2)β
√
pi
2
)
.
For the probability that agent 2 wins the prize we obtain
1− p(e) = 1− Φ
(
log(e1/e2)β
√
pi
2
)
= Φ
(
− log(e1/e2)β
√
pi
2
)
= Φ
(
log(e2/e1)β
√
pi
2
)
.
Hence the expected payoff of agent i = 1, 2 is
Πi(e) = Φ
(
log(ei/ej)β
√
pi
2
)
u∗ − c(ei)
= Φ
(
log(ei/ej)β
√
pi
2
)
2γe∗β − γeβi .
Step 2. Suppose ej = e∗ and consider the choice of agent i 6= j. We immediately obtain
Πi(e∗, e∗) = 0. We will now show that Πi(ei, e∗) ≤ 0 always holds, i.e.,
Φ
(
log(ei/e∗)β
√
pi
2
)
≤ 12
(
ei
e∗
)β
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for all ei ∈ R+. After the change of variables x = log(ei/e∗)β
√
pi/2 this becomes the requirement
that
Φ(x) ≤ 12e
x
√
2/pi (D.3)
for all x ∈ R. Inequality (D.3) is satisfied for x = 0, where LHS and RHS both take a value of
1/2. Furthermore, the LHS function and the RHS function are tangent at x = 0, because their
derivatives are both equal to 1/
√
2pi at this point. It then follows immediately that inequality
(D.3) is also satisfied for all x > 0, because the LHS is strictly concave in x in this range, while
the RHS is strictly convex. We now consider the remaining case where x < 0. We use the fact
that Φ(x) = erfc(−x/√2)/2, where
erfc(y) = 2√
pi
∫ ∞
y
e−t
2
dt
is the complementary error function (see e.g. Chang et al., 2011). After the change of variables
y = −x/√2 we thus need to verify
erfc(y) ≤ e−2y/
√
pi (D.4)
for all y > 0. Inequality (D.4) is satisfied for y = 0, where LHS and RHS both take a value
of 1. Now observe that the derivative of the LHS with respect to y is given by −2e−y2/√pi,
while the derivative of the RHS is −2e−2y/
√
pi/
√
pi. The condition that the former is weakly
smaller than the latter can be rearranged to y ≤ 2/√pi, which implies that (D.4) is satisfied for
0 < y ≤ 2/√pi. For larger values of y, we can use a Chernoff bound for the complementary error
function. Theorem 1 in Chang et al. (2011) implies that
erfc(y) ≤ e−y2
for all y ≥ 0. The inequality e−y2 ≤ e−2y/
√
pi can be rearranged to y ≥ 2/√pi. This implies that
(D.4) is satisfied also for y > 2/
√
pi, which completes the proof. 
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